We introduce a simple, practical approach with probabilistic information-theoretic security to solve one of quantum key distribution’s major security weaknesses: the requirement of an authenticated classical channel to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. Our scheme uses classical secret sharing techniques and partially trusted intermediaries and provides arbitrarily high confidence in the security of the protocol. Our protocol has the drawback that users are unable to detect some types of failures, although they can take preemptive measures to make the probability of failure arbitrarily small. Increased security is achieved with modest increases in resource costs. 1
We introduce a simple, practical approach with probabilistic information-theoretic security to solve one of quantum key distribution’s major security weaknesses: the requirement of an authenticated classical channel to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. Our scheme uses classical secret sharing techniques and partially trusted intermediaries and provides arbitrarily high confidence in the security of the protocol. Our protocol has the drawback that users are unable to detect some types of failures, although they can take preemptive measures to make the probability of failure arbitrarily small. Increased security is achieved with modest increases in resource costs. 1
We introduce a simple, practical approach with probabilistic information-theoretic security to solve one of quantum key distribution's major security weaknesses: the requirement of an authenticated classical channel to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. Our scheme employs classical secret sharing and partially trusted intermediaries to provide arbitrarily high confidence in the security of the protocol. Although certain failures elude detection, we discuss preemptive strategies to reduce the probability of failure to an arbitrarily small level: probability of such failures is exponentially suppressed with increases in connectivity (i.e., connections per node).
The paper addresses entity authentication in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems as a decisive condition of their practical security. It is shown that the information-theoretic security of quantum key agreement does not eliminate the need to authenticate the communicating parties: an unauthenticated classical channel leaves the system exposed to the man-in-the-middle attack, since the eavesdropper can run independent QKD instances with each party and reconcile two keys under full control. Existing authentication methods are analysed and classified by the underlying cryptographic primitive: symmetric schemes based on Wegman–Carter universal hashing, pre-shared and fixed keys, public-key infrastructure, two-way authentication, quantum entity/identity authentication, and zero-knowledge proofs. For each class the operating principle, advantages and limitations are determined, with emphasis on key management, scalability and trust distribution. It is established that symmetric and quantum-layer methods rely on pre-shared secrets with a quadratic growth of key material, public-key infrastructure introduces a single trust bottleneck and quantum-vulnerable primitives, while existing zero-knowledge authentication schemes are quantum and bound to the physical layer or solve network properties other than identity. A comparative analysis reveals an unresolved scientific gap: the absence of a scalable entity-authentication method that simultaneously provides non-disclosure of the secret, quantum resistance, sub-quadratic scalability and minimisation of trust assumptions. On this basis, a prospective research direction is substantiated – the construction of entity-authentication methods based on post-quantum zero-knowledge proofs operating over the classical control plane of scalable QKD networks. The requirements for such a method are formulated, and its compatibility with formal QKD security proofs is discussed.
The security of quantum cryptography relies on the foundations of quantum mechanics, in contrast to traditional public key cryptography which relies on the computational difficulty of certain mathematical functions, and cannot provide any indication of eavesdropping or guarantee of key security. The proposal present in this work develops a quantum key distribution model to safeguard security in large networks, in the directions of classical cryptography and quantum cryptography. Two three-party Quantum key distribution are used in this model, one with implicit user authentication and the other with explicit mutual authentication, are proposed to demonstrate the merits of the new combination. The performance of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems have notably progressed since the early experimental demonstrations. The current evolutions in QKD research indicate that the pace of this progression is very likely to be maintained, if not increased, in the future years. In parallel to these improvements of QKD techniques, commercial products are also being developed, making QKD deployment a feasible alternative for securing real data networks. Deployment of a real QKD network is however far from being straightforward. It requires development of a network architecture connecting multiple users that may possibly be very far away from each other. Considering the fact that the existing QKD links are only point-to-point, and intrinsically limited in distance, deployment of a practical QKD network structure is a nontrivial problem. The proposed work describes the proposed architecture for a QKD network specify the requirements relevant to the network design, protocols, and services. The objective of this specification is to define the major components and their main features The proposal provides security against such attacks as man-in-the-middle, eavesdropping and replay. It also improves the efficiency of the quantum key distribution which contains the fewest number of communication rounds among existing Quantum key distributions. In this model two parties can share and use a long-term secret (repeatedly). To prove the security of the proposed schemes, this proposed model provides a primitive called the Unbiased-Chosen Basis (UCB) assumption with the quantum key in angular positions.
In the existing study of third party authentication, for message transformation has less security against attacks such as man-in-the-middle, efficiency and so on. In this approach, we at hand give a Quantum Key Distribution Protocol (QKDP) to safeguard the security in larger networks, which uses the combination of merits of classical cryptography and quantum cryptography. Two three-party QKDPs, one implemented with implicit user authentication and the other with explicit mutual authentication, which include the following: 1. Security against such attacks as the man-in-themiddle, eavesdropping and replay. 2. Efficiency is improved as the proposed protocols contain the fewest number of communication rounds among the existing QKDPs. 3. Two parties can share and use a long-term secret (repeatedly). To prove the security of the proposed schemes, this work also presents a new primitive called the Unbiased-Chosen Basis (UCB) assumption.
Quantum key distribution protocols allow two honest distant parties to establish a common truly random secret key in the presence of powerful adversaries, provided that the two users share a short secret key beforehand. This pre-shared secret key is used mainly for authentication purposes in the post-processing of classical data that have been obtained during the quantum communication stage, and it prevents a man-in-the-middle attack. The necessity of a pre-shared key is usually considered to be the main drawback of quantum key distribution protocols, and it becomes even stronger for large networks involving more than two users. Here, we discuss the conditions under which physical unclonable functions can be integrated in currently available quantum key distribution systems in order to facilitate the generation and the distribution of the necessary pre-shared key with the smallest possible cost in the security of the systems. Moreover, the integration of physical unclonable functions in quantum key distribution networks allows for real-time authentication of the devices that are connected to the network.
Quantum key distribution protocols allow two honest distant parties to establish a common truly random secret key in the presence of powerful adversaries, provided that the two users share a short secret key beforehand. This pre-shared secret key is used mainly for authentication purposes in the post-processing of classical data that have been obtained during the quantum communication stage, and it prevents a man-in-the-middle attack. The necessity of a pre-shared key is usually considered to be the main drawback of quantum key distribution protocols, and it becomes even stronger for large networks involving more than two users. Here, we discuss the conditions under which physical unclonable functions can be integrated in currently available quantum key distribution systems in order to facilitate the generation and the distribution of the necessary pre-shared key with the smallest possible cost in the security of the systems. Moreover, the integration of physical unclonable functions in quantum key distribution networks allows for real-time authentication of the devices that are connected to the network.