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Lecture notes in computer science

On the Cryptographic Deniability of the Signal Protocol

Nihal Vatandas, Rosario Gennaro, Bertrand Ithurburn, Hugo Krawczyk

Published Jan 1, 2020• 32 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-57878-7_10

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Abstract A deniable authenticated key exchange (DAKE) protocol establishes a secure channel without producing cryptographic evidence of communication. A DAKE offersstrong deniabilityif transcripts provide no evidence even if long-term key material is compromised (offline deniability) and no outsider can obtain evidence even when interactively colluding with an insider (online deniability). Unfortunately, existing strongly deniable DAKEs have not been adopted by secure messaging tools due to security and deployability weaknesses. In this work, we propose three new strongly deniable key exchange protocols—DAKEZ, ZDH, and XZDH—that are designed to be used in modern secure messaging applications while eliminating the weaknesses of previous approaches. DAKEZ offers strong deniability in synchronous network environments, while ZDH and XZDH can be used to construct asynchronous secure messaging systems with offline and partial online deniability. DAKEZ and XZDH provide forward secrecy against active adversaries, and all three protocols can provide forward secrecy against future quantum adversaries while remaining classically secure if attacks against quantum-resistant cryptosystems are found. We seek to reduce barriers to adoption by describing our protocols from a practitioner’s perspective, including complete algebraic specifications, cryptographic primitive recommendations, and prototype implementations. We evaluate concrete instantiations of our DAKEs and show that they are the most efficient strongly deniable schemes; with all of our classical security guarantees, our exchanges require only 1 ms of CPU time on a typical desktop computer and at most 464 bytes of data transmission. Our constructions are nearly as efficient as key exchanges with weaker deniability, such as the ones used by the popular OTR and Signal protocols.
Although the objective of secure communication can be achieved by using cryptographic tools, the undeniability that results from cryptographic properties may create a potential threat to the sender of the message. Unfortunately, most existing deniable protocols only provide 1-out-of-2 deniability. When both parties (the sender and the receiver) are allowed to deny generating the message, a dispute might occur between these two parties. The 1-out-of-2 deniable protocol can result in an unfair resolution of the dispute. Therefore, we propose a new model of deniability, called 1-out-of-∞ deniability, that can provide full deniability. The 1-out-of-∞ deniability protocol allows the originator of the message to deny that he or she generated the message, since there are an infinite number of possible message generators; at the same time, all transmitted messages can be protected and authenticated between the sender and the intended receiver. Our design can be implemented by using any public-key cryptography technique. We also analyze the correctness of the proposed protocols based on logical rules, and two practical examples are given to illustrate our design.
The notion of deniable authentication protocol was introduced in 1998 by Dwork et al. [11] and Aumann and Rabin [1, 2] independently. As a new cryptographic authentication protocol, a deniable authentication protocol enables an intended receiver to identify the source of a given message without being able to prove the identity of the sender to a third party. Over the past years, many deniable authentication protocols have been proposed. In this paper, we would like to present a universal encrypted deniable authentication protocol from any public key encryption scheme. Provided that the public key encryption scheme is secure, a secure deniable authentication protocol can be directly derived.