Starting from logical structures of classical and quantum mechanics we reconstruct the logic of so-called no-signaling theories, where the correlations among subsystems of a composite system are restricted only by a simplest form of causality forbidding an instantaneous communication. Although such theories are, as it seems, irrelevant for the description of physical reality, they are helpful in understanding the relevance of quantum mechanics. The logical structure of each theory has an epistemological flavor, as it is based on analysis of possible results of experiments. In this note we emphasize that not only logical structures of classical, quantum and no-signaling theory may be treated on the same ground but it is also possible to give to all of them a common ontological basis by constructing a “phase space” in all cases. In non-classical cases the phase space is not a set, as in classical theory, but a more general object obtained by means of category theory, but conceptually it plays the same role as the phase space in classical physics.
We analyze the structure of the so called non-signaling theories respecting relativistic causality but allowing correlations violating bounds imposed by quantum mechanics such as CHSH inequality. We discuss relations among such theories, quantum mechanics, and classical physics. In particular we reconstruct the probability theory adequate for the simplest instance of a non-signaling theory, the two non-signaling boxes world, and exhibit its differences in comparison with classical and quantum probabilities. We show that the question whether such a theory can be treated as a kind of "generalization" of the quantum theory of the two-qubit system cannot be answered positively. Some of its features put it closer to the quantum world, for example measurements must be destructive, on the other hand the Heisenberg uncertainty relations are not satisfied. Another interesting property contrasting it from quantum mechanics is that the subset of "classically correlated states," i.e.\ the states with only classical correlations, does not reproduce the classical world of two two-state systems. Our results establish a new link between quantum information theory and the well-developed theory of quantum logics and can shed new light on the problem why quantum mechanics is distinguished among non-signaling theories.
We analyze the structure of the so called non-signaling theories respecting relativistic causality but allowing correlations violating bounds imposed by quantum mechanics such as CHSH inequality. We discuss relations among such theories, quantum mechanics, and classical physics. In particular we reconstruct the probability theory adequate for the simplest instance of a non-signaling theory, the two non-signaling boxes world, and exhibit its differences in comparison with classical and quantum probabilities. We show that the question whether such a theory can be treated as a kind of "generalization" of the quantum theory of the two-qubit system cannot be answered positively. Some of its features put it closer to the quantum world, for example measurements must be destructive, on the other hand the Heisenberg uncertainty relations are not satisfied. Another interesting property contrasting it from quantum mechanics is that the subset of "classically correlated states," i.e.\ the states with only classical correlations, does not reproduce the classical world of two two-state systems. Our results establish a new link between quantum information theory and the well-developed theory of quantum logics and can shed new light on the problem why quantum mechanics is distinguished among non-signaling theories.
The aim of this paper is to relate algebraic quantum mechanics to topos theory, so as to construct new foundations for quantum logic and quantum spaces. Motivated by Bohr’s idea that the empirical content of quantum physics is accessible only through classical physics, we show how a noncommutative C*-algebra of observables A induces a topos
T(A) in which the amalgamation of all of its commutative subalgebras comprises a single commutative C*-algebra
A . According to the constructive Gelfand duality theorem of Banaschewski and Mulvey, the latter has an internal spectrum
Σ(A) in
T(A) , which in our approach plays the role of the quantum phase space of the system. Thus we associate a locale (which is the topos-theoretical notion of a space and which intrinsically carries the intuitionistic logical structure of a Heyting algebra) to a C*-algebra (which is the noncommutative notion of a space). In this setting, states on A become probability measures (more precisely, valuations) on
Σ , and self-adjoint elements of A define continuous functions (more precisely, locale maps) from
Σ to Scott’s interval domain. Noting that open subsets of
Σ(A) correspond to propositions about the system, the pairing map that assigns a (generalized) truth value to a state and a proposition assumes an extremely simple categorical form. Formulated in this way, the quantum theory defined by A is essentially turned into a classical theory, internal to the topos
T(A) .These results were inspired by the topos-theoretic approach to quantum physics proposed by Butterfield and Isham, as recently generalized by Döring and Isham.
The aim of this paper is to relate algebraic quantum mechanics to topos theory, so as to construct new foundations for quantum logic and quantum spaces. Motivated by Bohr’s idea that the empirical content of quantum physics is accessible only through classical physics, we show how a C*-algebra of observables A induces a topos T (A) in which the amalgamation of all of its commutative subalgebras comprises a single commutative C*-algebra A. According to the constructive Gelfand duality theorem of Banaschewski and Mulvey, the latter has an internal spectrum Σ(A) in T (A), which in our approach plays the role of a quantum phase space of the system. Thus we associate a locale (which is the topos-theoretical notion of a space and which intrinsically carries the intuitionistic logical structure of a Heyting algebra) to a C*-algebra (which is the noncommutative notion of a space). In this setting, states on A become probability
This paper deals with the foundations of quantum mechanics. We start by outlining the characterisation, due to Birkhoff and Von Neumann, of the logical structures of the theories of classical physics and quantum mechanics, as boolean and modular lattices respectively. We then derive these descriptions from what we claim are basic properties of any physical theory - i.e. the notion that a quantity in such a theory may be analysed into parts and that the results of this analysis may be treated in languages with an underlying boolean structure. We shall see that in the course of constructing a model of a theory with these properties different indistinguishable possibilities will arise for how the elements of the model may be named, that is to say different possibilities arise for how they can be associated with points from Set. Taking a particular collection of possibilities gives the usual boolean lattice of the propositions of classical physics. Taking all possibilities - in a sense, the set of all things that may be described by physical theories - gives the lattice of quantum mechanical propositions. This gives an interpretation of quantum mechanics as the complete set of such possible descriptions, the complete physical description of the world.
In my dissertation I analyze the structure of fundamental physical theories. I start with an analysis of what an adequate primitive ontology is, discussing the measurement problem in quantum mechanics and theirs solutions. It is commonly said that these theories have little in common. I argue instead that the moral of the measurement problem is that the wave function cannot represent physical objects and a common structure between these solutions can be recognized: each of them is about a clear three-dimensional primitive ontology that evolves according to a law determined by the wave function. The primitive ontology is what matter is made of while the wave function tells the matter how to move. One might think that what is important in the notion of primitive ontology is their three-dimensionality. If so, in a theory like classical electrodynamics electromagnetic fields would be part of the primitive ontology. I argue that, reflecting on what the purpose of a fundamental physical theory is, namely to explain the behavior of objects in three--dimensional space, one can recognize that a fundamental physical theory has a particular architecture. If so, electromagnetic fields play a different role in the theory than the particles and therefore should be considered, like the wave function, as part of the law.Therefore, we can characterize the general structure of a fundamental physical theory as a mathematical structure grounded on a primitive ontology. I explore this idea to better understand theories like classical mechanics and relativity, emphasizing that primitive ontology is crucial in the process of building new theories, being fundamental in identifying the symmetries. Finally, I analyze what it means to explain the word around us in terms of the notion of primitive ontology in the case of regularities of statistical character. Here is where the notion of typicality comes into play: we have explained a phenomenon if the typical histories of the primitive ontology give rise to the statistical regularities we observe.