Measurement-device-independent continuous-variable quantum key distribution (MDI-CVQKD) protocol calibrates the phase reference frames by transmitting local oscillator pulses between two legitimate parties. The above implementation leaves massive loopholes; in particular, an eavesdropper can attack the system by manipulating the power of the local oscillator pulses. In this paper, a Bayesian phase-noise estimation model is proposed to estimate the phase drift and its uncertainty in the MDI-CVQKD protocol. The model employs the Bayesian estimation of the very weak quantum signal pulses and eliminates the necessity of transmitting local oscillator pulses between two legitimate parties. Moreover, the Bayesian inference algorithm has the characteristic of high robustness to noise and can achieve a well-motivated confidence interval of the estimated eigenphase. Comparing with its Gaussian counterpart, we adopt the discrete modulation in the MDI-CVQKD protocol, which allows a much better reconciliation efficiency at low signal-to-noise ratio. With simpler implementation, the proposed Bayesian phase-noise estimation model precisely avoids the security bottleneck due to the transmitted local oscillator pulses.
Measurement-device-independent continuous-variable quantum key distribution (MDI-CVQKD) protocol calibrates the phase reference frames by transmitting local oscillator pulses between two legitimate parties. The above implementation leaves massive loopholes; in particular, an eavesdropper can attack the system by manipulating the power of the local oscillator pulses. In this paper, a Bayesian phase-noise estimation model is proposed to estimate the phase drift and its uncertainty in the MDI-CVQKD protocol. The model employs the Bayesian estimation of the very weak quantum signal pulses and eliminates the necessity of transmitting local oscillator pulses between two legitimate parties. Moreover, the Bayesian inference algorithm has the characteristic of high robustness to noise and can achieve a well-motivated confidence interval of the estimated eigenphase. Comparing with its Gaussian counterpart, we adopt the discrete modulation in the MDI-CVQKD protocol, which allows a much better reconciliation efficiency at low signal-to-noise ratio. With simpler implementation, the proposed Bayesian phase-noise estimation model precisely avoids the security bottleneck due to the transmitted local oscillator pulses.
Excess noise induced by the phase drifts is a serious impairment for the continuous-variable quantum key distribution with locally generated local oscillator scheme, which is recently proposed to avoid the side channel attacks due to the transmitted local oscillator. Theoretical and experimental studies on the phase estimation have been widely reported, while two frequency-locked laser sources are indispensable to achieve quantum coherent detection. Moreover, the self-referenced phase estimation scheme requires to propagate the strong reference pulse through optical fiber, which opens a security loophole through the manipulation of the reference pulse amplitude. Based on the theoretical security and Bayes' theorem, we propose a phase estimation protocol, which does not require propagating the strong reference pulse for performing phase estimation. Compared to the other related work, the protocol can avoid the security problem caused by strong reference pulse. Moreover, this algorithm is an iterative progress for each of experiment to obtain the phase estimation and its uncertainty. We hope the proposed scheme could further promote the performance of continuous-variable quantum key distribution.
The trusted phase noise model for continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol with a real local oscillator (LLO CVQKD) has been established recently, which can lead to a better quantum key distribution (QKD) performance by moving part of the phase noise from the untrusted channel-added noise to the trusted detector-added noise. However, the calibration of the trusted phase noise is related to the intensity of the phase-reference pulse, which can be used by the eavesdropper to hack the QKD system. Here, we present a polarization attack scheme against the phase-reference pulse. In practical LLO CVQKD systems, only a part of the phase-reference pulses are used to measure and compensate for the polarization drift of the signal pulses due to the limitation of polarization measurement. We show that Eve can manipulate the polarization of the unmeasured part of the phase-reference pulses to control the trusted phase noise. Simulations show that improving the polarization measurement ratio to 100% or monitoring the phase-reference pulse intensity in real time is necessary to guarantee the security of the practical LLO CVQKD system.
We study the validity of partially trusting the phase noise associated with estimation uncertainty in a continuous variable quantum key distribution system with a local local oscillator (LLO-CVQKD) and investigate optimal system parameters. We find that the trusted phase noise model enhances the key rate and transmission distance performance but opens a security loophole by manipulating the reference pulse amplitude. Therefore, we propose a “reference pulse attack” on the trusted phase noise LLO-CVQKD system where Eve achieves 100% information hacking without being detected at 23.8km and 32.0km while using lossless and 0.14dB/km loss channels, respectively. Nevertheless, by re-analyzing the attack, countermeasures are also proposed to keep the performance advantages of the trusted phase noise model. As a result, the trusted phase noise LLO-CVQKD can still provide a superior secure key rate (e.g., 9 times higher key rate at 20km) and an increased transmission distance by 45%, compared to that of the untrusted phase noise system.
Continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI-QKD) allows remote parties to share information-theoretical secure keys while defending all the side-channel attacks on measurement devices. However, the secure transmission distance and the secret key rate are quite limited due to the high untrusted equivalent excess noise in the Gaussian modulation. More particularly, extremely high-efficiency homodyne detections are required for even non-zero secure transmission distances, which directly restrict its practical realization. Here, we propose a CV-MDI-QKD protocol by encoding the key information into matched discrete phases of two groups of coherent states, which decreases the required detection efficiency for ideally asymmetric cases, and makes it possible to practically achieve secure key distribution with current low-efficiency homodyne detections. Besides, a proof-of-principle experiment with a locally generated oscillator is implemented, which, for the first time, demonstrates the realizability of CV-MDI-QKD using all fiber-based devices. The discrete-modulated phase-matching method provides an alternative direction of an applicable quantum key distribution with practical security.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proven to promise unconditionally secure data communication between remote legitimate users，based on the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics. QKD has great potential to be commercialized in the market and implemented in securing critical institutions, such as financial infrastructures, smart Grid, and national defence. Most theoretical security analyses of QKD protocols are based on several idealistic assumptions. However, the practical limitations, such as device imperfections, may bring security loopholes and leave QKD systems vulnerable to malicious eavesdropping attacks. Since QKD systems will be used as the practical applications in the real-world, it is of great importance to study the practical security and practical implementations of QKD protocols. Compared with dedicated single-photon based discrete variable (DV) QKD protocols, continuous variable (CV) QKD systems have attracted more attentions in recent years, as they benefit from their compatibility with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) telecommunication components and high key rate over metropolitan networks. However, the requirement of a co-transmitted local oscillator (LO) brings a number of issues that compromises secure key generation and becomes a major obstacle to the practical implementation of CVQKD. To overcome these problems, a new CVQKD protocol with a locally generated LO (LLO) at Bob has been proposed. Based on previous studies, this thesis presents a novel quantum attack based on a discovered security loophole of the LLO CVQKD protocol, and demonstrates two high performance and low complexity practical LLO CVQKD systems. 1. After exploring the phase recovery scheme and the phase noise model, the first quantum attack on LLO CVQKD system is proposed, that exploits the phase estimation error associated with the amplitude of the phase reference pulses, in a ‘reference pulse attack’. Under this attack, a new system noise model and a refined linear quantum states transmission model have been developed when the phase noise is partially trusted. The attack performance is evaluated in terms of excess noise manipulation and mutual information extraction over both trusted – referred to as realistic, and untrusted – referred to as paranoid, security models of phase noise. Effective countermeasures are also given to improve the practical security and performance of the LLO CVQKD system under the trusted phase noise model. 2. Aside from the practical security analysis, two practical LLO CVQKD implementations developed in the laboratory are demonstrated here. The first practical LLO CVQKD system is featured as high speed (500 MHz) and low complexity, realizing the world’s fastest predicted key rate of 26.9 Mbps over a 15 km optical fibre link. To increase the signal repetition rate, and hence the potential secure key rate, our system is equipped with high-performance, wideband devices and components designed to support high repetition rate operations. To reduce the system complexity and correct for any phase shift during transmission, reference pulses are interleaved with quantum signals at Alice. Customized monitoring software has been developed allowing all parameters to be controlled in real-time without any modification to the physical setup. The system-level noise model analysis is introduced at high bandwidth and a new ‘combined optimisation’ technique is proposed to simultaneously optimize system parameters to high precision. It also has the potential for an even faster implementation. 3. The second demonstrated system presents the feasibility of the first practical LLO CVQKD system. The system comprises integrated real-time data-processing units (DPUs) and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) telecommunication components. Instead of using conventional expensive, high-specification, standalone laboratory equipment (e.g. oscilloscope and arbitrary waveform generator (AWG) used in most CVQKD systems), each DPU consists of a high-speed, multi-channel data acquisition module, and is embedded in a computer at both Alice and Bob to achieve real-time quantum data generation, acquisition and analysis. In addition, a hardware-based filter unit has been implemented to amplify and stabilise modulation signals, together with a system-level noise model analysis and a combined parameter optimisation method to enhance the system key rate. In laboratory conditions, the system has been shown to run continuously, and the asymptotic secure key rates are estimated as 1.37 Mbps and 509 kbps over 15 km and 25 km optical fibre links, respectively, through stable excess noise measurements for over 10 hours at a 20 MHz repetition rate. The measurement results open up the possibility of building up a commercialized LLO CVQKD system.
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) with a real local oscillator (LO) is confronted with new security issues attributed to the reference pulses transmitted together with quantum signals over the insecure quantum channel. This paper proposes a method of phase attack on reference pulses of the CVQKD with real LOs. Under the phase attack, the phase drifts of reference pulses are manipulated by eavesdroppers so that the phase compensation error is increased. Consequently, the secret key rate is reduced because of the imperfect phase compensation for quantum signals. Based on the noise model of imperfect phase compensation, both the parameters of actual transmittance and actual excess noise are deduced from the phase compensation accuracy, and then they are compared with those estimated by training signals. The simulation results show that the secret key rate calculated from the theoretical parameters is consistent with the one estimated by training signals.