It is discussed, why classical simulators of quantum computers escape from some no-go claims like Kochen-Specker, Bell, or recent Conway-Kochen "Free Will" theorems.
This thesis explores the exact differences between the two most well-known no-hidden variable theories: the Bell theorem and the Kochen-Specker theorem. Furthermore, it tries to place a newer result called `the free will theorem', as developed by John Conway and Simon Kochen, in this context. To compare the Bell and Kochen-Specker theorems a reformulation of the two theorems by David Mermin will be discussed, which turns out to lead to an even stronger no-hidden variable theory. From the discussion of the free will theorem and the critical reactions it has elicited, it will become clear that the free will theorem is actually very similar to this stronger no-hidden variable theory.
The interpretation of quantum mechanics has been a problem since its founding days. A large contribution to the discussion of possible interpretations of quantum mechanics is given by the so-called impossibility proofs for hidden variable models; models that allow a realist interpretation. In this thesis some of these proofs are discussed, like von Neumann's Theorem, the Kochen-Specker Theorem and the Bell-inequalities. Some more recent developments are also investigated, like Meyer's nullification of the Kochen-Specker Theorem, the MKC-models and Conway and Kochen's Free Will Theorem. This last one is taken to suggest that the problems that arise for certain interpretations of quantum mechanics are not limited to realist interpretations only, but also affect certain instrumentalist interpretations. It is argued that one may arrive at a more satisfying interpretation of quantum mechanics if one adopts a logic that seems more compatible with the instrumentalist viewpoint namely, intuitionistic logic. The motivations for adopting this form of logic rather than classical logic or quantum logic are linked to some of the philosophical ideas of Bohr. In particular a new interpretation of Bohr's notion of complementarity is proposed. Finally some possibilities are explored for linking the intuitionistic interpretation of quantum mechanics to the mathematical formalism of the theory.