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International Journal of Theoretical Physics

Verifiable Quantum Key Exchange with Authentication

Runhua Shi, Bai Liu, Mingwu Zhang

Published Jan 1, 2021• 10 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s10773-020-04681-0

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Password authentication is a prevalent method of user verification across the Internet, and its use extends to scenarios where resources are limited. However, current password authentication protocols primarily rely on traditional password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols (e.g., SRP, OPAQUE), which are vulnerable to attacks by quantum adversaries. To date, no efficient quantum algorithm has been found to solve the common challenges in lattice-based cryptography. Therefore, quantum-resistant PAKE protocols are generally built upon lattice-based cryptography. In this work, we propose a threshold verifiable oblivious pseudorandom function () protocol based on secret sharing. We then integrate it into a PAKE protocol and present an instantiation of a quantum-safe threshold PAKE protocol () based on the Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) assumption. This integration gives our PAKE protocol resistance to precomputation attacks, similar to OPAQUE. Furthermore, by incorporating thresholding techniques into the PAKE protocol, we mitigate the risk of single points of failure on the server side. Our protocol not only preserves the security guarantees of traditional PAKE schemes but also resists attacks from quantum adversaries. We also provide a comprehensive security analysis and evaluation of, providing valuable insights for its practical implementation.