This thesis aims to legitimize the inclusion of action at a distance in scientific theories. I approach this task from two angles. In the first part, I show that action at a distance is a genuine metaphysical possibility. To do so, I examine how theorists in the history of science have justified their assumption of locality (and find these justifications inadequate), reconcile action at a distance with scientific explanation and show that it is not a threat to causation. In the second part, I consider an actual instance of action at a distance in nature: quantum nonlocality. Since action at a distance cannot be excluded through reason alone, if experience indicates action at a distance one may call it as such. I argue that action at a distance is the most viable theory by which to interpret quantum nonlocality.
This thesis aims to legitimize the inclusion of action at a distance in scientific theories. I approach this task from two angles. In the first part, I show that action at a distance is a genuine metaphysical possibility. To do so, I examine how theorists in the history of science have justified their assumption of locality (and find these justifications inadequate), reconcile action at a distance with scientific explanation and show that it is not a threat to causation. In the second part, I consider an actual instance of action at a distance in nature: quantum nonlocality. Since action at a distance cannot be excluded through reason alone, if experience indicates action at a distance one may call it as such. I argue that action at a distance is the most viable theory by which to interpret quantum nonlocality.
I feel compelled to respond to the frequent references to spooky action at a distance that often accompany reports of experiments investigating entangled quantum mechanical states. Most, but not all, of these articles have appeared in the popular press. As an experimentalist I have great admiration for such experiments and the concomitant advances in quantum information and quantum computing, but accompanying claims of action at a distance are quite simply nonsense. Some physicists and philosophers of science have bought into the story by promoting the nonlocal nature of quantum mechanics. In 1964, John Bell proved that classical hidden variable theories cannot reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics unless they employ some type of action at a distance. I have no problem with this conclusion. Unfortunately, Bell later expanded his analysis and mistakenly deduced that quantum mechanics and by implication nature herself are nonlocal. In addition, some of these articles present Einstein in caricature, a tragic figure who neither understood quantum mechanics nor believed it to be an accurate theory of nature. Consequently, the current experiments have proven him wrong. This is also nonsense.
Introduction Important advances in scientific knowledge may, not infrequently, be looked at from several angles. Here, in investigating the question the article title defines, part of our attention will have to be turned on the relationships of Bell's theorem to the old, but still not fully cleared up, question of the nature of causality. The word “nonlocality” means the violation of local causality, the initial meaning of whichwas that no influence, that is, no causal action , can be propagated faster than light. For a long time it was a received view that actions somewhat akin to the basically time-directed ones that living beings perform also take place within inanimate nature. This conception of causality may be called the causality–action theory . But later, having in view Hume's serious reservations concerning it, renowned philosophers of science claimed it might and should be dropped, since the effects it was meant to account for could be explained just as well by considering that what is at work is simply a conjunction of physical laws expressed by means of differential equations – a view that later Hempel and Oppenheim generalized and called the D-N (deductive–nomological) model of explanation (reprinted in [1]). Here the (widely accepted, as it seems) corresponding conception of causality will, for simplicity, be called the law-centered theory of causality . But does the latter theory subsume, at least within physics, all the meanings of the word ‘cause’ that true understanding calls for? Among philosophers the matter is not settled. Hempel himself granted that in several respects the D-N model is somehow inadequate for analyzing the cause–effect relationship [2]. And it seems indeed that a significant argument favoring a ‘no’ answer to the question might have been put forward as early as 1907 (although, to our knowledge, it was not), when Einstein pointed out that according to his then two years old special relativity (SR) theory, if we assumed an effect could follow its cause sooner than light velocity permits, then in some other frames of reference it would occur before its cause. For, concerning this consequence of the assumption, he wrote, “in my opinion, regarded as pure logic … it contains no contradiction; however it absolutely clashes with the character of our total experience, and in this way is proved the impossibility of the hypothesis” [3].
Since the discovery of Bell’s theorem, the physics community has come to take seriously the possibility that the universe might contain physical processes which are spatially nonlocal, but there has been no such revolution with regard to the possibility of temporally nonlocal processes. In this article, we argue that the assumption of temporal locality is actively limiting progress in the field of quantum foundations. We investigate the origins of the assumption, arguing that it has arisen for historical and pragmatic reasons rather than good scientific ones, then explain why temporal locality is in tension with relativity and review some recent results which cast doubt on its validity.
Introduction Fifty years after the publication of Bell's theorem, there remains some controversy regarding what the theorem is telling us about quantum mechanics, and what the experimental violations of Bell inequalities are telling us about the world. This chapter represents my best attempt to be clear about what I think the lessons are. In brief: There is some sort of nonlocality inherent in any quantum theory, and, moreover, in any theory that reproduces, even approximately, the quantum probabilities for the outcomes of experiments. But not all forms of nonlocality are the same; there is a distinction to be made between action at a distance and other forms of nonlocality, and I will argue that the nonlocality needed to violate the Bell inequalities need not involve action at a distance. Furthermore, the distinction between forms of nonlocality makes a difference when it comes to compatibility with relativistic causal structure. The Bell locality condition is a condition which, if satisfied, renders possible a completely local account of the correlations between outcomes of spatially separated experiments. Bell's theorem tells us that the probabilities that we compute from quantum mechanics do not admit of such an account. Modulo auxiliary assumptions that, in my opinion, should be noncontroversial, this yields the conclusion that there must be something nonlocal about any theory that yields the quantum mechanical probabilities or anything close to them. One way to violate the Bell locality condition – and this is the way that any deterministic theory must do it – is via straightforward action at a distance. However, we should also consider the possibility of a stochastic theorywith probabilistic laws that involve irreducible correlations. The sort of nonlocality inherent in such a theory involves relations between events that are significantly different from causal relations as usually conceived. Perhaps surprisingly, such a theory, unlike its deterministic cousins, need not invoke a distinguished relation of distant simultaneity. This makes a difference for the situation of the two sorts of theories vis-a-vis relativity. Though a deterministic theory can achieve the appearance of being relativistic, at the level of observable phenomena, it can do so only by introducing a preferred foliation and with it a causal structure at odds with relativistic causal structures. Things are otherwise with dynamical collapse theories.
It has been claimed that quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, i.e., that the predictions of quantum mechanics are at odds with a conception of the world where all the interactions are mediated by local mechanisms. The cited reason is the violation of the Bell inequality in cases where measurements are performed on quantum systems of particles that have interacted in the past. Quantum mechanics predicts that the state of the particles in such a system are correlated, a result obtained from considering a thought-experiment often known as EPR. In this thesis, I will argue that the violation of the Bell inequality in EPR forces us to either accept that causes sometimes act both backwards and forwards in time, or give up some widely-held assumptions about causal relations or the role of causal explanations. First, I will present three principles regarding causality that I take be widely accepted. I will then present the background for the claim the quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, and discuss the implications of non-local causal influences in light of the Special Theory of Relativity. One argument against a causal explanation of the EPR-correlations will be discussed, and different models for the causal structure of EPR will be assessed. I will argue that a retrocausal model – models that include instances of retrocausation, where the direction of causation is the opposite of the direction of time – is the only viable option if we want to uphold the three principles presented in chapter 1. I will discuss the plausibility of rejecting one of these principles, and argue that at least one of the can be restricted in a way that still accounts for our commitment to it. Finally, I will assess the non-local models against the retrocausal models, and argue that a retrocausal model offers interpretational advantages over the non-local alternatives.
Einstein became bothered by quantum mechanical action at a distance within two years of Schrödinger's introduction of his eponymous wave equation. If the wave function represents the "real" physical state of a particle, then the measurement of the particle's position would result in the instantaneous collapse of the wave function to the single, measured position. Such a process seemingly violates not only the Schrödinger equation but also special relativity. Einstein was not alone in this vexation; however, the dilemma eventually faded as physicists concentrated on using the Schrödinger equation to solve a plethora of pressing problems. For the next 30 years, wave function collapse, while occasionally discussed by physicists, was primarily a topic of interest for philosophers. That is, until 1964, when Bell introduced his famous inequality and maintained that its violation proved that quantum mechanics and, by implication, nature herself are nonlocal. Unfortunately, this brought the topic back to mainstream physics, where it has remained and continues to muddy the waters. To be sure, not all physicists are bothered by the apparent nonlocality of quantum mechanics. So where have those who embrace quantum nonlocality gone wrong? I argue that the answer is a gratuitous belief in the ontic nature of the quantum state.