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Process Studies

A Response to G.B. Bagci’s "Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber Collapse Theory and Whiteheadian Process Philosophy"

William Michael Kallfelz

Published Jan 1, 2009• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract I examine G.B. Baga’s arguments for the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics as ideally suited for Whitehead’s philosophy. Much of Bagci’s claims are in response to Michael Epperson, who argues in the same vein in favor of decoherence accounts (Omnès; Zureck). Pace Epperson, I do not think that decoherence is the final arbiter here, and instead I contrast GRW with several other accounts addressing foundational problems of quantum theory (Finkehtein; Green; Peres and Temo; etc.), which aho account for relativistic covariance, while GRW does not. I argue that such latter research programs align themselves in a more convincing manner with Whitehead’s scheme, in epistemic as well as metaphysical senses, than GRW.

DOI
10.2307/44798495

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arXiv:1307.0827•The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science•Dec 23, 2014•24 citations
Abstract I examine G.B. Baga’s arguments for the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics as ideally suited for Whitehead’s philosophy. Much of Bagci’s claims are in response to Michael Epperson, who argues in the same vein in favor of decoherence accounts (Omnès; Zureck). Pace Epperson, I do not think that decoherence is the final arbiter here, and instead I contrast GRW with several other accounts addressing foundational problems of quantum theory (Finkehtein; Green; Peres and Temo; etc.), which aho account for relativistic covariance, while GRW does not. I argue that such latter research programs align themselves in a more convincing manner with Whitehead’s scheme, in epistemic as well as metaphysical senses, than GRW.
Abstract There have been many attempts to undertand the connections between quantum theory and Whiteheadian process philosophy However, due to the ontological considerations, it is very important to specify which interpretation of quantum theory one embraces before inquiring into the details of Whitehead’s philosophy of organism. In this article, I argue that Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) collapse interpretation of quantum theory serves as a suitable point of departure for future endeavors. Comparisons with manyworlds interpretation and decoherence approach have also been provided.
Carrying out a research program outlined by John S. Bell in 1987, we arrive at a relativistic version of the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW) model of spon-taneous wavefunction collapse. The GRW model was proposed as a solution of the measurement problem of quantum mechanics and involves a stochastic and nonlinear modification of the Schrödinger equation. It deviates very little from the Schrödinger equation for microscopic systems but efficiently suppresses, for macroscopic systems, superpositions of macroscopically different states. As sug-gested by Bell, we take the primitive ontology, or local beables, of our model to be a discrete set of space-time points, at which the collapses are centered. This set is random with distribution determined by the initial wavefunction. Our model is nonlocal and violates Bell’s inequality though it does not make use of a preferred slicing of space-time or any other sort of synchronization of spacelike separated points. Like the GRW model, it reproduces the quantum probabilities in all cases presently testable, though it entails deviations from the quantum formalism that are in principle testable. Our model works in Minkowski space-time as well as in (well-behaved) curved background space-times. PACS numbers: 03.65.Ta; 03.65.Ud; 03.30.+p. Key words: spontaneous wave-function collapse; relativity; quantum theory without observers. 1
Ever since we have been in the possession of quantum theories without observers, such as Bohmian mechanics or the Ghirardi‐Rimini‐Weber (GRW) theory of spontaneous wave function collapse, a major challenge in the foundations of quantum mechanics is to devise a relativistic quantum theory without observers. One of the difficulties is to reconcile nonlocality with relativity. I report about recent progress in this direction based on the GRW model: A relativistic version of the model has been devised for the case of N noninteracting (but entangled) particles. A key ingredient was to focus not on the evolution of the wave function but rather on the evolution of the matter in space‐time as determined by the wave function.
The Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW) theory is a physical theory that, when combined with a suitable ontology, provides an explanation of quantum mechanics. The so-called collapse of the wave function is problematic in conventional quantum theory but not in the GRW theory, in which it is governed by a stochastic law. A possible ontology is the flash ontology, according to which matter consists of random points in space-time, called flashes. The joint distribution of these points, a point process in space-time, is the topic of this work. The mathematical results concern mainly the existence and uniqueness of this distribution for several variants of the theory. Particular attention is paid to the relativistic version of the GRW theory that was developed in 2004.
Among several possibilities for what reality could be like in view of the empirical facts of quantum mechanics, one is provided by theories of spontaneous wave function collapse, the best known of which is the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW) theory. We show mathematically that in GRW theory (and similar theories) there are limitations to knowledge, that is, inhabitants of a GRW universe cannot find out all the facts true of their universe. As a specific example, they cannot accurately measure the number of collapses that a given physical system undergoes during a given time interval; in fact, they cannot reliably measure whether one or zero collapses occur. Put differently, in a GRW universe certain meaningful, factual questions are empirically undecidable. We discuss several types of limitations to knowledge and compare them with those in other (no-collapse) versions of quantum mechanics, such as Bohmian mechanics. Most of our results also apply to observer-induced collapses as in orthodox quantum mechanics (as opposed to the spontaneous collapses of GRW theory). 1 Introduction 1.1 Known examples of limitations to knowledge 1.2 Remarks2 Brief Review of GRW Theories 2.1 The GRW process 2.2 GRWm 2.3 GRWf3 First Examples of Limitations to Knowledge in GRW Theories4 Measurements of Flashes in GRWf, or of Collapses in GRWm 4.1 An example in which ψ is known 4.2 Other choices of ψ 4.3 Experiments beginning before t 2 4.4 If ψ is random 4.5 Optimal way of distinguishing two density matrices 4.6 If ψ is unknown5 Measurements of m(x) in GRWmAppendix