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The Computer Journal

Fully Deniable Message Authentication Protocols Preserving Confidentiality

Lein Harn, Chiou‐Yng Lee, C. Lin, Chin‐Chen Chang

Published Aug 23, 2011• 8 citations

Abstract

Although the objective of secure communication can be achieved by using cryptographic tools, the undeniability that results from cryptographic properties may create a potential threat to the sender of the message. Unfortunately, most existing deniable protocols only provide 1-out-of-2 deniability. When both parties (the sender and the receiver) are allowed to deny generating the message, a dispute might occur between these two parties. The 1-out-of-2 deniable protocol can result in an unfair resolution of the dispute. Therefore, we propose a new model of deniability, called 1-out-of-∞ deniability, that can provide full deniability. The 1-out-of-∞ deniability protocol allows the originator of the message to deny that he or she generated the message, since there are an infinite number of possible message generators; at the same time, all transmitted messages can be protected and authenticated between the sender and the intended receiver. Our design can be implemented by using any public-key cryptography technique. We also analyze the correctness of the proposed protocols based on logical rules, and two practical examples are given to illustrate our design.

DOI: 10.1093/comjnl/bxr081

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Although the objective of secure communication can be achieved by using cryptographic tools, the undeniability that results from cryptographic properties may create a potential threat to the sender of the message. Unfortunately, most existing deniable protocols only provide 1-out-of-2 deniability. When both parties (the sender and the receiver) are allowed to deny generating the message, a dispute might occur between these two parties. The 1-out-of-2 deniable protocol can result in an unfair resolution of the dispute. Therefore, we propose a new model of deniability, called 1-out-of-∞ deniability, that can provide full deniability. The 1-out-of-∞ deniability protocol allows the originator of the message to deny that he or she generated the message, since there are an infinite number of possible message generators; at the same time, all transmitted messages can be protected and authenticated between the sender and the intended receiver. Our design can be implemented by using any public-key cryptography technique. We also analyze the correctness of the proposed protocols based on logical rules, and two practical examples are given to illustrate our design.

The notion of deniable authentication protocol was introduced in 1998 by Dwork et al. [11] and Aumann and Rabin [1, 2] independently. As a new cryptographic authentication protocol, a deniable authentication protocol enables an intended receiver to identify the source of a given message without being able to prove the identity of the sender to a third party. Over the past years, many deniable authentication protocols have been proposed. In this paper, we would like to present a universal encrypted deniable authentication protocol from any public key encryption scheme. Provided that the public key encryption scheme is secure, a secure deniable authentication protocol can be directly derived.

Intended receiver and deniability properties are two basic properties satisfied by deniable authentication protocols. Recently, a deniable authentication protocol with sender protection is proposed to protect the right of the real sender. In other words, the sender can prove that he/she really sent the message to guard against circumvention by some receivers. However, the honest receiver still suffers the circumventing risk due to the senders' deniability. If the sender sent a deniable authenticated message to the innocent receiver and claimed that the message was generated by receivers. Then the receiver has nothing to convince the others that he/she is innocent. To provide fair protection and anonymity both for senders and receivers, a new deniable authentication protocol with anonymous fair protection is proposed.

Deniable Authentication protocols allow a Sender to authenticate a message for a Receiver, in a way that the Receiver cannot convince a third party that such authentication (or any authentication) ever took place.We present two new approaches to the problem of deniable authentication. The novelty of our schemes is that they do not require the use of CCA-secure encryption (all previous known solutions did), thus showing a different generic approach to the problem of deniable authentication. This new approach is practically relevant as it leads to more efficient protocols and security reductions.In the process we point out a subtle definitional issue for deniability. In particular we propose the notion of forward deniability, which requires that the authentications remain deniable even if the Sender wants to later prove that she authenticated a message. We show that forward deniability is not implied by the original notion of deniability, by showing some deniable protocols which are not forward deniable. Our new proposals are forward deniable.

Deniable ring authentication protocol allows a sender to deny an authentication and his identity is anonymous to the receiver. In this work,we propose a new deniable ring authentication protocol based on the multi-receiver encryption scheme. The receiver encrypts an authentication key with multi-receiver encryption scheme and sends it to the sender. The sender decrypts it using his private key to obtain the authentication key and uses this key to authenticate messages. This protocol only requires two communication rounds and its deniability holds in the concurrent setting without requiring timing assumption due to the multi-receiver encryption.

A deniable authentication protocol should satisfy the property that only the intended receiver authenticates the sender’s identity of received messages. This property is called authentication property. On the other hand, the intended receiver cannot prove the sender’s identity to the third party. The second property is called deniability property. To satisfy deniability property, in most deniable authentication protocols, the receiver is able to forge/modify the received message from the sender. Since the received data is forgeable by the receiver, the sender easily denies that he/she sent the data. Although the sent message is deniable for the sender, the sender still has no evidence to prove that he/she sent the message to prevent the receiver’s circumvention. In this propose, a new property, sender protection, is proposed for the deniable authentication protocol. In a deniable authentication protocol with sender protection, although the sent message is still forgeable by the receiver, the sender can provide an evidence to prove that whether or not the message is really sent from him/her. To protect senders more completely, it is better that the sender is anonymous in a deniable authentication protocol. Therefore, another goal of our research is to design a deniable authentication protocols with anonymous and protected sender.

This paper presents a deniable authenticated key agreement protocol. This protocol can provide an authenticated session key while the sender and the receiver can deny their involvement in such a protocol if the protocol is executed successfully. Then both can deny their transmitted messages protected by the authenticated session key. If this protocol fails, no authenticated session key can be established and no protected messages can be transmitted. The protocol can be proved secure against key compromise impersonation attack. The protocol employs a new method to isolate a session key from confirmation keys.