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International Conference on Quantum Information

Security Evaluation of Dual-threshold Homodyne Quantum Cryptographic Systems

Manuel Sabban, Qing Xu, Philippe B. Gallion, Francisco Javier Mendieta

Published Jan 1, 2008• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In this work we present a quantitative security analysis of a dual-threshold homodyne quantum cryptography with two types of possible eavesdropping attacks in terms of the differential of mutual information.
DOI
10.1364/icqi.2008.jmb77

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