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Bell’s theorem from Moore’s theorem

Chris Fields

Published Jan 1, 2012• 6 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

It is shown that the restrictions of what can be inferred from classically recorded observational outcomes that are imposed by the no-cloning theorem, the Kochen–Specker theorem and Bell's theorem also follow from restrictions on inferences from observations formulated within classical automata theory. Similarities between the assumptions underlying classical automata theory and those underlying universally unitary quantum theory are discussed.

Related papers

Bell's theorem from Moore's theorem

Chris Fields

It is shown that the restrictions of what can be inferred from classically recorded observational outcomes that are imposed by the no-cloning theorem, the Kochen–Specker theorem and Bell's theorem also follow from restrictions on inferences from observations formulated within classical automata theory. Similarities between the assumptions underlying classical automata theory and those underlying universally unitary quantum theory are discussed.

arXiv:1201.3672•International Journal of General Systems•Dec 13, 2012•6 citations

Kochen-Specker Theorem and Games

Laura Mančinska

One of the statements one would hear pretty early in any quantum mechanics course is that for quantum particles there are properties which do not have definite values. For example, if we measure |+〉 in standard basis, the best we can do to describe the outcome is to say, that with probability 1/2 we will get 0 and with probability 1/2 we will get 1. Yet one could wonder, is this really the way things are or is it just because our description of this quantum particle is incomplete, but in fact there are some hidden variables inside every quantum system that contain enough information to tell the outcome of measurement (see Fig. 1). However, many people disdain the idea of hidden variables, so there has been rather long history of theorems that forbid theories involving hidden variables. Usually if one wants to prove some no hidden variables theorem he has to assume something about the hidden variables theories he is going to forbid. One of such assumptions is non-contextuality, which means that the outcome we get after measuring with an observable is the same regardless of what other observables we choose to measure at the same time. The first theorem forbidding hidden variables theories is due to von Neumann in 1932. Then for a third of a century everyone cited von Neumann’s work carelessly, till Bell in 1966 indicated that there was an unreasonable assumption in von Neumann’s proof and urged for further examination of the problem (see [6] and [1] for more historical details). Bell also constructed a hidden variables model for one qubit that could assign the outcome of any observable in a way consistent with quantum mechanics. He also proved two theorems that forbid non-contextual hidden variables theories using counterexamples with larger quantum systems. Yet surprisingly he himself thought that hidden variables do exists and considered these theorems only as characterizations of the hidden variables theory we should look for. In this essay we will discuss several versions of one of the two Bell’s theorems. The theorem we will consider was also independently proven by Kochen and Specker in 1967 (see [5]), hence it is called Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem. For shortness and in order not to mix this theorem with another Bell’s theorem from now on we will refer to it as Kochen-Specker theorem. We will be interested in proving several versions of this theorem and the following lemma will turn out to be of great use:

•Jan 1, 2007•0 citations

Classical simulators of quantum computers and no-go theorems

Alexander Yu. Vlasov

It is discussed, why classical simulators of quantum computers escape from some no-go claims like Kochen-Specker, Bell, or recent Conway-Kochen "Free Will" theorems.

arXiv:quant-ph/0605219•May 25, 2006•1 citation

An Epistemological Criticism to the Bell–Kochen–Specker Theorem

Claudio Garola, Luigi Accardi, Guillaume Adenier +5 more

The Bell–Kochen–Specker theorem is criticized from an epistemological point of view, showing that its proofs rest on an implicit epistemological assumption which does not fit in with the operational and antimetaphysical attitude of orthodox quantum mechanics.

AIP conference proceedings•Jan 1, 2009•6 citations

Hidden-Variable Theories

Reinhold A. Bertlmann, Nicolai Friis

Abstract In chapter 12 we give an overview of the historical development of hidden-variable theories aiming to attribute ‘hidden’ definite outcomes to any potential measurement on a quantum system. We start with a discussion of von Neumann’s assumption on hidden-variable models, which was later realized not to hold by Hermann, Kochen, Specker, and Bell, going into detail on Bell’s refutation of von Neumann’s arguments. We then turn to the notion of contextuality, which severely restricts hidden-variable models: we discuss Gleason’s theorem before stating and proving the famous Kochen-Specker theorem, as well as the simpler versions of Peres’ nonet and Mermin’s pentagram. These results show that quantum mechanics is not compatible with the assignment of definite measurement outcomes to all possible measurements, and such assignments can hence only be made once a restricted set of observables, a context, is selected

•Sep 7, 2023•0 citations

A simple proof of the Kochen-Specker theorem on the problem of hidden variables

Norbert Straumann

In this talk I present a simple derivation of an old result of Kochen and Specker, which is apparently unrelated to the famous work of Bell on hidden variables, but is presumably equally important. Kochen and Specker showed in 1967 that quantum mechanics cannot be embedded into a classical stochastic theory, provided the quantum theoretical probability distributions are reproduced and one additional highly desirable property is satisfied. This showed in a striking manner what were the difficulties in implementing the Einstein programme of a `complete' version of quantum mechanics.

arXiv:0801.4931•Annalen der Physik•Dec 14, 2009•4 citations
It is shown that the restrictions of what can be inferred from classically recorded observational outcomes that are imposed by the no-cloning theorem, the Kochen–Specker theorem and Bell's theorem also follow from restrictions on inferences from observations formulated within classical automata theory. Similarities between the assumptions underlying classical automata theory and those underlying universally unitary quantum theory are discussed.
One of the statements one would hear pretty early in any quantum mechanics course is that for quantum particles there are properties which do not have definite values. For example, if we measure |+〉 in standard basis, the best we can do to describe the outcome is to say, that with probability 1/2 we will get 0 and with probability 1/2 we will get 1. Yet one could wonder, is this really the way things are or is it just because our description of this quantum particle is incomplete, but in fact there are some hidden variables inside every quantum system that contain enough information to tell the outcome of measurement (see Fig. 1). However, many people disdain the idea of hidden variables, so there has been rather long history of theorems that forbid theories involving hidden variables. Usually if one wants to prove some no hidden variables theorem he has to assume something about the hidden variables theories he is going to forbid. One of such assumptions is non-contextuality, which means that the outcome we get after measuring with an observable is the same regardless of what other observables we choose to measure at the same time. The first theorem forbidding hidden variables theories is due to von Neumann in 1932. Then for a third of a century everyone cited von Neumann’s work carelessly, till Bell in 1966 indicated that there was an unreasonable assumption in von Neumann’s proof and urged for further examination of the problem (see [6] and [1] for more historical details). Bell also constructed a hidden variables model for one qubit that could assign the outcome of any observable in a way consistent with quantum mechanics. He also proved two theorems that forbid non-contextual hidden variables theories using counterexamples with larger quantum systems. Yet surprisingly he himself thought that hidden variables do exists and considered these theorems only as characterizations of the hidden variables theory we should look for. In this essay we will discuss several versions of one of the two Bell’s theorems. The theorem we will consider was also independently proven by Kochen and Specker in 1967 (see [5]), hence it is called Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem. For shortness and in order not to mix this theorem with another Bell’s theorem from now on we will refer to it as Kochen-Specker theorem. We will be interested in proving several versions of this theorem and the following lemma will turn out to be of great use:
Abstract In chapter 12 we give an overview of the historical development of hidden-variable theories aiming to attribute ‘hidden’ definite outcomes to any potential measurement on a quantum system. We start with a discussion of von Neumann’s assumption on hidden-variable models, which was later realized not to hold by Hermann, Kochen, Specker, and Bell, going into detail on Bell’s refutation of von Neumann’s arguments. We then turn to the notion of contextuality, which severely restricts hidden-variable models: we discuss Gleason’s theorem before stating and proving the famous Kochen-Specker theorem, as well as the simpler versions of Peres’ nonet and Mermin’s pentagram. These results show that quantum mechanics is not compatible with the assignment of definite measurement outcomes to all possible measurements, and such assignments can hence only be made once a restricted set of observables, a context, is selected
In this talk I present a simple derivation of an old result of Kochen and Specker, which is apparently unrelated to the famous work of Bell on hidden variables, but is presumably equally important. Kochen and Specker showed in 1967 that quantum mechanics cannot be embedded into a classical stochastic theory, provided the quantum theoretical probability distributions are reproduced and one additional highly desirable property is satisfied. This showed in a striking manner what were the difficulties in implementing the Einstein programme of a `complete' version of quantum mechanics.