Quantum contextuality and its ontological meaning are very controversial issues, and they relate to other problems concerning the foundations of quantum theory. I address this controversy and stress the fact that contextuality is a universal topological property of quantum processes, which conflicts with the basic metaphysical assumption of the definiteness of being. I discuss the consequences of this fact and argue that generic quantum potentiality as a real physical indefiniteness has nothing in common with the classical notions of possibility and counterfactuality, and that also it reverses, in a way, the classical mirror-like relation between actuality and definite possibility.
Quantum contextuality and its ontological meaning are very controversial issues, and they relate to other problems concerning the foundations of quantum theory. I address this controversy and stress the fact that contextuality is a universal topological property of quantum processes, which conflicts with the basic metaphysical assumption of the definiteness of being. I discuss the consequences of this fact and argue that generic quantum potentiality as a real physical indefiniteness has nothing in common with the classical notions of possibility and counterfactuality, and that also it reverses, in a way, the classical mirror-like relation between actuality and definite possibility.
Since being defined by Kochen and Specker, and separately by Bell, contextuality has been proposed as one of the key phenomena that distinguishing quantum theory from classical theories. However, with the rise of quantum information contextuality's position as the leading definition of the quantum/classical boundary has been called into question. This is due to the fact that a contextual explanation is required by subtheories that offer no exponential quantum computational advantage over classical computation. In this thesis, submitted in requirement for a PhD in physics with quantum information, we shall explore this unwanted contextuality, and show that generalized contextuality is more prevalent than was previously thought. \n \nFirst we will show that the single-qubit stabilizer subtheory, which was previously thought of as a non-contextual subtheory, requires a generalized contextual ontological model, when transformations are included in the operational description. In addition to this we show that the even smaller single-rebit stabilizer subtheory, a strict subtheory of the single-qubit stabilizer subtheory, must also admit a generalized contextual ontological model, again when transformations are included in the operational description. We then show that both these subtheories require negatively represented quasi-probability representations, re-establishing the link between contextuality and negativity for transformations. We also investigate the representation of transformations in generic quasi-probability representations, showing that under a reasonable assumption almost-all unitaries must be negatively represented by a finite quasi-probability representation. \n \nSecond we will investigate the efficiently simulable n-qubit stabilizer subtheory, which exhibits all forms of contextuality and thus represents the main obstacle to identifying contextuality as a resource for quantum computation. To this end we present an attempt at constructing a model based on a frame-switching Wigner function. This leads us to constructing a contextual ψ-epistemic ontological model of the n-qubit stabilizer formalism. We shall see that this model is outcome deterministic, which is one of the core assumptions in the definition of traditional non-contextuality. This model then will lead us to a result that proves that any ontological model of the n-qubit stabilizer formalism requires at least n-1 generators to be encoded in the ontology of the model. As n-1 generators represents almost full knowledge about the stabilizer state, we therefore posit that ψ-onicity, a more controversial notion of non-classicality, is actually the resource for quantum computation.
Abstract Metaphysicians should pay attention to quantum mechanics, but not because it provides definitive answers to many metaphysical questions. The theory itself is remarkably silent on the nature of the physical world, and the various interpretations of the theory on offer present conflicting ontological pictures. Rather, quantum mechanics is essential to the metaphysician because it reshapes standard metaphysical debates and opens up unforeseen new metaphysical possibilities. Even if quantum mechanics provides few clear answers, there are good reasons to think that any adequate understanding of the quantum world will result in a radical reshaping of our classical worldview in some way or other. Whatever the world is like at the atomic scale, it is almost certainly not the swarm of particles pushed around by forces that is often presupposed. This book guides readers through the theory of quantum mechanics and its implications for metaphysics in a clear and accessible way. The theory and its various interpretations are presented with a minimum of technicality. The consequences of these interpretations for metaphysical debates concerning realism, indeterminacy, causation, determinism, holism, and individuality (among other topics) are explored in detail, stressing the novel form that the debates take given the empirical facts in the quantum domain. While quantum mechanics may not deliver unconditional pronouncements on these issues, the range of possibilities consistent with our knowledge of the empirical world is relatively small—and each possibility is metaphysically revisionary in some way.
This doctoral dissertation contains four main elements: \n \n1. We put forward an interpretational map of quantum mechanics in general and of the modal interpretation in particular based on metaphysical and anti-metaphysical stances. \n \n2. In contraposition to what we characterize as the anti-metaphysical and classical metaphysical \n \nstances we collect arguments in favor of a constructive metaphysical stance. \n \n3. We analyze the meaning of contextuality and possibility in quantum theory in general, and in the modal interpretation in particular. \n \n4. Finally, we end up with a proposal for the development of a possible constructive metaphysical scheme based on the notion of potentiality. \n \nAlthough some of these problems are well known in the literature we attempt to cast new light on the discussion through the analysis of the concepts involved and their relation to the formalism. We attempt to make explicit the tension in between the theoretical conditions and the conceptual structure of the theory, in order to discuss and disclose the metaphysical ideas involved within the different interpretational problems of quantum mechanics. We believe that this analysis can help us to understand much of the implicit background of such theoretical conditions. \n \nThe dissertation centers itself on the modal and contextual character of quantum mechanics. On the one hand, we discuss the contextual character of quantum possibility through the development of a Modal Kochen-Specker theorem, and on the other hand, we analyze the contextual character of quantum correlations through the distinction of properties. In the last part we discuss some more speculative ideas related to the possible metaphysical developments of quantum mechanics based on the notion of potentiality.
Quantum mechanics has maintained over the years the reputation of being "the most obscure theory." It works perfectly well, but nobody seems to know why. It has been argued that the difficulty in understanding quantum theory is our failed attempt to force onto it a wrong conceptual scheme, wanting at all costs to think about the objects of the theory as, precisely, objects, i.e., entities having continuously actual spatiotemporal properties. This too restrictive spatiotemporal scheme is most probably at the heart of the problem, as also underlined by the Einsteinian revolution, but then what could be an alternative? Many thinkers have suggested that we must surrender to the fact that our physical world is one of immanent powers and potencies. Aristotle did so ante quantum litteram, followed by scholars like Heisenberg, Primas, Shimony, Piron, Kastner, Kauffman, de Ronde, just to name a few, including the authors, who were both students of Piron in Geneva. However, if on the one hand a potentiality ontology puts the accent on the processes of change, responsible for the incessant shifts between actual and potential properties, on the other hand it does not tell what these changes are all about. In other words, the metaphysical question remains of identifying the nature of the bearer of these potencies, or potentialities, and of the entities that can actualize them. It is the purpose of the present article to emphasize that the above question has found a possible answer in the recent Conceptuality Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, which we believe offers the missing ontology and metaphysics that can make the theory fully intelligible, and even intuitive.
Recent research on quantum contextuality has been strongly centered on device-independent frameworks, such as the many graph approaches to contextuality and the celebrated sheaf-theoretical approach. Contextuality is described in these frameworks as a property of data only, making it possible to characterize and quantify the phenomena regardless of the reasons why it occurs. In this paper we look beyond the data and focus on possible explanations for this experimental fact. We show that a classical system generating contextual data can easily be found if the following conditions are satisfied (1) We only have access to a specific collection of epistemic measurements (which, all things considered, is basically Bohr's view on quantum measurements) and (2) There is a limitation on which of these measurements can be jointly performed. The way we see it, this example indicates that contextuality may be a consequence of the type of measurement taken into account, instead of an intrinsic feature of the system upon which these measurements are performed; if this is correct, the widespread idea that quantum contextuality is a non-classical feature can be avoided.
In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. We will argue that there exists a general confusion within the foundational literature arising from the improper of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. While the first one, introduced by Bohr, is related to an interpretation of which stresses the incompatibility (or complementarity) of certain measurement situations described in classical terms; the second meaning of is related to a purely formal understanding of as exposed by the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem which focuses instead on the constraints of the orthodox quantum formalism in order to interpret projection operators as preexistent or actual (definite valued) properties. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an omelette of contextuality which has been fully widespread through a popularized epistemic explanation of the KS theorem according to which: The measurement outcome of the observable A when measured together with B or together with C will necessarily differ in case [A, B] = [A, C] = 0, and [B, C] /= 0. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling and formal perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. Finally, we analyze the consequences of such widespread reading of KS theorem as related to statistical statements of measurement outcomes.