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Phase attack on reference pulses of continuous-variable quantum key distribution with real local oscillators

Biao Huang, Langhua Liu, Yu Wang, Yongmei Huang, Zhenming Peng

Published Dec 18, 2019• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) with a real local oscillator (LO) is confronted with new security issues attributed to the reference pulses transmitted together with quantum signals over the insecure quantum channel. This paper proposes a method of phase attack on reference pulses of the CVQKD with real LOs. Under the phase attack, the phase drifts of reference pulses are manipulated by eavesdroppers so that the phase compensation error is increased. Consequently, the secret key rate is reduced because of the imperfect phase compensation for quantum signals. Based on the noise model of imperfect phase compensation, both the parameters of actual transmittance and actual excess noise are deduced from the phase compensation accuracy, and then they are compared with those estimated by training signals. The simulation results show that the secret key rate calculated from the theoretical parameters is consistent with the one estimated by training signals.

DOI
10.1117/12.2538523

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Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) with a real local oscillator (LO) is confronted with new security issues attributed to the reference pulses transmitted together with quantum signals over the insecure quantum channel. This paper proposes a method of phase attack on reference pulses of the CVQKD with real LOs. Under the phase attack, the phase drifts of reference pulses are manipulated by eavesdroppers so that the phase compensation error is increased. Consequently, the secret key rate is reduced because of the imperfect phase compensation for quantum signals. Based on the noise model of imperfect phase compensation, both the parameters of actual transmittance and actual excess noise are deduced from the phase compensation accuracy, and then they are compared with those estimated by training signals. The simulation results show that the secret key rate calculated from the theoretical parameters is consistent with the one estimated by training signals.
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) with a real local oscillator (LO) is confronted with new security problems due to the reference pulses transmitted together with quantum signals over the insecure quantum channel. In this paper, we propose a method of phase attack on reference pulses of the CVQKD with real LOs. Under the phase attack, the phase drifts of reference pulses are manipulated by eavesdroppers, and then the phase compensation error is increased. Consequently, the secret key rate is reduced due to the imperfect phase compensation for quantum signals. Based on the noise model of imperfect phase compensation, the practical security of the CVQKD under phase attack is analyzed. Besides, we propose an effective method to detect the intensity of phase attack, in which the deviation of phase compensation error on quantum signals and that on reference signals are monitored in real time. The simulation results show that the security analysis is accurate and the method of phase attack detection is feasible.
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) with the local local oscillator (LLO) is confronted with new security problems due to the reference pulses transmitted together with quantum signals over the insecure quantum channel. In this paper, we propose a method of phase attack on reference pulses of the LLO-CVQKD with time-multiplexing. Under this phase attack, the phase drifts of reference pulses are manipulated by eavesdroppers, and then the phase compensation error is increased. Consequently, the secret key rate is reduced due to the imperfect phase compensation for quantum signals. Based on the noise model of imperfect phase compensation, the practical security of LLO-CVQKD under phase attack is analyzed. The simulation results show that the practical security is reduced due to the phase attack, yet it is still tight when system parameters are estimated by training signals.
In the continuous-variable quantum key distribution with real local oscillators, the reference pulses transmitted in the insecure quantum channel results in phase compensation noises on the homodyne detection of quantum signals. Traditionally, the phase compensation noise is modelled as a zero-mean Gaussian distribution for simplicity. However, it is more likely to be the one with non-zero mean in the actual environment. In this paper, the phase compensation noise is considered to be with a non-zero mean, and then the secure bound is analyzed according to the imperfect phase compensation noise model. The actual transmittance and excess noise are compared between the evaluation values derived from the theoretical analysis and the estimation values calculated by training signals. Simulation results show that the security analysis is consistent with the practical implementation, and the secret key rate decreases with the increasing mean value and noise variance.
The estimation of phase noise of continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol with a local local oscillator (LLO CVQKD), as a major process in quantifying the secret key rate, is closely relevant to the intensity of the phase reference. However, the transmission of the phase reference through the insecure quantum channel is prone to be exploited by the eavesdropper (Eve) to mount attacks. Here, we introduce a polarization attack scheme against the phase reference. Presently, in a practical LLO CVQKD system, only part of the phase reference pulses are measured to compensate for the polarization drift of the quantum signal pulses in a compensation cycle due to the limited polarization measurement rate, while the other part of the phase reference pulses are not measured. We show that Eve can control the phase noise by manipulating the polarization direction of the unmeasured phase reference to hide her attack on the quantum signal. Simulations show that Eve can obtain partial or total key rates information shared between Alice and Bob as the transmission distance increases. Improving the polarization measurement rate to 100% or monitoring the phase reference intensity in real-time is of great importance to protect the LLO CVQKD from polarization attack.
The trusted phase noise model for continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol with a real local oscillator (LLO CVQKD) has been established recently, which can lead to a better quantum key distribution (QKD) performance by moving part of the phase noise from the untrusted channel-added noise to the trusted detector-added noise. However, the calibration of the trusted phase noise is related to the intensity of the phase-reference pulse, which can be used by the eavesdropper to hack the QKD system. Here, we present a polarization attack scheme against the phase-reference pulse. In practical LLO CVQKD systems, only a part of the phase-reference pulses are used to measure and compensate for the polarization drift of the signal pulses due to the limitation of polarization measurement. We show that Eve can manipulate the polarization of the unmeasured part of the phase-reference pulses to control the trusted phase noise. Simulations show that improving the polarization measurement ratio to 100% or monitoring the phase-reference pulse intensity in real time is necessary to guarantee the security of the practical LLO CVQKD system.
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) with a real local oscillator (LO) experiences a phase attack security challenge due to the reference pulses transmitted along with quantum signals over an unsecure quantum channel. In this paper, a phase attack on reference pulses of CV-QKD with a real LO is investigated. The performance of the discrete-modulated (DM) CV-QKD under this attack is analyzed analytically and by simulation, and compared with the Gaussian-modulated (GM) CV-QKD. It is found that such an attack by an eavesdropper's, significantly reduce the transmission distance for the GM based CV-QKD, whereas, the DM based CV-QKD shows a high tolerance to high phase noise. Based on phase attack monitoring, a new adaptive modulation scheme is proposed for CV-QKD to adaptively switch between GM and DM so as to maintain the optimum secret key rate.