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Process Studies

Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber Collapse Theory and Whiteheadian Process Philosophy

G. Baris Bagci

Published Jan 1, 2009• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract There have been many attempts to undertand the connections between quantum theory and Whiteheadian process philosophy However, due to the ontological considerations, it is very important to specify which interpretation of quantum theory one embraces before inquiring into the details of Whitehead’s philosophy of organism. In this article, I argue that Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) collapse interpretation of quantum theory serves as a suitable point of departure for future endeavors. Comparisons with manyworlds interpretation and decoherence approach have also been provided.

DOI
10.2307/44798494

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A Response to G.B. Bagci’s "Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber Collapse Theory and Whiteheadian Process Philosophy"

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Abstract I examine G.B. Baga’s arguments for the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics as ideally suited for Whitehead’s philosophy. Much of Bagci’s claims are in response to Michael Epperson, who argues in the same vein in favor of decoherence accounts (Omnès; Zureck). Pace Epperson, I do not think that decoherence is the final arbiter here, and instead I contrast GRW with several other accounts addressing foundational problems of quantum theory (Finkehtein; Green; Peres and Temo; etc.), which aho account for relativistic covariance, while GRW does not. I argue that such latter research programs align themselves in a more convincing manner with Whitehead’s scheme, in epistemic as well as metaphysical senses, than GRW.

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THE POINT PROCESSES OF THE GRW THEORY OF WAVE FUNCTION COLLAPSE

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The Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW) theory is a physical theory that, when combined with a suitable ontology, provides an explanation of quantum mechanics. The so-called collapse of the wave function is problematic in conventional quantum theory but not in the GRW theory, in which it is governed by a stochastic law. A possible ontology is the flash ontology, according to which matter consists of random points in space-time, called flashes. The joint distribution of these points, a point process in space-time, is the topic of this work. The mathematical results concern mainly the existence and uniqueness of this distribution for several variants of the theory. Particular attention is paid to the relativistic version of the GRW theory that was developed in 2004.

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Among several possibilities for what reality could be like in view of the empirical facts of quantum mechanics, one is provided by theories of spontaneous wave function collapse, the best known of which is the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW) theory. We show mathematically that in GRW theory (and similar theories) there are limitations to knowledge, that is, inhabitants of a GRW universe cannot find out all the facts true of their universe. As a specific example, they cannot accurately measure the number of collapses that a given physical system undergoes during a given time interval; in fact, they cannot reliably measure whether one or zero collapses occur. Put differently, in a GRW universe certain meaningful, factual questions are empirically undecidable. We discuss several types of limitations to knowledge and compare them with those in other (no-collapse) versions of quantum mechanics, such as Bohmian mechanics. Most of our results also apply to observer-induced collapses as in orthodox quantum mechanics (as opposed to the spontaneous collapses of GRW theory). 1 Introduction 1.1 Known examples of limitations to knowledge 1.2 Remarks2 Brief Review of GRW Theories 2.1 The GRW process 2.2 GRWm 2.3 GRWf3 First Examples of Limitations to Knowledge in GRW Theories4 Measurements of Flashes in GRWf, or of Collapses in GRWm 4.1 An example in which ψ is known 4.2 Other choices of ψ 4.3 Experiments beginning before t 2 4.4 If ψ is random 4.5 Optimal way of distinguishing two density matrices 4.6 If ψ is unknown5 Measurements of m(x) in GRWmAppendix

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Quantum Processes: A Whiteheadian Interpretation of Quantum Field Theory (review)

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Reviewed by: Quantum Processes: A Whiteheadian Interpretation of Quantum Field Theory Henry J. Folse Quantum Processes: A Whiteheadian Interpretation of Quantum Field Theory. Frank Hättich . Munster: Agenda Verlag, 2004. xiv + 280 pp. Euro 29.90, pbk.3-89688-204-x. Many philosophers and physicists—including the current reviewer—have argued that Whitehead's process philosophy provides a conceptual framework better suited for understanding the quantum theoretical account of the atomic domain than does the substance ontology that has dominated Western metaphysics. However, apart from calling attention to this issue, few (with the notable exceptions of Henry Stapp and Jorge Nobo) have attempted to do anything about it. Frank Hättich has now changed this situation by providing a sustained analysis of quantum field theory (QFT) in terms of Whitehead's ontological scheme. The result is interesting for two reasons: (1) by extending the match between Whitehead's specific metaphysical proposals and the mathematics of algebraic QFT to a level of detail never before attempted, Hättich greatly strengthens the hope that process ontology can help resolve quantum mysteries; and (2) in noting the points of noncompatibility between QFT and Whitehead's metaphysical conclusions, he suggests ways of revising Whitehead's pioneering effort to enhance the match between speculative ontological scheme and contemporary physical theory. Hättich's book is in three unequal parts: the first two are exegetical, and the third, constituting nearly half the book, is synthetic. Part I presents a "simplified version" of those parts of Whitehead's ontology pertinent to the interpretation of QFT to be presented, and Part II presents an algebraic formulation of [End Page 283] QFT susceptible to that interpretation. Although Part I is "self-contained" from the point of view of its intended application, it is unlikely that a reader wholly ignorant of Whitehead's process ontology would gain enough enlightenment to appreciate much of the author's argumentation; but it is equally unlikely that such a person would be reading this book. Part II presumes considerable mathematical sophistication and familiarity with the formalism of at least quantum mechanics and some knowledge of field theory. It is "introductory" only in the sense that it introduces the particular version of QFT, algebraic QFT (AQFT), to which process ontology is to be applied. Of course, both Whitehead's metaphysics and quantum theory have been subjected to many and various rival interpretations, and in selecting among them Hättich has clearly, and reasonably, been led by choices that maximize the connections he wishes to explore. It is misleading to see the goal here as developing yet another argument for why quantum theory must (or must not) be interpreted realistically. Rather, this investigation presupposes a realist interpretation and then gets to work constructing an ontological framework to show how this is possible, thereby suggesting that those who have argued that a realist interpretation of quantum theory is conceptually impossible have done so because they remain committed to ontological presuppositions moored in classical physics. In presenting the ontological framework for his project in Part III, Hättich accounts for the process of each occasion's creative concrescence from pure potentiality to determined actuality in terms of three Whiteheadian concepts: (1) the extensive continuum; (2) eternal objects; and (3) the underlying activity. Each one of these ontological elements is then matched up with an aspect of the mathematical formalism by which AQFT represents the quantum state of a region in spacetime. Hättich then shows that given these identifications, various consequences of the mathematical formalism imply that some of the ontological claims made by Whitehead are either inconsistent or incompatible with the presumption that AQFT gives us a true account of the world. Thus although the final conclusions of this investigation are critical of Whitehead's specific metaphysical conclusions, the extent of the applicability of his ontological categories to quantum mechanics and QFT provides persuasive grounds for hoping that future realist interpretations of quantum theory can learn much from process metaphysics. For this reason, Hättich is to be commended for keeping the project of process ontology alive by proposing specific reasons for revising Whiteheadian conclusions based on our best scientific theories of the microdomain, rather than arguing...

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We discuss the epistemological features of the Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber proposal to modify quantum mechanics in order to overcome the objectification problem, that means the transition between the quantum and the classical level of description of natural phenomena. We shall show that the GRW is a realistic theory, but in a way quite different from Einstein realism or other kinds of realism proposed in the past, such as the Many World Interpretation or the Bohmian Mechanics.

arXiv:2103.04805•Mar 8, 2021•0 citations

Collapse and Relativity

Roderich Tumulka

Ever since we have been in the possession of quantum theories without observers, such as Bohmian mechanics or the Ghirardi‐Rimini‐Weber (GRW) theory of spontaneous wave function collapse, a major challenge in the foundations of quantum mechanics is to devise a relativistic quantum theory without observers. One of the difficulties is to reconcile nonlocality with relativity. I report about recent progress in this direction based on the GRW model: A relativistic version of the model has been devised for the case of N noninteracting (but entangled) particles. A key ingredient was to focus not on the evolution of the wave function but rather on the evolution of the matter in space‐time as determined by the wave function.

arXiv:quant-ph/0602208•AIP conference proceedings•Jan 1, 2006•86 citations
Abstract There have been many attempts to undertand the connections between quantum theory and Whiteheadian process philosophy However, due to the ontological considerations, it is very important to specify which interpretation of quantum theory one embraces before inquiring into the details of Whitehead’s philosophy of organism. In this article, I argue that Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) collapse interpretation of quantum theory serves as a suitable point of departure for future endeavors. Comparisons with manyworlds interpretation and decoherence approach have also been provided.
Abstract I examine G.B. Baga’s arguments for the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics as ideally suited for Whitehead’s philosophy. Much of Bagci’s claims are in response to Michael Epperson, who argues in the same vein in favor of decoherence accounts (Omnès; Zureck). Pace Epperson, I do not think that decoherence is the final arbiter here, and instead I contrast GRW with several other accounts addressing foundational problems of quantum theory (Finkehtein; Green; Peres and Temo; etc.), which aho account for relativistic covariance, while GRW does not. I argue that such latter research programs align themselves in a more convincing manner with Whitehead’s scheme, in epistemic as well as metaphysical senses, than GRW.
The Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW) theory is a physical theory that, when combined with a suitable ontology, provides an explanation of quantum mechanics. The so-called collapse of the wave function is problematic in conventional quantum theory but not in the GRW theory, in which it is governed by a stochastic law. A possible ontology is the flash ontology, according to which matter consists of random points in space-time, called flashes. The joint distribution of these points, a point process in space-time, is the topic of this work. The mathematical results concern mainly the existence and uniqueness of this distribution for several variants of the theory. Particular attention is paid to the relativistic version of the GRW theory that was developed in 2004.
Among several possibilities for what reality could be like in view of the empirical facts of quantum mechanics, one is provided by theories of spontaneous wave function collapse, the best known of which is the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW) theory. We show mathematically that in GRW theory (and similar theories) there are limitations to knowledge, that is, inhabitants of a GRW universe cannot find out all the facts true of their universe. As a specific example, they cannot accurately measure the number of collapses that a given physical system undergoes during a given time interval; in fact, they cannot reliably measure whether one or zero collapses occur. Put differently, in a GRW universe certain meaningful, factual questions are empirically undecidable. We discuss several types of limitations to knowledge and compare them with those in other (no-collapse) versions of quantum mechanics, such as Bohmian mechanics. Most of our results also apply to observer-induced collapses as in orthodox quantum mechanics (as opposed to the spontaneous collapses of GRW theory). 1 Introduction 1.1 Known examples of limitations to knowledge 1.2 Remarks2 Brief Review of GRW Theories 2.1 The GRW process 2.2 GRWm 2.3 GRWf3 First Examples of Limitations to Knowledge in GRW Theories4 Measurements of Flashes in GRWf, or of Collapses in GRWm 4.1 An example in which ψ is known 4.2 Other choices of ψ 4.3 Experiments beginning before t 2 4.4 If ψ is random 4.5 Optimal way of distinguishing two density matrices 4.6 If ψ is unknown5 Measurements of m(x) in GRWmAppendix
Reviewed by: Quantum Processes: A Whiteheadian Interpretation of Quantum Field Theory Henry J. Folse Quantum Processes: A Whiteheadian Interpretation of Quantum Field Theory. Frank Hättich . Munster: Agenda Verlag, 2004. xiv + 280 pp. Euro 29.90, pbk.3-89688-204-x. Many philosophers and physicists—including the current reviewer—have argued that Whitehead's process philosophy provides a conceptual framework better suited for understanding the quantum theoretical account of the atomic domain than does the substance ontology that has dominated Western metaphysics. However, apart from calling attention to this issue, few (with the notable exceptions of Henry Stapp and Jorge Nobo) have attempted to do anything about it. Frank Hättich has now changed this situation by providing a sustained analysis of quantum field theory (QFT) in terms of Whitehead's ontological scheme. The result is interesting for two reasons: (1) by extending the match between Whitehead's specific metaphysical proposals and the mathematics of algebraic QFT to a level of detail never before attempted, Hättich greatly strengthens the hope that process ontology can help resolve quantum mysteries; and (2) in noting the points of noncompatibility between QFT and Whitehead's metaphysical conclusions, he suggests ways of revising Whitehead's pioneering effort to enhance the match between speculative ontological scheme and contemporary physical theory. Hättich's book is in three unequal parts: the first two are exegetical, and the third, constituting nearly half the book, is synthetic. Part I presents a "simplified version" of those parts of Whitehead's ontology pertinent to the interpretation of QFT to be presented, and Part II presents an algebraic formulation of [End Page 283] QFT susceptible to that interpretation. Although Part I is "self-contained" from the point of view of its intended application, it is unlikely that a reader wholly ignorant of Whitehead's process ontology would gain enough enlightenment to appreciate much of the author's argumentation; but it is equally unlikely that such a person would be reading this book. Part II presumes considerable mathematical sophistication and familiarity with the formalism of at least quantum mechanics and some knowledge of field theory. It is "introductory" only in the sense that it introduces the particular version of QFT, algebraic QFT (AQFT), to which process ontology is to be applied. Of course, both Whitehead's metaphysics and quantum theory have been subjected to many and various rival interpretations, and in selecting among them Hättich has clearly, and reasonably, been led by choices that maximize the connections he wishes to explore. It is misleading to see the goal here as developing yet another argument for why quantum theory must (or must not) be interpreted realistically. Rather, this investigation presupposes a realist interpretation and then gets to work constructing an ontological framework to show how this is possible, thereby suggesting that those who have argued that a realist interpretation of quantum theory is conceptually impossible have done so because they remain committed to ontological presuppositions moored in classical physics. In presenting the ontological framework for his project in Part III, Hättich accounts for the process of each occasion's creative concrescence from pure potentiality to determined actuality in terms of three Whiteheadian concepts: (1) the extensive continuum; (2) eternal objects; and (3) the underlying activity. Each one of these ontological elements is then matched up with an aspect of the mathematical formalism by which AQFT represents the quantum state of a region in spacetime. Hättich then shows that given these identifications, various consequences of the mathematical formalism imply that some of the ontological claims made by Whitehead are either inconsistent or incompatible with the presumption that AQFT gives us a true account of the world. Thus although the final conclusions of this investigation are critical of Whitehead's specific metaphysical conclusions, the extent of the applicability of his ontological categories to quantum mechanics and QFT provides persuasive grounds for hoping that future realist interpretations of quantum theory can learn much from process metaphysics. For this reason, Hättich is to be commended for keeping the project of process ontology alive by proposing specific reasons for revising Whiteheadian conclusions based on our best scientific theories of the microdomain, rather than arguing...
Ever since we have been in the possession of quantum theories without observers, such as Bohmian mechanics or the Ghirardi‐Rimini‐Weber (GRW) theory of spontaneous wave function collapse, a major challenge in the foundations of quantum mechanics is to devise a relativistic quantum theory without observers. One of the difficulties is to reconcile nonlocality with relativity. I report about recent progress in this direction based on the GRW model: A relativistic version of the model has been devised for the case of N noninteracting (but entangled) particles. A key ingredient was to focus not on the evolution of the wave function but rather on the evolution of the matter in space‐time as determined by the wave function.