Reconciliation based key exchange schemes using lattices: a review

Susanne Rieß

Sonam Yadav

The Ding Reconciliation Scheme is dissected in detail in this study. A recently proposed method within the lattice-based cryptography framework. The study delves into the mathematical foundations and principles of the scheme, its role in secure key exchange, and its in-depth examination of the key exchange protocol that leverages it. It discusses theoretical security guarantees, vulnerabilities, and mitigation strategies. The paper also provides insights into the practical implementation of the scheme, highlighting its computational efficiency and performance evaluations. It also conducts a comparative analysis with other prominent lattice-based key exchange protocols to assess its strengths and weaknesses, highlighting potential advantages and areas for further research. The paper serves as a reference for researchers, cryptographers, and practitioners interested in the Ding Reconciliation Scheme and its applications in lattice-based cryptography, contributing to the ongoing dialogue in the field and promoting advancements in secure communication solutions.

Parhat Abla

Group key exchange schemes allow group members to agree on a session key. Although there are many works on constructing group key exchange schemes, but most of them are based on algebraic problems which can be solved by quantum algorithms in polynomial time. Even if several works considered lattice based group key exchange schemes, believed to be post-quantum secure, but only in the random oracle model. In this work, we propose a group key exchange scheme based on ring learning with errors problem. On contrast to existing schemes, our scheme is proved to be secure in the standard model. To achieve this, we define and instantiate multi-party key reconciliation mechanism. Furthermore, using known compiler with lattice based signature schemes, we can achieve authenticated group key exchange with postquantum security.

Shanbiao Wang, Yan Zhu, Di Ma +1 more

Xiaopeng Yang, Wenping Ma, Zhang Cheng-li

Using the hard assumption of Ring-Decision Learning With Errors (DLWE) in the lattice, we propose a new authenticated key exchange (AKE) scheme which is based on Peikert’s reconciliation technique. Under the CK+ model, the proposed scheme is provably secure. Compared with the traditional Diffie-Hellman (DH) authenticated key exchange (AKE) schemes, the proposed scheme not only has better efficiency and stronger security but also resists quantum attacks because of the hard assumption on lattice problem. The comparisons between Ring-LWE based ones shows that the proposed scheme protects the shared session key with balanced key derivation function (KDF) compared with those current AKE schemes from LWE.

Zilong Wang, Honggang Hu