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An Assumption in the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Huw Price

Published Nov 1, 1978• 1 citation
OpenAlex

Abstract

'In the ontological models framework [Harrigan & Spekkens 2007], it is assumed that the probability measure representing a quantum state is independent of the choice of future measurement setting.' (Leifer 2014, 140) In this recently-unearthed piece I discuss a version of the above assumption, concluding that it is 'very difficult to justify on metaphysical grounds'. I note that abandoning it has an interesting potential payoff, given its crucial role in the no-go theorems of Bell and of Kochen & Specker. There has been increased interest in this option in recent years, under the label of retrocausal models of QM (see, e.g., Price & Wharton 2015, Wharton & Argaman 2020). The present piece may be of interest to diligent historians of this approach. It was written in 1978, while I was a graduate student in Cambridge.

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This note contains some initial work on attempting to bring recent developments in the foundations of quantum mechanics concerning the nature of the wavefunction within the scope of more logical and structural methods. A first step involves generalising and reformulating a criterion for the reality of the wavefunction proposed by Harrigan & Spekkens, which was central to the PBR theorem. The resulting criterion has several advantages, including the avoidance of certain technical difficulties relating to sets of measure zero. By considering the 'reality' not of the wavefunction but of the observable properties of any ontological physical theory a novel characterisation of non-locality and contextuality is found. Secondly, a careful analysis of preparation independence, one of the key assumptions of the PBR theorem, leads to an analogy with Bell locality, and thence to a proposal to weaken it to an assumption of `no-preparation-signalling' in analogy with no-signalling. This amounts to introducing non-local correlations in the joint ontic state, which is, at least, consistent with the Bell and Kochen-Specker theorems. The question of whether the PBR result can be strengthened to hold under this relaxed assumption is therefore posed.

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But this conclusion [nonlocality] needs careful discussion in order to clarify what is going on . (Redhead 1987, p. 3) Within the foundations of physics in recent years, Bell's theorem has played the role of what Thomas Kuhn calls a ‘paradigm’: that is, an exemplary piece of work that others learn from, imitate and develop. Following a period of articulation and consolidation, the first generation of developments of the Bell theorem was initiated by Heywood and Redhead (1983). They produced a nonlocality result in the algebraic style of the Bell–Kochen–Specker theorem (Bell 1966; Kochen and Specker 1967), moving away from the probabilistic relations characteristic of the Bell theorems proper. More recently a second generation develops results by Peres (1990), Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger (1990), and Hardy (1993). In addition to moving away from probabilities, this generation tries to dispense with the limiting inequalities of the Bell theorem to yield socalled ‘Bell theorems without inequalities’. With respect to probabilities, however, Hardy is a half-way house. It requires no inequalities but the result contradicts quantum mechanics under certain locality assumptions only if the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics hold in at least one case. I want to examine the Hardy theorem and its interpretation. Initially, I intend to ignore respects in which it dispenses with probabilities because I want to point out the interesting significance of the theorem in a probabilistic context. We will see that when probabilities are restored, so are inequalities. Then we will see what the theorem has to contribute on the topic of locality.

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The presence of contextuality in quantum theory was first highlighted by Bell, Kochen and Specker, who discovered that for quantum systems of three or more dimensions, measurements could not be viewed as deterministically revealing pre-existing properties of the system. More precisely, no model can assign deterministic outcomes to the projectors of a quantum measurement in a way that depends only on the projector and not the context (the full set of projectors) in which it appeared, despite the fact that the Born rule probabilities associated with projectors are independent of the context. A more general, operational definition of contextuality introduced by Spekkens, which we will term 'probabilistic contextuality', drops the assumption of determinism and allows for operations other than measurements to be considered contextual. Even two-dimensional quantum mechanics can be shown to be contextual under this generalised notion. Probabilistic noncontextuality represents the postulate that elements of an operational theory that cannot be distinguished from each other based on the statistics of arbitrarily many repeated experiments (they give rise to the same operational probabilities) are ontologically identical. In this paper, we introduce a framework that enables us to distinguish between different noncontextuality assumptions in terms of the relationships between the ontological representations of objects in the theory given a certain relation between their operational representations. This framework can be used to motivate and define a 'possibilistic' analogue, encapsulating the idea that elements of an operational theory that cannot be unambiguously distinguished operationally can also not be unambiguously distinguished ontologically. We then prove that possibilistic noncontextuality is equivalent to an alternative notion of noncontextuality proposed by Hardy. Finally, we demonstrate that these weaker noncontextuality assumptions are sufficient to prove alternative versions of known 'no-go' theorems that constrain ψ -epistemic models for quantum mechanics.

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On the Applicability of the Probability Concept to Quantum Theory

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Springer eBooks•Jan 1, 1976•8 citations
'In the ontological models framework [Harrigan & Spekkens 2007], it is assumed that the probability measure representing a quantum state is independent of the choice of future measurement setting.' (Leifer 2014, 140) In this recently-unearthed piece I discuss a version of the above assumption, concluding that it is 'very difficult to justify on metaphysical grounds'. I note that abandoning it has an interesting potential payoff, given its crucial role in the no-go theorems of Bell and of Kochen & Specker. There has been increased interest in this option in recent years, under the label of retrocausal models of QM (see, e.g., Price & Wharton 2015, Wharton & Argaman 2020). The present piece may be of interest to diligent historians of this approach. It was written in 1978, while I was a graduate student in Cambridge.
This note contains some initial work on attempting to bring recent developments in the foundations of quantum mechanics concerning the nature of the wavefunction within the scope of more logical and structural methods. A first step involves generalising and reformulating a criterion for the reality of the wavefunction proposed by Harrigan & Spekkens, which was central to the PBR theorem. The resulting criterion has several advantages, including the avoidance of certain technical difficulties relating to sets of measure zero. By considering the 'reality' not of the wavefunction but of the observable properties of any ontological physical theory a novel characterisation of non-locality and contextuality is found. Secondly, a careful analysis of preparation independence, one of the key assumptions of the PBR theorem, leads to an analogy with Bell locality, and thence to a proposal to weaken it to an assumption of `no-preparation-signalling' in analogy with no-signalling. This amounts to introducing non-local correlations in the joint ontic state, which is, at least, consistent with the Bell and Kochen-Specker theorems. The question of whether the PBR result can be strengthened to hold under this relaxed assumption is therefore posed.
But this conclusion [nonlocality] needs careful discussion in order to clarify what is going on . (Redhead 1987, p. 3) Within the foundations of physics in recent years, Bell's theorem has played the role of what Thomas Kuhn calls a ‘paradigm’: that is, an exemplary piece of work that others learn from, imitate and develop. Following a period of articulation and consolidation, the first generation of developments of the Bell theorem was initiated by Heywood and Redhead (1983). They produced a nonlocality result in the algebraic style of the Bell–Kochen–Specker theorem (Bell 1966; Kochen and Specker 1967), moving away from the probabilistic relations characteristic of the Bell theorems proper. More recently a second generation develops results by Peres (1990), Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger (1990), and Hardy (1993). In addition to moving away from probabilities, this generation tries to dispense with the limiting inequalities of the Bell theorem to yield socalled ‘Bell theorems without inequalities’. With respect to probabilities, however, Hardy is a half-way house. It requires no inequalities but the result contradicts quantum mechanics under certain locality assumptions only if the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics hold in at least one case. I want to examine the Hardy theorem and its interpretation. Initially, I intend to ignore respects in which it dispenses with probabilities because I want to point out the interesting significance of the theorem in a probabilistic context. We will see that when probabilities are restored, so are inequalities. Then we will see what the theorem has to contribute on the topic of locality.
The presence of contextuality in quantum theory was first highlighted by Bell, Kochen and Specker, who discovered that for quantum systems of three or more dimensions, measurements could not be viewed as deterministically revealing pre-existing properties of the system. More precisely, no model can assign deterministic outcomes to the projectors of a quantum measurement in a way that depends only on the projector and not the context (the full set of projectors) in which it appeared, despite the fact that the Born rule probabilities associated with projectors are independent of the context. A more general, operational definition of contextuality introduced by Spekkens, which we will term 'probabilistic contextuality', drops the assumption of determinism and allows for operations other than measurements to be considered contextual. Even two-dimensional quantum mechanics can be shown to be contextual under this generalised notion. Probabilistic noncontextuality represents the postulate that elements of an operational theory that cannot be distinguished from each other based on the statistics of arbitrarily many repeated experiments (they give rise to the same operational probabilities) are ontologically identical. In this paper, we introduce a framework that enables us to distinguish between different noncontextuality assumptions in terms of the relationships between the ontological representations of objects in the theory given a certain relation between their operational representations. This framework can be used to motivate and define a 'possibilistic' analogue, encapsulating the idea that elements of an operational theory that cannot be unambiguously distinguished operationally can also not be unambiguously distinguished ontologically. We then prove that possibilistic noncontextuality is equivalent to an alternative notion of noncontextuality proposed by Hardy. Finally, we demonstrate that these weaker noncontextuality assumptions are sufficient to prove alternative versions of known 'no-go' theorems that constrain ψ -epistemic models for quantum mechanics.