A theoretical investigation is made into the difficulties encountered in constructing a deterministic model for quantum mechanics and into the restrictions that can be placed on the form of such a model.The various implications of the known 11 impossi bil ity proofs II are examined.A possible explanation for the non-locality required by Bell's proof is suggested in terms of backwards-in-time causality.The efficacy of the Kochen and Specker proof is brought into doubt by showing that there is a possible way of avoiding its implications in the only known physically realizable situation to which it applies.Also, a new thought experiment is put forward to show that a particle's predetermined momentum and energy values cannot satisfy the laws of momentum and energy conservation without conflicting with the predictions of quantum mechanics.Special attention is paid to a particular class of deterministic models which appear not to have been explicitly studied before.The models considered are those for which the individual outcomes of measurements are not dependent on hidden variables associated with the measuring apparatus and for which the hidden variables of a particle do not need to be randomized after each measurement.Specific models of this type are constructed and examined for the cases of both discrete and continuous spectra of eigenvalues.In developing these models a need is found for a joint distribution for position and momentum.In relation to this point, it is demonstrated that the quantum mechanical wave equations actually point to a particular joint distribution expression, namely the Margenau and Hill distribution.The schemes considered are found to have certain shortcomings and possible steps towards more satisfactory models are suggested.
A theoretical investigation is made into the difficulties encountered in constructing a deterministic model for quantum mechanics and into the restrictions that can be placed on the form of such a model.The various implications of the known 11 impossi bil ity proofs II are examined.A possible explanation for the non-locality required by Bell's proof is suggested in terms of backwards-in-time causality.The efficacy of the Kochen and Specker proof is brought into doubt by showing that there is a possible way of avoiding its implications in the only known physically realizable situation to which it applies.Also, a new thought experiment is put forward to show that a particle's predetermined momentum and energy values cannot satisfy the laws of momentum and energy conservation without conflicting with the predictions of quantum mechanics.Special attention is paid to a particular class of deterministic models which appear not to have been explicitly studied before.The models considered are those for which the individual outcomes of measurements are not dependent on hidden variables associated with the measuring apparatus and for which the hidden variables of a particle do not need to be randomized after each measurement.Specific models of this type are constructed and examined for the cases of both discrete and continuous spectra of eigenvalues.In developing these models a need is found for a joint distribution for position and momentum.In relation to this point, it is demonstrated that the quantum mechanical wave equations actually point to a particular joint distribution expression, namely the Margenau and Hill distribution.The schemes considered are found to have certain shortcomings and possible steps towards more satisfactory models are suggested.
Abstract Quantum states in superposition cannot be observed, suggesting that they merely embody information on possible measurement results. Yet, we think of them as describing physical systems that evolve in time according to given mathematical equations. Furthermore, evolution takes place in physical space-time, and local causality is imposed on space-time by Special Relativity (a sequence of cause and effect that constitutes a fundamental principle by which we think about and do scientific work). It is therefore strange that there is non–locality and violation of causality embedded in Quantum Mechanics. We try to give here a first step to see whether a deterministic and local interpretation is possible. We will show that Bell’s inequality is not conclusive about the non–local nature of Quantum Mechanics, in that there exists an interpretation of reality (which we put forward) which is local and in which Bell’s inequality cannot be derived. Assuming determinism and locality a new Bell-like inequality is derived, which is always satisfied by Quantum Mechanics and which allows for local hidden variables [1].
The dominance of the Copenhagen interpretation is the result of a historical accident (Cushing, 1994). At the Solvay conference in 1927, Louis de Broglie put forward the deterministic pilot wave theory, described later. Never slow to criticize, Pauli jumped up and demolished de Broglie’s proposal, and de Broglie was so discouraged by this that he did not develop his interpretation any further. The Copenhagen interpretation was then developed by Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli and many others, as described in the previous chapter. It was strongly supported by von Neumann’s proof of the impossibility of hidden variables. Years later, in 1952, Bohm published a deterministic hidden variable theory, showing that there must be something wrong with von Neumann’s proof. The error was found by John Bell in 1966, as described in the last chapter, and he also showed how Pauli’s objections to de Broglie’s original idea can be answered. If this had been done at the conference in 1927, quantum mechanics could have been interpreted deterministically from the beginning. The essential mistake in the Copenhagen interpretation is to treat it as a complete account of the behaviour of each individual system. It is frequently claimed that it enables us to calculate, at least in principle, everything that can be measured. Thus Hooft (1997, p. 11) said that ‘The laws of quantum mechanics have been formulated very accurately. We know exactly how to compute anything we would like to know.’ Also Peierls (1997, p. 25) has said that quantum mechanics ‘had become a complete and consistent scheme capable of giving a unique answer to any questions relating to actual or possible observations’. Even if this were true, it would not imply that it is the final complete theory, for it is always possible that some new phenomenon might be found that cannot be calculated quantum-mechanically. However, it is not true: there are many phenomena such as the time of decay of a radioactive nucleus, or the direction a particle is scattered by a nucleus, that cannot be calculated, even in principle. Quantum mechanics is therefore an incomplete theory. We can only calculate the statistical properties of these systems, such as the half-life of a radioactive decay or the differential scattering cross-section that gives the probabilities that a particle is scattered through various angles. All measurements of quantum systems are of this statistical character. It might be thought that the possibility of making measurements on a single electron provides an exception to this. However, even in such cases the electron is continually bathed in a fluctuating background radiation from nearby atoms. Since this is variable, that electron is a member of an ensemble of electrons subject to different fluctuations. All these examples clearly demonstrate the statistical character of quantum mechanics. ‘I am rather firmly convinced’, Einstein (in Schilpp, 1949, pp. 666, 671) remarked, ‘that the essentially statistical character of contemporary quantum theory is solely to be ascribed to fact that this theory operates with an incomplete description of physical systems’. As a result, ‘the c-function is to be understood as the description not of a single system but of an ensemble of systems’. So, ‘if the statistical quantum theory does not pretend to describe the individual system completely, it appears unavoidable to look elsewhere for a complete description of the individual systems’. Thus ‘the difficulties of theoretical interpretation disappear, if one views the quantum-mechanical description as a description of an ensemble of systems’. If this is achieved, ‘the statistical theory would, within the framework of future physics, take an approximately analogous position to statistical mechanics within the framework of classical mechanics’. ‘Thus, essentially, nothing has changed since Galileo or Newton or Faraday concerning the status of the ‘‘observer’’ or our ‘‘consciousness’’ or of our ‘‘information’’ in physics’ (Popper, 1982, p. 46). Once this is accepted, the quantum paradoxes that plagued the Copenhagen interpretation are easily resolved, as described below. In any textbook of quantum mechanics problems such as the calculation of the energy levels of the hydrogen atom are solved as if that hydrogen atom is alone in the universe. As Feynman (1972) remarked, ‘when we solve a quantum-mechanical problem, what we really do is to divide the universe into two parts – the system in which we are interested and the rest of the universe. We then usually act as if the system in which we are interested comprised the whole universe.’ In fact, however, every hydrogen atom on which measurements are made is surrounded by other atoms and exposed to their radiations. Quantum mechanics somehow takes this into account and gives the average behaviour of an ensemble of hydrogen atoms. A more detailed theory takes these influences into account. One attempt to do this is stochastic electrodynamics, described in a later section.
We discuss quantum conditional probability and its applications to deterministic hidden-variable models. We derive empirical tests corresponding to mathematical no-go proofs, providing rigorous statistical tests based on experimental outcomes. Evidently, it now possible to examine the statistical power of the empirical tests, and place confidence intervals on the parameters that precisely measure the departure of hidden-variable models from quantum experimental outcomes. Moreover, reinterpretation of well-known results in the light of quantum conditional probability provides other experimental demonstrations and no-go proofs: outcomes for the familiar Young double-slit experiment show that there are no deterministic hidden-variable models of the type considered by Kochen and Specker [J. Math. Mech. 17, 59 (1967)] or Bell [Rev. Mod. Phys. 38, 447 (1966)].
Certain concrete "ontological models" for quantum mechanics (models in which measurement outcomes are deterministic and quantum states are equivalent to classical probability distributions over some space of `hidden variables') are examined. The models are generalizations of Kochen and Specker's such model for a single 2-dimensional system - in particular a model for a three dimensional quantum system is considered in detail. Unfortunately, it appears the models do not quite reproduce the quantum mechanical statistics. They do, however, come close to doing so, and in as much as they simply involve probability distributions over the complex projective space they do reproduce pretty much everything else in quantum mechanics. The Kochen-Specker theorem is examined in the light of these models, and the rather mild nature of the manifested contextuality is discussed.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
We attempt to contribute some novel points of view to the "foundations of quantum mechanics", using mathematical tools from "quantum probability theory" (such as the theory of operator algebras). We first introduce an abstract algebraic framework for the formulation of mathematical models of physical systems that is general enough to encompass classical and quantum mechanical models. After a short discussion on the properties of classical systems (realism and determinism), we move on to the study of a general class of quantum-mechanical models of physical systems and explain what some of the key problems in a quantum theory of observations and measurements are. In the last part of our essay, we attempt to elucidate the roles played by entanglement between a system and its environment and of information loss in understanding "decoherence" and "dephasing", which are key mechanisms in a quantum theory of measurements and experiments. We also discuss the problem of "time in quantum mechanics" and sketch an answer to the question when an experiment can be considered to have been completed successfully.