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Security of Quantum Key Distribution Against All Collective Attacks

Ran Gelles, Technion Iit

Published Jan 1, 2005• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Quantum theory introduced us with new methods of keys exchange. The security of those methods, has been investigated in the last few years, reaching several different results. In this paper we shall review one of the security proofs against a specific (though quite general) attack named the collective attack. This seminar is

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Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables the generation of secure keys between two distant users. Security proof of QKD against general coherent attacks is challenging, while the one against collective attacks is much easier. As an effective and general solution, the postselection method tries to extend security analyses of collective attacks to be against coherent attacks. However, it gives a bad performance. To overcome this drawback, instead of directly calculating key rate by postselection method, we propose a method correlating the failure probabilities of phase error estimation against collective and coherent attacks, enabling the use of the independent and identically distributed assumption in parameter estimation against coherent attacks. Then the key rate can be obtained by uncertainty relation of entropy. Our method can be applied to various QKD protocols, providing better performance compared with the traditional postselection method. For instance, we give the finite-key analyses of the side-channel-secure (SCS) QKD and the no-phase-postselection (NPP) twin-field (TF) QKD to show their performance improvements with the proposed method.
Secure and efficient communication between two parties always incents scholars for further research. Creation of such a means of communication yields commercial benefits for our society. With the creation of a quantum computer, some classical protocols used for secure communication is no longer secure. Quantum key distribution is created to solve this problem. Although a quantum key distribution protocol is in theory guaranteed to be secure, there has been ways to breach its security in real life application. Since the creation of the first quantum key distribution protocol, there has been a rival between the defending and attacking side of quantum key distribution. In this paper, we first seek to discuss the basics of the first quantum key distribution protocol. Secondly, we discuss about the attacks against that protocol and the modifications made to the protocol in response to these attacks. Currently, researchers have permanently closed one side of the implementation loophole that could give rise to potential means of hacking of the protocol.
Quantum Key Distribution is one of the most mature quantum protocols. This technological advancement comes with a need for new security proofs that work with realistic devices and perform well in the finite-size regime, where the users exchange a large but finite set of messages. In recent years, we have seen a new generation of proof techniques utilizing ideas from convex optimization or information theory. In this talk, I will present these new ideas and review some challenges and opportunities for the future work.
Evaluating the theoretical limit of the amount of information Eve can steal from a quantum key distribution protocol under given conditions is one of the most important things that need to be done in security proof. In addition to source loopholes and detection loopholes, channel attacks are considered to be the main ways of information leakage, while collective attacks are considered to be the most powerful active channel attacks. Here we deduce in detail the capability limit of Eve's collective attack in non-entangled quantum key distribution, like BB84 and measurement-device-independent protocols, and entangled quantum key distribution, like device-independent protocol, in which collective attack is composed of quantum weak measurement and quantum unambiguous state discrimination detection. The theoretical results show that collective attacks are equivalent in entangled and non-entangled quantum key distribution protocols. We also find that compared with the security proof based on entanglement purification, the security proof based on collective attack not only improves the system's tolerable bit error rate, but also improves the key rate.