Which theories lead to a contradiction between simple reasoning principles and modelling observers' memories as physical systems? Frauchiger and Renner have shown that this is the case for quantum theory (Frauchiger and Renner 2018 Nat. Commun. 9 3711). Here we generalize the conditions of the Frauchiger–Renner result so that they can be applied to arbitrary physical theories, and in particular to those expressed as generalized probabilistic theories (GPTs) (Hardy 2001 arXiv:quant-ph/0101012; Barrett 2007 Phys. Rev. A 75 032304). We then apply them to a particular GPT, box world, and find a deterministic contradiction in the case where agents may share a PR box (Popescu and Rohrlich 1994 Found. Phys. 24 379–85), which is stronger than the quantum paradox, in that it does not rely on post-selection. Obtaining an inconsistency for the framework of GPTs broadens the landscape of theories which are affected by the application of classical rules of reasoning to physical agents. In addition, we model how observers' memories may evolve in box world, in a way consistent with Barrett's criteria for allowed operations (Barrett 2007 Phys. Rev. A 75 032304; Gross et al 2010 Phys. Rev. Lett. 104 080402).
Which theories lead to a contradiction between simple reasoning principles and modelling observers' memories as physical systems? Frauchiger and Renner have shown that this is the case for quantum theory (Frauchiger and Renner 2018 Nat. Commun. 9 3711). Here we generalize the conditions of the Frauchiger–Renner result so that they can be applied to arbitrary physical theories, and in particular to those expressed as generalized probabilistic theories (GPTs) (Hardy 2001 arXiv:quant-ph/0101012; Barrett 2007 Phys. Rev. A 75 032304). We then apply them to a particular GPT, box world, and find a deterministic contradiction in the case where agents may share a PR box (Popescu and Rohrlich 1994 Found. Phys. 24 379–85), which is stronger than the quantum paradox, in that it does not rely on post-selection. Obtaining an inconsistency for the framework of GPTs broadens the landscape of theories which are affected by the application of classical rules of reasoning to physical agents. In addition, we model how observers' memories may evolve in box world, in a way consistent with Barrett's criteria for allowed operations (Barrett 2007 Phys. Rev. A 75 032304; Gross et al 2010 Phys. Rev. Lett. 104 080402).
Which theories lead to a contradiction between simple reasoning principles and modelling observers’ memories as physical systems? Frauchiger and Renner have shown that this is the case for quantum theory (Frauchiger and Renner 2018 Nat. Commun. 9 3711). Here we generalize the conditions of the Frauchiger–Renner result so that they can be applied to arbitrary physical theories, and in particular to those expressed as generalized probabilistic theories (GPTs) (Hardy 2001 arXiv: quant-ph/0101012 ; Barrett 2007 Phys. Rev. A 75 032304). We then apply them to a particular GPT, box world, and find a deterministic contradiction in the case where agents may share a PR box (Popescu and Rohrlich 1994 Found. Phys. 24 379–85), which is stronger than the quantum paradox, in that it does not rely on post-selection. Obtaining an inconsistency for the framework of GPTs broadens the landscape of theories which are affected by the application of classical rules of reasoning to physical agents. In addition, we model how observers’ memories may evolve in box world, in a way consistent with Barrett’s criteria for allowed operations (Barrett 2007 Phys. Rev. A 75 032304; Gross et al 2010 Phys. Rev. Lett. 104 080402). Ordinary readers, forgive my paradoxes: one must make them when one reflects; and whatever you may say, I prefer being a man with paradoxes than a man with prejudices. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education
This thesis reports progress in the analysis of causality and multi-agent logical paradoxes in quantum and post-quantum theories. These research areas are highly relevant for the foundations of physics as well as the development of quantum technologies. In the first part, focussing on causality, we develop techniques for using generalised entropies to analyse distinctions between classical and non-classical causal structures. We derive new properties of Tsallis entropies of systems that follow from the relevant causal structure, and apply these to obtain new necessary constraints for classicality in the Triangle causal structure. Supplementing the method with the post-selection technique, we provide evidence that Shannon and Tsallis entropic constraints are insufficient for detecting non-classicality in Bell scenarios with non-binary outcomes. This points to the need for better methods of characterising correlations in non-classical causal structures. Further, we investigate the relationships between causality and space-time by developing a framework for modelling cyclic and fine-tuned influences in non-classical theories. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for such causal models to be compatible with a space-time structure and for ruling out operationally detectable causal loops. In particular, this provides an operational framework for analysing post-quantum theories admitting jamming non-local correlations. In the second part, we investigate multi-agent logical paradoxes such as the Frauchiger-Renner paradox and develop a framework for analysing such paradoxes in arbitrary physical theories. Applying this to box world, a post-quantum theory, we derive a stronger paradox that does not rely on post-selection. Our results reveal that reversible evolution of agents' memories is not necessary for deriving multi-agent paradoxes, and that certain forms of contextuality might be.
Causality and logic are both fundamental to our understanding of the universe, but our intuitions about these are challenged by quantum phenomena. This thesis reports progress in the analysis of causality and multi-agent logical paradoxes in quantum and post-quantum theories. Both these research areas are highly relevant for the development of quantum technologies such as quantum cryptography and computing. \n \nPart I of this thesis focuses on causality. Firstly, we develop techniques for using generalised entropies \nto analyse distinctions between classical and non-classical causal structures. We derive new properties of classical and quantum Tsallis entropies of systems that follow from the relevant causal structure, and apply these to obtain new necessary constraints for classicality in the Triangle causal structure. Supplementing the method with the post-selection technique, we provide evidence that Shannon and Tsallis entropic constraints are insufficient for detecting non-classicality in Bell scenarios with non-binary outcomes. This points to the need for better methods of characterising correlations in non-classical causal structures. Secondly, we investigate the relationships between causality and space-time by developing a framework for modelling cyclic and fine-tuned influences in non-classical theories. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for such causal models to be compatible with a space-time structure and for ruling out operationally detectable causal loops. In particular, this provides an operational framework for analysing post-quantum theories admitting jamming non-local correlations. \n \nIn Part II of this thesis, we investigate multi-agent logical paradoxes, of which the quantum Frauchiger-Renner paradox has been the only example. We develop a framework for analysing such paradoxes in arbitrary physical theories. Applying this to box world, a post-quantum theory, we derive a stronger paradox that does not rely on post-selection. Our results reveal that reversible, unitary evolution of agents' memories is not necessary for deriving multi-agent logical paradoxes, rather that certain forms of contextuality could be.
Abstract Information is physical(Landauer 1961IBM J. Res. Dev.5183–91), and for a physical theory to be universal, it should model observers as physical systems, with concrete memories where they store the information acquired through experiments and reasoning. Here we address these issues in Spekkens’ toy theory (Spekkens 2005Phys. Rev.A71052108), a non-contextual epistemically restricted model that partially mimics the behaviour of quantum mechanics. We propose a way to model physical implementations of agents, memories, measurements, conditional actions and information processing. We find that the actions of toy agents are severely limited: although there are non-orthogonal states in the theory, there is no way for physical agents to consciously prepare them. Their memories are also constrained: agents cannot forget in which of two arbitrary states a system is. Finally, we formalize the process of making inferences about other agents’ experiments and model multi-agent experiments like Wigner’s friend. Unlike quantum theory (Nurgalieva and del Rio Lidia 2019Electron. Proc. Theor. Comput. Sci.287267–97; Fraseret al2020 Fitch’s knowability axioms are incompatible with quantum theory arXiv: 2009.00321 ; Frauchiger and Renner 2018Nat. Commun.93711; Nurgalieva and Renner 2021Contemp. Phys.611–24; Brukner 2018Entropy20350) or box world (Vilasiniet al2019New J. Phys.21113028), in toy theory there are no inconsistencies when physical agents reason about each other’s knowledge.
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the Frauchiger–Renner paradox (2018), a significant thought experiment that demonstrates a logical contradiction arising when standard quantum mechanics is applied to nested observers. Building on Wigner’s friend scenario, it examines the formal setup, derives the contradiction from assumptions of universality, the Born rule, and self-consistency in multi-agent reasoning, and evaluates proposed resolutions across major interpretations of quantum mechanics (Copenhagen, Everettian/many-worlds, relational, QBism, decoherent histories, and objective collapse theories). The work explores historical context, epistemological implications for observation, objectivity, and intersubjectivity, as well as recent experimental probes and theoretical refinements. It argues that the paradox reveals deep tensions in applying quantum theory to complex, self-referential scenarios involving observers (2026).
How can we consistently model the knowledge of the natural world provided by physical theories? Philosophers frequently use epistemic logic to model reasoning and knowledge abstractly, and to formally study the ramifications of epistemic assumptions. One famous example is Fitch's paradox, which begins with minimal knowledge axioms and derives the counter-intuitive result that agent knows every true statement. Accounting for knowledge that arises from physical theories complicates matters further. For example, quantum mechanics allows observers to model other agents as quantum systems themselves, and to make predictions about measurements performed on each others' memories. Moreover, complex thought experiments in which agents' memories are modelled as quantum systems show that multi-agent reasoning chains can yield paradoxical results.
Here, we bridge the gap between quantum paradoxes and foundational problems in epistemic logic, by relating the assumptions behind the recent Frauchiger-Renner quantum thought experiment and the axioms for knowledge used in Fitch's knowability paradox. Our results indicate that agents' knowledge of quantum systems must violate at least one of the following assumptions: it cannot be distributive over conjunction, have a kind of internal continuity, and yield a constructive interpretation all at once. Indeed, knowledge provided by quantum mechanics apparently contradicts traditional notions of how knowledge behaves; for instance, it may not be possible to universally assign objective truth values to claims about agent knowledge. We discuss the relations of this work to results in quantum contextuality and explore possible modifications to standard epistemic logic that could make it consistent with quantum theory.