We prove that a theory that is different from a classical theory and has the property that orthogonal states of a physical system are compatible states (a property called orthomodularity in axiomatics) cannot describe two separated entities. Quantum mechanics has this property and as a consequence it is impossible to describe two separated entities in quantum mechanics. This is essentially due to the fact that quantum mechanics is too specific a theory. We indicate the direction for a generalization where the problem could be solved.
We prove that a theory that is different from a classical theory and has the property that orthogonal states of a physical system are compatible states (a property called orthomodularity in axiomatics) cannot describe two separated entities. Quantum mechanics has this property and as a consequence it is impossible to describe two separated entities in quantum mechanics. This is essentially due to the fact that quantum mechanics is too specific a theory. We indicate the direction for a generalization where the problem could be solved.
We consider the situation of a physical entity that is the compound entity consisting of two 'separated' quantum entities. In earlier work it has been proven by one of the authors that such a physical entity cannot be described by standard quantum mechanics. More precisely, it was shown that two of the axioms of traditional quantum axiomatics are at the origin of the impossibility for standard quantum mechanics to describe this type of compound entity. One of these axioms is equivalent with the superposition principle, which means that separated quantum entities put the linearity of quantum mechanics at stake. We analyze the conceptual steps that are involved in this proof, and expose the necessary material of quantum axiomatics to be able to understand the argument
We consider the situation of a physical entity that is the compound entity consisting of two ‘separated ’ quantum entities. In earlier work it has been proved by one of the authors that such a physical entity cannot be described by standard quantum mechanics. More precisely, it was shown that two of the axioms of traditional quantum axiomatics are at the origin of the impossibility for standard quantum mechanics to describe this type of compound entity. One of these axioms is equivalent with the superposition principle, which means that separated quantum entities put the linearity of quantum mechanics at stake. We analyze the conceptual steps that are involved in this proof, and expose the necessary material of quantum axiomatics to be able to understand the argument. 1
Einstein's article on the EPR paradox is the most cited of his works, but not many know that it was not fully representative of the way he thought about the incompleteness of the quantum formalism. Indeed, his main worry was not Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which he accepted, but the experimental non-separability of spatially separate systems. The same problem was also recognized, years later, by one of us, as part of an axiomatic analysis of the quantum formalism, which revealed an unexpected structural limitation of the quantum formalism in Hilbert space, preventing the description of separate systems. As we will explain, this limitation does not manifest at the level of the states, but of the projectors describing the properties, in the sense that there are not enough properties in the formalism to describe separate systems. The question remains whether separability is a possibility at the fundamental level and if a formalism should integrate it into its mathematical structure, as a possibility. To aid our intuition, we offer a reflection based on a powerful analogy between physical systems and human conceptual entities, as the question of separability also arises for the latter.
Abstract Einstein’s article on the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox is the most cited of his works, but not many know that it was not fully representative of the way he thought about the incompleteness of the quantum formalism. Indeed, his main worry was not Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, which he accepted, but the experimental non-separability of spatially separate systems. The same problem was also recognized, years later, by one of us, as part of an axiomatic analysis of the quantum formalism, which revealed an unexpected structural limitation of the quantum formalism in Hilbert space, preventing the description of separate systems. As we will explain, this limitation does not manifest at the level of the states, but of the projectors describing the properties, in the sense that there are not enough properties in the formalism to describe separate systems. The question remains whether separability is a possibility at the fundamental level and if a formalism should integrate it into its mathematical structure, as a possibility. To aid our intuition, we offer a reflection based on a powerful analogy between physical systems and human conceptual entities, as the question of separability also arises for the latter. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Newton, Principia, Newton Geneva Edition (17th–19th) and modern Newtonian mechanics: heritage, past & present’.
Some general principles There are some important differences between quantum and classical reasoning which reflect the different mathematical structure of the two theories. The most precise classical description of a mechanical system is provided by a point in the classical phase space, while the most precise quantum description is a ray or onedimensional subspace of the Hilbert space. This in itself is not an important difference. What is more significant is the fact that two distinct points in a classical phase space represent mutually exclusive properties of the physical system: if one is a true description of the sytem, the other must be false. In quantum theory, on the other hand, properties are mutually exclusive in this sense only if the corresponding projectors are mutually orthogonal. Distinct rays in the Hilbert space need not be orthogonal to each other, and when they are not orthogonal, they do not correspond to mutually exclusive properties. As explained in Sec. 4.6, if the projectors corresponding to the two properties do not commute with one another, and are thus not orthogonal, the properties are (mutually) incompatible. The relationship of incompatibility means that the properties cannot be logically compared, a situation which does not arise in classical physics. The existence of this nonclassical relationship of incompatibility is a direct consequence of assuming (following von Neumann) that the negation of a property corresponds to the orthogonal complement of the corresponding subspace of the Hilbert space; see the discussion in Sec. 4.6.