arXiv:0803.2717 · New Journal of Physics

Distributed authentication for randomly compromised networks

Travis Roland Beals, Kevin P Hynes, Barry C. Sanders

Published Aug 21, 2009• 3 citations

Abstract

We introduce a simple, practical approach with probabilistic information-theoretic security to solve one of quantum key distribution's major security weaknesses: the requirement of an authenticated classical channel to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. Our scheme employs classical secret sharing and partially trusted intermediaries to provide arbitrarily high confidence in the security of the protocol. Although certain failures elude detection, we discuss preemptive strategies to reduce the probability of failure to an arbitrarily small level: probability of such failures is exponentially suppressed with increases in connectivity (i.e., connections per node).

DOI: 10.1088/1367-2630/11/8/085005

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