Spontaneous collapse models are proposed modifications to quantum mechanics which aim to solve the measurement problem. In this article, we will consider models which attempt to extend a specific spontaneous collapse model, the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber model (GRW), to be consistent with special relativity. We will present a condition that a relativistic GRW model must meet for three cases: for a single particle, for $N$ distinguishable particles, and for indistinguishable particles. We will then show that this relativistic condition implies that one can have a relativistic GRW model for a single particles or for distinguishable noninteracting, nonentangled particles but not otherwise.Spontaneous collapse models are proposed modifications to quantum mechanics which aim to solve the measurement problem. In this article, we will consider models which attempt to extend a specific spontaneous collapse model, the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber model (GRW), to be consistent with special relativity. We will present a condition that a relativistic GRW model must meet for three cases: for a single particle, for $N$ distinguishable particles, and for indistinguishable particles. We will then show that this relativistic condition implies that one can have a relativistic GRW model for a single particles or for distinguishable noninteracting, nonentangled particles but not otherwise.

arXiv:1907.02370Physical Review AApr 22, 202114 citations

A Response to G.B. Bagci’s "Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber Collapse Theory and Whiteheadian Process Philosophy"

William Michael Kallfelz

Abstract I examine G.B. Baga’s arguments for the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics as ideally suited for Whitehead’s philosophy. Much of Bagci’s claims are in response to Michael Epperson, who argues in the same vein in favor of decoherence accounts (Omnès; Zureck). Pace Epperson, I do not think that decoherence is the final arbiter here, and instead I contrast GRW with several other accounts addressing foundational problems of quantum theory (Finkehtein; Green; Peres and Temo; etc.), which aho account for relativistic covariance, while GRW does not. I argue that such latter research programs align themselves in a more convincing manner with Whitehead’s scheme, in epistemic as well as metaphysical senses, than GRW.Abstract I examine G.B. Baga’s arguments for the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics as ideally suited for Whitehead’s philosophy. Much of Bagci’s claims are in response to Michael Epperson, who argues in the same vein in favor of decoherence accounts (Omnès; Zureck). Pace Epperson, I do not think that decoherence is the final arbiter here, and instead I contrast GRW with several other accounts addressing foundational problems of quantum theory (Finkehtein; Green; Peres and Temo; etc.), which aho account for relativistic covariance, while GRW does not. I argue that such latter research programs align themselves in a more convincing manner with Whitehead’s scheme, in epistemic as well as metaphysical senses, than GRW.

Process StudiesJan 1, 20091 citation

The Sine-Gordon model revisited I

Giuliano Niccoli, Teschner, J.

Jan 1, 200940 citations

N

distinguishable particles, and for indistinguishable particles. We will then show that this relativistic condition implies that one can have a relativistic GRW model for a single particles or for distinguishable noninteracting, nonentangled particles but not otherwise.