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Information and The Brukner-Zeilinger Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: A Critical Investigation

A. Shafiee, F. Safinejad, F. Naqsh

Published Jan 1, 2004• 9 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

In Brukner and Zeilinger's interpretation of quantum mechanics, information is introduced as the most fundamental notion and the finiteness of information is considered as an essential feature of quantum systems. They also define a new measure of information which is inherently different from the Shannon information and try to show that the latter is not useful in defining the information content in a quantum object. Here, we show that there are serious problems in their approach which make their efforts unsatisfactory. The finiteness of information does not explain how objective results appear in experiments and what an instantaneous change in the so-called information vector (or catalog of knowledge) really means during the measurement. On the other hand, Brukner and Zeilinger's measure of information is derived basically from a definition of variance for a binomial distribution. This quantifies the dispersion of methods for putting N constituents of a system into two different groups and illustrates, principally, the distinction between the frequency of occurrence and the probability of occurrence of an event. So, it does not qualify as a proper measure of information.

Related papers

On the Supposed Conceptual Inadequacy of the Shannon Information

Christopher G. Timpson

In Phys. Rev. A 63 022113 (2001), Brukner and Zeilinger claim that the Shannon information is not well defined as a measure of information in quantum mechanics, adducing arguments that seek to show that it is inextricably tied to classical notions of measurement. It is shown here that these arguments do not succeed: the Shannon information does not have problematic ties to classical concepts. In a further argument, Brukner and Zeilinger compare the Shannon information unfavourably to their preferred information measure, I(p), with regard to the definition of a notion of `total information content'. This argument is found unconvincing and the relationship betwen measures of information and notions of `total information content' investigated.

•Dec 30, 2001•8 citations

On the Brukner–Zeilinger approach to information in quantum measurements

Alexey E. Rastegin

We address the problem of properly quantifying information in quantum theory. Brukner and Zeilinger proposed the concept of an operationally invariant measure based on measurement statistics. Their measure of information is calculated with probabilities generated in a complete set of mutually complementary observations. This approach was later criticized for several reasons. We show that some critical points can be overcome by means of natural extension or reformulation of the Brukner–Zeilinger approach. In particular, this approach is connected with symmetric informationally complete measurements. The ‘total information’ of Brukner and Zeilinger can further be treated in the context of mutually unbiased measurements as well as general symmetric informationally complete measurements. The Brukner–Zeilinger measure of information is also examined in the case of detection inefficiencies. It is shown to be decreasing under the action of bistochastic maps. The Brukner–Zeilinger total information can be used for estimating the map norm of quantum operations.

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The Applicability of Shannon Information in Quantum Mechanics and Zeilinger's Foundational Principle

Christopher G. Timpson

Recently, Brukner and Zeilinger have presented a number of arguments suggesting that the Shannon information is not well defined as a measure of information in quantum mechanics. If established, this result would be highly significant, as the Shannon information is fundamental to the way we think about information not only in classical but also in quantum information theory. On consideration, however, these arguments are found unsuccessful; I go on to suggest how they might be arising as a consequence of Zeilinger's proposed foundational principle for quantum mechanics.

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The information interpretation of quantum mechanics

Karl Svozil

In the information interpretation of quantum mechanics, information is the most fundamental, basic entity. Every quantized system is associated with a definite discrete amount of information (cf. Zeilinger). This information content remains constant at all times and is permutated one-to-one throughout the system evolution. What is interpreted as measurement is a particular type of information transfer over a fictitious interface. The concept of a many-to-one state reduction is not a fundamental one but results from the practical impossibility to reconstruct the original state after the measurement.

arXiv:quant-ph/0006033•Jun 7, 2000•4 citations

Comment on "Conceptual Inadequacy of Shannon Information ..." by C. Brukner and A. Zeilinger

Michael J. W. Hall

It is pointed out that the case for Shannon entropy and von Neumann entropy, as measures of uncertainty in quantum mechanics, is not as bleak as suggested in quant-ph/0006087. The main argument of the latter is based on one particular interpretation of Shannon's H-function (related to consecutive measurements), and is shown explicitly to fail for other physical interpretations. Further, it is shown that Shannon and von Neumann entropies have in fact a common fundamental significance, connected to the existence of a unique geometric measure of uncertainty for classical and quantum ensembles. Some new properties of the ``total information'' measure proposed in quant-ph/0006087 are also given.

arXiv:quant-ph/0007116•Jul 31, 2000•8 citations

Realism and Antirealism in Informational Foundations of Quantum Theory

Tina Bilban

Zeilinger-Brukner's informational foundations of quantum theory, a theory based on Zeilinger's foundational principle for quantum mechanics that an elementary system carried one bit of information, explains seemingly unintuitive quantum behavior with simple theoretical framework. It is based on the notion that distinction between reality and information cannot be made, therefore they are the same. As the critics of informational foundations of quantum theory show, this antirealistic move captures the theory in tautology, where information only refers to itself, while the relationships outside the information with the help of which the nature of information would be defined are lost and the questions "Whose information? Information about what?" cannot be answered. The critic's solution is a return to realism, where the observer's effects on the information are neglected. We show that radical antirealism of informational foundations of quantum theory is not necessary and that the return to realism is not the only way forward. A comprehensive approach that exceeds mere realism and antirealism is also possible: we can consider both sources of the constraints on the information, those coming from the observer and those coming from the observed system/nature/reality. The information is always the observer's information about the observed. Such a comprehensive philosophical approach can still support the theoretical framework of informational foundations of quantum theory: If we take that one bit is the smallest amount of information in the form of which the observed reality can be grasped by the observer, we can say that an elementary system (grasped and defined as such by the observer) correlates to one bit of information. Our approach thus explains all the features of the quantum behavior explained by informational foundations of quantum theory: the wave function and its collapse, entanglement, complementarity and quantum randomness. However, it does so in a more comprehensive and intuitive way. The presented approach is close to Husserl's explanation of the relationship between reality and the knowledge we have about it, and to Bohr's personal explanation of quantum mechanics, the complexity of which has often been missed and simplified to mere antirealism. Our approach thus reconnects phenomenology with contemporary philosophy of science and introduces the comprehensive approach that exceeds mere realism and antirealism to the field of quantum theories with informational foundations, where such an approach has not been taken before. Quanta 2014; 3: 32–42.

Quanta•Aug 23, 2014•3 citations
In Brukner and Zeilinger's interpretation of quantum mechanics, information is introduced as the most fundamental notion and the finiteness of information is considered as an essential feature of quantum systems. They also define a new measure of information which is inherently different from the Shannon information and try to show that the latter is not useful in defining the information content in a quantum object. Here, we show that there are serious problems in their approach which make their efforts unsatisfactory. The finiteness of information does not explain how objective results appear in experiments and what an instantaneous change in the so-called information vector (or catalog of knowledge) really means during the measurement. On the other hand, Brukner and Zeilinger's measure of information is derived basically from a definition of variance for a binomial distribution. This quantifies the dispersion of methods for putting N constituents of a system into two different groups and illustrates, principally, the distinction between the frequency of occurrence and the probability of occurrence of an event. So, it does not qualify as a proper measure of information.
In Phys. Rev. A 63 022113 (2001), Brukner and Zeilinger claim that the Shannon information is not well defined as a measure of information in quantum mechanics, adducing arguments that seek to show that it is inextricably tied to classical notions of measurement. It is shown here that these arguments do not succeed: the Shannon information does not have problematic ties to classical concepts. In a further argument, Brukner and Zeilinger compare the Shannon information unfavourably to their preferred information measure, I(p), with regard to the definition of a notion of `total information content'. This argument is found unconvincing and the relationship betwen measures of information and notions of `total information content' investigated.
We address the problem of properly quantifying information in quantum theory. Brukner and Zeilinger proposed the concept of an operationally invariant measure based on measurement statistics. Their measure of information is calculated with probabilities generated in a complete set of mutually complementary observations. This approach was later criticized for several reasons. We show that some critical points can be overcome by means of natural extension or reformulation of the Brukner–Zeilinger approach. In particular, this approach is connected with symmetric informationally complete measurements. The ‘total information’ of Brukner and Zeilinger can further be treated in the context of mutually unbiased measurements as well as general symmetric informationally complete measurements. The Brukner–Zeilinger measure of information is also examined in the case of detection inefficiencies. It is shown to be decreasing under the action of bistochastic maps. The Brukner–Zeilinger total information can be used for estimating the map norm of quantum operations.
Recently, Brukner and Zeilinger have presented a number of arguments suggesting that the Shannon information is not well defined as a measure of information in quantum mechanics. If established, this result would be highly significant, as the Shannon information is fundamental to the way we think about information not only in classical but also in quantum information theory. On consideration, however, these arguments are found unsuccessful; I go on to suggest how they might be arising as a consequence of Zeilinger's proposed foundational principle for quantum mechanics.
In the information interpretation of quantum mechanics, information is the most fundamental, basic entity. Every quantized system is associated with a definite discrete amount of information (cf. Zeilinger). This information content remains constant at all times and is permutated one-to-one throughout the system evolution. What is interpreted as measurement is a particular type of information transfer over a fictitious interface. The concept of a many-to-one state reduction is not a fundamental one but results from the practical impossibility to reconstruct the original state after the measurement.
It is pointed out that the case for Shannon entropy and von Neumann entropy, as measures of uncertainty in quantum mechanics, is not as bleak as suggested in quant-ph/0006087. The main argument of the latter is based on one particular interpretation of Shannon's H-function (related to consecutive measurements), and is shown explicitly to fail for other physical interpretations. Further, it is shown that Shannon and von Neumann entropies have in fact a common fundamental significance, connected to the existence of a unique geometric measure of uncertainty for classical and quantum ensembles. Some new properties of the ``total information'' measure proposed in quant-ph/0006087 are also given.
Zeilinger-Brukner's informational foundations of quantum theory, a theory based on Zeilinger's foundational principle for quantum mechanics that an elementary system carried one bit of information, explains seemingly unintuitive quantum behavior with simple theoretical framework. It is based on the notion that distinction between reality and information cannot be made, therefore they are the same. As the critics of informational foundations of quantum theory show, this antirealistic move captures the theory in tautology, where information only refers to itself, while the relationships outside the information with the help of which the nature of information would be defined are lost and the questions "Whose information? Information about what?" cannot be answered. The critic's solution is a return to realism, where the observer's effects on the information are neglected. We show that radical antirealism of informational foundations of quantum theory is not necessary and that the return to realism is not the only way forward. A comprehensive approach that exceeds mere realism and antirealism is also possible: we can consider both sources of the constraints on the information, those coming from the observer and those coming from the observed system/nature/reality. The information is always the observer's information about the observed. Such a comprehensive philosophical approach can still support the theoretical framework of informational foundations of quantum theory: If we take that one bit is the smallest amount of information in the form of which the observed reality can be grasped by the observer, we can say that an elementary system (grasped and defined as such by the observer) correlates to one bit of information. Our approach thus explains all the features of the quantum behavior explained by informational foundations of quantum theory: the wave function and its collapse, entanglement, complementarity and quantum randomness. However, it does so in a more comprehensive and intuitive way. The presented approach is close to Husserl's explanation of the relationship between reality and the knowledge we have about it, and to Bohr's personal explanation of quantum mechanics, the complexity of which has often been missed and simplified to mere antirealism. Our approach thus reconnects phenomenology with contemporary philosophy of science and introduces the comprehensive approach that exceeds mere realism and antirealism to the field of quantum theories with informational foundations, where such an approach has not been taken before. Quanta 2014; 3: 32–42.