Abstract There is a long tradition of preferring local theories to ones that posit lawful or causal influence at a spacetime distance. In this paper, we argue against this preference. We argue that nonlocality is scientifically unobjectionable and that nonlocal theories can be known. Scientists can gather evidence for them and confirm them in much the same way that they do for local theories. We think these observations point to a deeper constraint on scientific theorizing and experimentation: the (quasi‐) isolation of causal or lawful influence. We argue that this requirement ought to replace the locality desideratum in science. We then explore the possibility that the order of explanation has been reversed: perhaps it is isolatable influence that determines what counts as local in the first place.
Abstract There is a long tradition of preferring local theories to ones that posit lawful or causal influence at a spacetime distance. In this paper, we argue against this preference. We argue that nonlocality is scientifically unobjectionable and that nonlocal theories can be known. Scientists can gather evidence for them and confirm them in much the same way that they do for local theories. We think these observations point to a deeper constraint on scientific theorizing and experimentation: the (quasi‐) isolation of causal or lawful influence. We argue that this requirement ought to replace the locality desideratum in science. We then explore the possibility that the order of explanation has been reversed: perhaps it is isolatable influence that determines what counts as local in the first place.
In a recent note, Hance and Hossenfelder (arXiv:2211.01331) recall that "locally causal completions of quantum mechanics are possible, if they violate the assumption [called statistical independence or measurement independence] that the hidden variables do not in any way depend on measurement settings" and that, consequently, the experimental violations of Bell inequalities "show that maintaining local causality requires violating statistical independence". However, Hance and Hossenfelder also argue that "we should (...) look for independent experimental evidence that can distinguish the two different options: non-locality and statistical independence, or locality and violations of statistical independence" and that "the unwillingness to consider theories without statistical independence may be the reason we do not yet have a locally causal theory for the foundations of physics that is consistent with general relativity". Here, we recall that there is a third option, namely, rejecting that measurement outcomes are governed in any way by hidden variables. Moreover, we argue that some recent results in the search for principles singling out the sets of quantum correlations for Bell and Kochen-Specker contextuality scenarios point out that this third option is scientifically more plausible and answers the question of why and how nature produces quantum nonlocality.
Introduction Important advances in scientific knowledge may, not infrequently, be looked at from several angles. Here, in investigating the question the article title defines, part of our attention will have to be turned on the relationships of Bell's theorem to the old, but still not fully cleared up, question of the nature of causality. The word “nonlocality” means the violation of local causality, the initial meaning of whichwas that no influence, that is, no causal action , can be propagated faster than light. For a long time it was a received view that actions somewhat akin to the basically time-directed ones that living beings perform also take place within inanimate nature. This conception of causality may be called the causality–action theory . But later, having in view Hume's serious reservations concerning it, renowned philosophers of science claimed it might and should be dropped, since the effects it was meant to account for could be explained just as well by considering that what is at work is simply a conjunction of physical laws expressed by means of differential equations – a view that later Hempel and Oppenheim generalized and called the D-N (deductive–nomological) model of explanation (reprinted in [1]). Here the (widely accepted, as it seems) corresponding conception of causality will, for simplicity, be called the law-centered theory of causality . But does the latter theory subsume, at least within physics, all the meanings of the word ‘cause’ that true understanding calls for? Among philosophers the matter is not settled. Hempel himself granted that in several respects the D-N model is somehow inadequate for analyzing the cause–effect relationship [2]. And it seems indeed that a significant argument favoring a ‘no’ answer to the question might have been put forward as early as 1907 (although, to our knowledge, it was not), when Einstein pointed out that according to his then two years old special relativity (SR) theory, if we assumed an effect could follow its cause sooner than light velocity permits, then in some other frames of reference it would occur before its cause. For, concerning this consequence of the assumption, he wrote, “in my opinion, regarded as pure logic … it contains no contradiction; however it absolutely clashes with the character of our total experience, and in this way is proved the impossibility of the hypothesis” [3].
Explaining observations in terms of causes and effects is central to empirical science. However, correlations between entangled quantum particles seem to defy such an explanation. This implies that some of the fundamental assumptions of causal explanations have to give way. We consider a relaxation of one of these assumptions, Bell's local causality, by allowing outcome dependence: a direct causal influence between the outcomes of measurements of remote parties. We use interventional data from a photonic experiment to bound the strength of this causal influence in a two-party Bell scenario, and observational data from a Bell-type inequality test for the considered models. Our results demonstrate the incompatibility of quantum mechanics with a broad class of nonlocal causal models, which includes Bell-local models as a special case. Recovering a classical causal picture of quantum correlations thus requires an even more radical modification of our classical notion of cause and effect.
It has been argued that quantum mechanics is not locally causal and cannot be embedded in a locally causal theory. That conclusion depends on treating certain experimental parameters, typically the orientations of polarization filters, as free variables. Roughly speaking it is supposed that an experimenter is quite free to choose among the various possibilities offered by his equipment. But it might be that this apparent freedom is illusory. Perhaps experimental parameters and experimental results are both consequences, or partially so, of some common hidden mechanism. Then the apparent non-locality could be simulated. This possibility is the starting point of a paper by Clauser, Home and Shimony (CHS hereafter), which is valuable in particular for a careful mathematical formulation of the assumption which excludes such a conspiracy. In this connection they severely criticize my own ‘theory of local beables’ (B hereafter). Much of their criticism is perfectly just. In B there were jumps in the argument, and the assumption in question was not stated at the appropriate place, but only later and inadequately. However, I do not agree with CHS that this assumption, when carefully formulated, is an unreasonable one. I will organize these remarks around the three phrases in which I belatedly formulated the hypothesis in B, Section 8.
Introduction Fifty years after the publication of Bell's theorem, there remains some controversy regarding what the theorem is telling us about quantum mechanics, and what the experimental violations of Bell inequalities are telling us about the world. This chapter represents my best attempt to be clear about what I think the lessons are. In brief: There is some sort of nonlocality inherent in any quantum theory, and, moreover, in any theory that reproduces, even approximately, the quantum probabilities for the outcomes of experiments. But not all forms of nonlocality are the same; there is a distinction to be made between action at a distance and other forms of nonlocality, and I will argue that the nonlocality needed to violate the Bell inequalities need not involve action at a distance. Furthermore, the distinction between forms of nonlocality makes a difference when it comes to compatibility with relativistic causal structure. The Bell locality condition is a condition which, if satisfied, renders possible a completely local account of the correlations between outcomes of spatially separated experiments. Bell's theorem tells us that the probabilities that we compute from quantum mechanics do not admit of such an account. Modulo auxiliary assumptions that, in my opinion, should be noncontroversial, this yields the conclusion that there must be something nonlocal about any theory that yields the quantum mechanical probabilities or anything close to them. One way to violate the Bell locality condition – and this is the way that any deterministic theory must do it – is via straightforward action at a distance. However, we should also consider the possibility of a stochastic theorywith probabilistic laws that involve irreducible correlations. The sort of nonlocality inherent in such a theory involves relations between events that are significantly different from causal relations as usually conceived. Perhaps surprisingly, such a theory, unlike its deterministic cousins, need not invoke a distinguished relation of distant simultaneity. This makes a difference for the situation of the two sorts of theories vis-a-vis relativity. Though a deterministic theory can achieve the appearance of being relativistic, at the level of observable phenomena, it can do so only by introducing a preferred foliation and with it a causal structure at odds with relativistic causal structures. Things are otherwise with dynamical collapse theories.
This thesis aims to legitimize the inclusion of action at a distance in scientific theories. I approach this task from two angles. In the first part, I show that action at a distance is a genuine metaphysical possibility. To do so, I examine how theorists in the history of science have justified their assumption of locality (and find these justifications inadequate), reconcile action at a distance with scientific explanation and show that it is not a threat to causation. In the second part, I consider an actual instance of action at a distance in nature: quantum nonlocality. Since action at a distance cannot be excluded through reason alone, if experience indicates action at a distance one may call it as such. I argue that action at a distance is the most viable theory by which to interpret quantum nonlocality.