The early twentieth century brought about the rejection by physicists of the doctrine of determinism - the belief that complete knowledge of the initial conditions of an interaction in nature allows precise and unambiguous prediction of the outcome. This book traces the origins of a central problem leading to this change in viewpoint and paradoxes raised by attempts to formulate a consistent theory of the nature of light. It outlines the different approaches adopted by members of different national cultures to the apparent inconsistencies, explains why Einstein's early (1905) attempt at a resolution was not taken seriously for fifteen years, and describes the mixture of ideas that created a route to a new, antideterministic formulation of the laws of nature. Dr Wheaton describes the experimental work on the new forms of radiation found at the turn of the century and shows how the interpretation of energy transfer from X-rays to matter gradually transformed a classical wave explanation of light to one based on particle like quanta of energy, and further, he explains how influential scientists came reluctantly to accept a wavelike interpretation of matter as well. This new and distinctively different account of one of the major theoretical shifts in modern physical thought will be of fundamental interest to physical scientists and philosophers, as well as to historians of science.
The early twentieth century brought about the rejection by physicists of the doctrine of determinism - the belief that complete knowledge of the initial conditions of an interaction in nature allows precise and unambiguous prediction of the outcome. This book traces the origins of a central problem leading to this change in viewpoint and paradoxes raised by attempts to formulate a consistent theory of the nature of light. It outlines the different approaches adopted by members of different national cultures to the apparent inconsistencies, explains why Einstein's early (1905) attempt at a resolution was not taken seriously for fifteen years, and describes the mixture of ideas that created a route to a new, antideterministic formulation of the laws of nature. Dr Wheaton describes the experimental work on the new forms of radiation found at the turn of the century and shows how the interpretation of energy transfer from X-rays to matter gradually transformed a classical wave explanation of light to one based on particle like quanta of energy, and further, he explains how influential scientists came reluctantly to accept a wavelike interpretation of matter as well. This new and distinctively different account of one of the major theoretical shifts in modern physical thought will be of fundamental interest to physical scientists and philosophers, as well as to historians of science.
For all practical purposes the wave theory of light is a certainty. This is the story of a radical change in humans' concept of light. In 1896 most physicists were convinced that light consisted of wave disturbances in a medium, the electromagnetic aether. The energy transported in radiation was thought to propagate spherically outward from its source and to spread out over successively larger volumes in space. Thirty years later, a remarkably different concept of light prevailed. Physicists then took seriously the evidence collected over the preceding two decades showing that the energy of radiation does not spread in space. Under certain conditions, light behaves like a stream of particles. Our subject is more than the story of a shift from one theoretical explanation of radiation to another. This reconsideration of the nature of light was a significant event in our scientific understanding of the world. To resolve the paradox that faced them, physicists rejected the venerable Platonic dictum that the microscopic realm recapitulates the macroscopic; that laws generalized from the behavior of objects in the perceivable world may be applied to the imperceivable one. By 1927 physicists had assigned to all forms of radiation a curious amalgam of wave and particle behavior. Waves spread energy over larger and larger volumes of space; particles do not. Reconciliation of these conflicting properties was possible only through appeal to an ontology that transcended mechanical incompatibility. Nature was declared to be only imperfectly rationalizable in terms of human experience with macroscopic interactions. The programmatic goal formulated in the seventeenth century to reduce all physical phenomena to consistent mechanical representations was here recognized to be unattainable.
In 1903 the physicist Albert Michelson made an astonishing pronouncement. Confident of the advances made by the great physicists of the Victorian era, such as Lord Kelvin, James Clark Maxwell and Thomas Edison, he declared that ‘the most important fundamental laws and facts of physical science have all been discovered, and these are now so firmly established that the possibility of their ever being supplemented in consequence of new discoveries is exceedingly remote’.1 In so doing he followed what appeared to be a long-established tradition that eminent physicists should make bold and far-reaching statements on the nature of the universe and its physical laws.2 Unfortunately, Michelson’s timing could not be worse as early twentieth-century physicists were about to make a string of discoveries that would fundamentally alter our perceptions of the universe. The world as Michelson understood it was about to be turned on its head by the work of three men: Max Planck, Albert Einstein and Ernest Rutherford. The first, Planck, was a respected German physicist who had done work on entropy, but had done little to distinguish himself. Then in 1900 he developed his ‘quantum theory’ which posited that energy did not flow as a stream or wave as had been imagined before, but rather was carried by packets or quanta. This seemingly simple, yet deceptively complex, thesis was to have a profound effect upon our understanding of the physical universe. Planck’s thesis proved to be the foundation for the modern discipline of quantum physics, a discipline that first came to the attention of the wider public when in 1905 a young Swiss patents clerk called Albert Einstein wrote five papers for the Annalen der Physik. Three of these papers are widely accepted to be among the best in the history of physics and examined photoelectric effects by applying Planck’s new quantum theory, Brownian Motion and a ‘Special Theory of Relativity’. As Bill Bryson notes in his Short History of Nearly Everything, ‘the first won its author a Nobel Prize and explained the nature of light (and also helped make television possible among other things). The Second provided proof that atoms do indeed exist – a fact that had surprisingly, been in some dispute. The third merely changed the world’.3 Thus within two years of Michelson’s pronouncement much of our understanding of the physical universe had been turned on its head by this new development; but for Michelson worse was to follow. In 1895, a young South African named Ernest Rutherford had won a scholarship to the world famous Cavendish Laboratory at the University of Cambridge. By 1911, Rutherford had become obsessed with the nature of atoms, the basic building blocks that form the constituent parts of the universe. That year he proposed his ‘theory of atomic nuclei’, which suggested that all the positive charge and most of the mass of an atom must be contained in a tiny nucleus at the atom’s centre, with the negatively charged electrons ‘in orbit’ about this nucleus. To prove his thesis Rutherford had to ‘split’ the atom to prove that he could release matter from this nucleus, something which he finally succeeded in doing in 1919 when he showed that by firing alpha-particles into nitrogen gas a small amount of hydrogen could be produced. In so doing he also established that energy could be released from the nucleus of an atom, thereby proving an essential part of Albert Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity: the unification of energy and mass, usually represented by the famous equation E=mc2.4 With Rutherford providing the link between quantum theory and nuclear physics the Newtonian view of the universe, which was at the heart of Michelson’s beliefs, had been rewritten in less that 20 years.
Einstein’s 1905 paper on the photoelectric effect, in which he considered Planck’s idea of quanta of energy to be a universal characteristic of light, marks the beginning of quantum theory. For over ten years Einstein stood alone on the issue of energy quantization of light; and although in 1915 experimental conrmation of his photoelectric effect came from painstaking experiments performed by Millikan, acceptance of the idea that light was composed of particles was far from universal. Millikan himself wrote in 1915: “Despite … the apparent complete success of the Einstein equation, the physical theory of which it was designed to be the symbolic expression is found so untenable that Einstein himself, I believe, no longer holds to it.” Einstein did hold to it. It was only in the mid 1920s, when Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Dirac, and others developed the rst forms of quantum theory, that serious discussions concerning the particle nature of light and the meaning of the new theory began. Discussions about the meaning of quantum theory continue today.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, it became clear that microscopic particles do not obey Newton's laws of classical mechanics. The idea of light quanta was at odds with the established wisdom that light is a wave phenomenon, of course, but no other explanation of the photoelectric effect seemed possible. The next step in the development of quantum mechanics was taken by Niels Bohr, who introduced postulates about the discreteness of the energy of the bound electrons in an atom similar to the discreteness of the energy of light quanta. Modern quantum mechanics was founded by Werner Heisenberg, Max Born, Erwin Schroedinger, Paul Adrian Maurice Dirac, Wolfgang Pauli, Enrico Fermi, and others. In quantum mechanics, it is in general fundamentally impossible to determine the exact outcome of an experiment; one can only determine the probability of any given outcome.
THE conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics. A great deal of the interest of Heisenberg's book lies in the very comprehensive account he gives of the origin and growth of the Copenhagen school, and the way the new phenomena forced a largely unwelcome picture of nature upon Bohr and his friends. The most important chapter from a philosophical point of view is that in which Heisenberg defends this interpretation against the attacks to which it has been subjected. The essence of his argument for the interpretation can be summed up in two propositions. (i) The Copenhagen interpretation of physical theory, which depends upon the acceptance of the so-called Principle of Complementarity, is an inevitable and final interpretation. The reason for this is that there are only two possible general models for understanding given physical phenomena; a particle model or a wave model. These are exhaustive and exclusive because the former depends upon discontinuous and the latter upon continuous (using substance here in the traditional philosophical sense). If we find, as we do, that the two fundamental constituents of the universe, matter and radiation, each exhibit two classes of phenomena, one explainable only on a particle model and one on a wave model, then we are compelled to adopt a complementarity hypothesis and give up the idea of finding a single and uniform model for the understanding of phenomena. There are only two kinds of models; they are mutually exclusive; both are required; hence we either despair before an insoluble problem or adopt the Copenhagen interpretation. (2) Any serious criticism of this interpretation must offer an alternative
The founding fathers of quantum mechanics had already perceived the essence of the difficulties of quantum mechanics; today, after almost a century, the discussions are still lively and, if some very interesting new aspects have emerged, at a deeper level the questions have not changed so much. What is more recent, nevertheless, is a general change of attitude among physicists: until about 1970 or 1980, most physicists thought that the essential questions had been settled, and that “Bohr was right and proved his opponents to be wrong”. This was probably a consequence of the famous discussions between Bohr, Einstein, Schrödinger, Heisenberg, Pauli, de Broglie, and others (in particular at the Solvay meetings [1–3], where Bohr's point of view had successfully resisted Einstein's extremely clever attacks). The majority of physicists did not know the details of the arguments. They nevertheless thought that the standard “Copenhagen interpretation” had clearly emerged from the infancy of quantum mechanics as the only sensible attitude for good scientists. This interpretation includes the idea that modern physics must contain indeterminacy as an essential ingredient: it is fundamentally impossible to predict the outcome of single microscopical events; it is impossible to go beyond the formalism of the wave function (or its generalization, the state vector ∣ψ) and complete it.