Abstract Information is physical(Landauer 1961IBM J. Res. Dev.5183–91), and for a physical theory to be universal, it should model observers as physical systems, with concrete memories where they store the information acquired through experiments and reasoning. Here we address these issues in Spekkens’ toy theory (Spekkens 2005Phys. Rev.A71052108), a non-contextual epistemically restricted model that partially mimics the behaviour of quantum mechanics. We propose a way to model physical implementations of agents, memories, measurements, conditional actions and information processing. We find that the actions of toy agents are severely limited: although there are non-orthogonal states in the theory, there is no way for physical agents to consciously prepare them. Their memories are also constrained: agents cannot forget in which of two arbitrary states a system is. Finally, we formalize the process of making inferences about other agents’ experiments and model multi-agent experiments like Wigner’s friend. Unlike quantum theory (Nurgalieva and del Rio Lidia 2019Electron. Proc. Theor. Comput. Sci.287267–97; Fraseret al2020 Fitch’s knowability axioms are incompatible with quantum theory arXiv: 2009.00321 ; Frauchiger and Renner 2018Nat. Commun.93711; Nurgalieva and Renner 2021Contemp. Phys.611–24; Brukner 2018Entropy20350) or box world (Vilasiniet al2019New J. Phys.21113028), in toy theory there are no inconsistencies when physical agents reason about each other’s knowledge.
Abstract Information is physical(Landauer 1961IBM J. Res. Dev.5183–91), and for a physical theory to be universal, it should model observers as physical systems, with concrete memories where they store the information acquired through experiments and reasoning. Here we address these issues in Spekkens’ toy theory (Spekkens 2005Phys. Rev.A71052108), a non-contextual epistemically restricted model that partially mimics the behaviour of quantum mechanics. We propose a way to model physical implementations of agents, memories, measurements, conditional actions and information processing. We find that the actions of toy agents are severely limited: although there are non-orthogonal states in the theory, there is no way for physical agents to consciously prepare them. Their memories are also constrained: agents cannot forget in which of two arbitrary states a system is. Finally, we formalize the process of making inferences about other agents’ experiments and model multi-agent experiments like Wigner’s friend. Unlike quantum theory (Nurgalieva and del Rio Lidia 2019Electron. Proc. Theor. Comput. Sci.287267–97; Fraseret al2020 Fitch’s knowability axioms are incompatible with quantum theory arXiv: 2009.00321 ; Frauchiger and Renner 2018Nat. Commun.93711; Nurgalieva and Renner 2021Contemp. Phys.611–24; Brukner 2018Entropy20350) or box world (Vilasiniet al2019New J. Phys.21113028), in toy theory there are no inconsistencies when physical agents reason about each other’s knowledge.
How can we consistently model the knowledge of the natural world provided by physical theories? Philosophers frequently use epistemic logic to model reasoning and knowledge abstractly, and to formally study the ramifications of epistemic assumptions. One famous example is Fitch's paradox, which begins with minimal knowledge axioms and derives the counter-intuitive result that agent knows every true statement. Accounting for knowledge that arises from physical theories complicates matters further. For example, quantum mechanics allows observers to model other agents as quantum systems themselves, and to make predictions about measurements performed on each others' memories. Moreover, complex thought experiments in which agents' memories are modelled as quantum systems show that multi-agent reasoning chains can yield paradoxical results.
Here, we bridge the gap between quantum paradoxes and foundational problems in epistemic logic, by relating the assumptions behind the recent Frauchiger-Renner quantum thought experiment and the axioms for knowledge used in Fitch's knowability paradox. Our results indicate that agents' knowledge of quantum systems must violate at least one of the following assumptions: it cannot be distributive over conjunction, have a kind of internal continuity, and yield a constructive interpretation all at once. Indeed, knowledge provided by quantum mechanics apparently contradicts traditional notions of how knowledge behaves; for instance, it may not be possible to universally assign objective truth values to claims about agent knowledge. We discuss the relations of this work to results in quantum contextuality and explore possible modifications to standard epistemic logic that could make it consistent with quantum theory.
Which theories lead to a contradiction between simple reasoning principles and modelling observers' memories as physical systems? Frauchiger and Renner have shown that this is the case for quantum theory (Frauchiger and Renner 2018 Nat. Commun. 9 3711). Here we generalize the conditions of the Frauchiger–Renner result so that they can be applied to arbitrary physical theories, and in particular to those expressed as generalized probabilistic theories (GPTs) (Hardy 2001 arXiv:quant-ph/0101012; Barrett 2007 Phys. Rev. A 75 032304). We then apply them to a particular GPT, box world, and find a deterministic contradiction in the case where agents may share a PR box (Popescu and Rohrlich 1994 Found. Phys. 24 379–85), which is stronger than the quantum paradox, in that it does not rely on post-selection. Obtaining an inconsistency for the framework of GPTs broadens the landscape of theories which are affected by the application of classical rules of reasoning to physical agents. In addition, we model how observers' memories may evolve in box world, in a way consistent with Barrett's criteria for allowed operations (Barrett 2007 Phys. Rev. A 75 032304; Gross et al 2010 Phys. Rev. Lett. 104 080402).
Which theories lead to a contradiction between simple reasoning principles and modelling observers’ memories as physical systems? Frauchiger and Renner have shown that this is the case for quantum theory (Frauchiger and Renner 2018 Nat. Commun. 9 3711). Here we generalize the conditions of the Frauchiger–Renner result so that they can be applied to arbitrary physical theories, and in particular to those expressed as generalized probabilistic theories (GPTs) (Hardy 2001 arXiv: quant-ph/0101012 ; Barrett 2007 Phys. Rev. A 75 032304). We then apply them to a particular GPT, box world, and find a deterministic contradiction in the case where agents may share a PR box (Popescu and Rohrlich 1994 Found. Phys. 24 379–85), which is stronger than the quantum paradox, in that it does not rely on post-selection. Obtaining an inconsistency for the framework of GPTs broadens the landscape of theories which are affected by the application of classical rules of reasoning to physical agents. In addition, we model how observers’ memories may evolve in box world, in a way consistent with Barrett’s criteria for allowed operations (Barrett 2007 Phys. Rev. A 75 032304; Gross et al 2010 Phys. Rev. Lett. 104 080402). Ordinary readers, forgive my paradoxes: one must make them when one reflects; and whatever you may say, I prefer being a man with paradoxes than a man with prejudices. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education
Abstract Quantum theory has an epistemic horizon, i.e. exact values cannot be assigned simultaneously to incompatible physical quantities. As shown by Spekkens’ toy theory, positing an epistemic horizon akin to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in a classical mechanical setting also leads to a plethora of quantum phenomena. We introduce a deterministic theory—nomic toy theory—in which information gathering agents are explicitly modelled as physical systems. Our main result shows the presence of an epistemic horizon for such agents. They can only simultaneously learn the values of observables whose Poisson bracket vanishes. Therefore, nomic toy theory has incompatible measurements and the complete state of a physical system cannot be known. The best description of a system by an agent is via an epistemic state of Spekkens’ toy theory. Our result reconciles us to measurement uncertainty as an aspect of the inseparability of subjects and objects. Significantly, the claims follow even though nomic toy theory is essentially classical. This work invites further investigations of epistemic horizons, such as the one of (full) quantum theory.
In order to better understand a complex theory like quantum mechanics, it is sometimes useful to take a step back and create alternative theories, with more intuitive foundations, and examine which features of quantum mechanics can be reproduced by such a foil theory. A prominent example is Spekkens' toy theory, which is based off a simple premise: "What if we took a common classical theory and added the uncertainty principle as a postulate?" In other words, the theory imposes an epistemic restriction on our knowledge about a physical system: only half of the variables can ever be known to an observer. Like good science fiction, from this simple principle a rich behaviour emerges, most notoriously when we compose several systems. The toy theory emulates some aspects of quantum non-locality, although crucially it is still a non-contextual model. In this pedagogical review we consolidate different approaches to Spekkens' toy theory, including the stabilizer formalism and the generalization to arbitrary dimensions, completing them with new results where necessary. In particular, we introduce a general characterization of measurements, superpositions and entanglement in the toy theory.
Spekkens’ toy model is a non-contextual hidden variable model with an epistemic restriction, a constraint on what an observer can know about reality. The aim of the model, developed for continuous and discrete prime degrees of freedom, is to advocate the epistemic view of quantum theory, where quantum states are states of incomplete knowledge about a deeper underlying reality. Many aspects of quantum mechanics and protocols from quantum information can be reproduced in the model. In spite of its significance, a number of aspects of Spekkens’ model remained incomplete. Formal rules for the update of states after measurement had not been written down, and the theory had only been constructed for prime-dimensional and infinite dimensional systems. In this work, we remedy this, by deriving measurement update rules and extending the framework to derive models in all dimensions, both prime and non-prime. Stabiliser quantum mechanics (SQM) is a sub-theory of quantum mechanics with restricted states, transformations and measurements. First derived for the purpose of constructing error correcting codes, it now plays a role in many areas of quantum information theory. Previously, it had been shown that Spekkens’ model was operationally equivalent to SQM in the case of odd prime dimensions. Here, exploiting known results on Wigner functions, we extend this to show that Spekkens’ model is equivalent to SQM in all odd dimensions, prime and non-prime. This equivalence provides new technical tools for the study of technically difficult compound-dimensional SQM.