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Quantum Information and Computation

Security bounds in quantum cryptography using d-level systems

AcinAntonio, GisinNicolas, ScaraniValerio

Published Nov 1, 2003• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We analyze the security of quantum cryptography schemes for d-level systems using 2 or d + 1 maximally conjugated bases, under individual eavesdropping attacks based on cloning machines and measure...
DOI
10.5555/2011556.2011557

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We analyze the security of quantum cryptography schemes for d-level systems using 2 or d+1 maximally conjugated bases, under individual eavesdropping attacks based on cloning machines and measurement after the basis reconciliation. We consider classical advantage distillation protocols, that allow to extract a key even in situations where the mutual information between the honest parties is smaller than the eavesdropper's information. In this scenario, advantage distillation protocols are shown to be as powerful as quantum distillation: key distillation is possible using classical techniques if and only if the corresponding state in the entanglement based protocol is distillable.
We consider two quantum cryptographic schemes relying on encoding the key into qudits, i.e., quantum states in a d-dimensional Hilbert space. The first cryptosystem uses two mutually unbiased bases (thereby extending the BB84 scheme), while the second exploits all d+1 available such bases (extending the six-state protocol for qubits). We derive the information gained by a potential eavesdropper applying a cloning-based individual attack, along with an upper bound on the error rate that ensures unconditional security against coherent attacks.
The study of quantum cryptography and quantum entanglement have traditionally been based on two-level quantum systems (qubits). In this paper, we consider a generalization of Ekert's entanglement-based quantum cryptographic protocol where qubits are replaced by three-level systems (qutrits). In order to investigate the security against the optimal individual attack, we derive the information gained by a potential eavesdropper applying a cloning-based attack. We exhibit the explicit form of this cloner, which is distinct from the previously known cloners, and conclude that the protocol is more robust than those based on entangled qubits as well as unentangled qutrits.
We investigate the security bounds of quantum-cryptographic protocols using ddd-level systems. In particular, we focus on schemes that use two mutually unbiased bases, thus extending the Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum-key-distribution scheme to higher dimensions. Under the assumption of general coherent attacks, we derive an analytic expression for the ultimate upper security bound of such quantum-cryptography schemes. This bound is well below the predictions of optimal cloning machines. The possibility of extraction of a secret key beyond entanglement distillation is discussed. In the case of qutrits we argue that any eavesdropping strategy is equivalent to a symmetric one. For higher dimensions such an equivalence is generally no longer valid.