Abstract. A broadcast protocol allows a sender to distribute a message through a point-to-point network to a set of parties, such that (i) all parties receive the same message, even if the sender is corrupted, and (ii) this is the sender’s message, if he is honest. Broadcast protocols satisfying these properties are known to exist if and only if t < n/3, where n denotes the total number of parties, and t denotes the maximal number of corruptions. When a setup allowing signatures is available to the parties, then such protocols exist even for t < n. Broadcast is the probably most fundamental primitive in distributed cryptography, and is used in almost any cryptographic (multi-party) protocol. However, a broadcast protocol “only ” satisfying the above properties might be insecure when being used in the context of another protocol. In order to be safely usable within other protocols, a broadcast protocol must satisfy a simulation-based security notion, which is secure under composition. In this work, we show that most broadcast protocols in the literature do not satisfy a (natural) simulation-based security notion. We do not know of any broadcast protocol which could be securely invoked in a multi-party computation protocol in the secure-channels model. The problem is that existing protocols for broadcast do not preserve the secrecy of the message while being broadcasted, and in particular allow the adversary to corrupt the sender (and change the message), depending on the message being broadcasted. For example, when every party should broadcast a random bit, the adversary could corrupt those parties that want to broadcast 0, and make them broadcast 1. More concretely, we show that simulatable broadcast in a model with secure channels is possible if and only if t < n/3, respectively t ≤ n/2 when a signature setup is available. The positive results are proven by constructing secure broadcast protocols.
Abstract. A broadcast protocol allows a sender to distribute a message through a point-to-point network to a set of parties, such that (i) all parties receive the same message, even if the sender is corrupted, and (ii) this is the sender’s message, if he is honest. Broadcast protocols satisfying these properties are known to exist if and only if t < n/3, where n denotes the total number of parties, and t denotes the maximal number of corruptions. When a setup allowing signatures is available to the parties, then such protocols exist even for t < n. Broadcast is the probably most fundamental primitive in distributed cryptography, and is used in almost any cryptographic (multi-party) protocol. However, a broadcast protocol “only ” satisfying the above properties might be insecure when being used in the context of another protocol. In order to be safely usable within other protocols, a broadcast protocol must satisfy a simulation-based security notion, which is secure under composition. In this work, we show that most broadcast protocols in the literature do not satisfy a (natural) simulation-based security notion. We do not know of any broadcast protocol which could be securely invoked in a multi-party computation protocol in the secure-channels model. The problem is that existing protocols for broadcast do not preserve the secrecy of the message while being broadcasted, and in particular allow the adversary to corrupt the sender (and change the message), depending on the message being broadcasted. For example, when every party should broadcast a random bit, the adversary could corrupt those parties that want to broadcast 0, and make them broadcast 1. More concretely, we show that simulatable broadcast in a model with secure channels is possible if and only if t < n/3, respectively t ≤ n/2 when a signature setup is available. The positive results are proven by constructing secure broadcast protocols.
We consider the classical problem of synchronous broadcast with dishonest majority, when a public-key infrastructure and digital signatures are available. In a surprising result, Hirt and Zikas (Eurocrypt 2010) recently observed that all existing protocols for this task are insecure against an adaptive adversary who can choose which parties to corrupt as the protocol progresses. Moreover, they prove an impossibility result for adaptively secure broadcast in their setting. We argue that the communication model adopted by Hirt and Zikas is unrealistically pes-simistic. We revisit the problem of adaptively secure broadcast in a more natural synchronous model (with rushing), and show that broadcast is possible in this setting for an arbitrary num-ber of corruptions. Our positive result holds under a strong, simulation-based definition in the universal-composability framework. We also study the impact of adaptive attacks on protocols for secure multi-party computation where broadcast is used as a sub-routine. 1
Broadcast is a primitive which allows a specific party to distribute a message consistently among n parties, even if up to t parties exhibit malicious behaviour.In the classical model with a complete network of bilateral authenticated channels, the seminal result of [15] shows that broadcast is achievable if and only if t < n/3.There are two generalizations suggested for the broadcast problem -with respect to the adversarial model and the communication model.Fitzi and Maurer [10] consider a (non-threshold) general adversary that is characterized by the subsets of parties that could be corrupted, and show that broadcast can be realized from bilateral channels if and only if the union of no three possible corrupted sets equals the entire set of n parties.On the other hand, [4] extends the standard model of bilateral channels with the existence of b-minicast channels that allow to locally broadcast among any subset of b parties; the authors show that in this enhanced model of communication, secure broadcast tolerating up to t corrupted parties is possible if and only if t < b-1 b+1 n.These generalizations are unified in [14] where Raykov studies the problem of achieving broadcast from a complete set of b-minicast channels that is secure under general adversaries, and gives a tight characterization of the possible corrupted subsets of parties against which broadcast is (im)possible.This thesis initiates the study of achievability of broadcast in scenarios where only some subset of b-minicast channels are available, thereby addressing an open problem posed by [14].Even though the broadcast problem has been studied for the concrete case of incomplete 3minicast networks in [16] and [12], not much work has been done with respect to general b-minicast models.Our major contribution is the identification of types of minicast channels that are essential for broadcast secure against general adversaries.In particular, this allows us to derive a bound on the amount of b-minicasts required for some party to broadcast.Inspired by the result of [14], the thesis also proves some properties for an interesting class of adversaries, named chain adversaries, that are relevant to the problem at hand, and proposes a hierarchy over all possible general adversaries targeting a set of n parties.We conclude the discussion by showing why a prominent method to construct broadcast protocols -used by [16] for 3-minicast models -is not feasible when it comes to incomplete b-minicast models.
In this dissertation, we consider the design of broadcast and secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols in the presence of adversarial faults.
Secure multi-party computation is the most generic problem in fault-tolerant distributed computing. In principle, a multi-party computation protocol can be used to solve any distributed cryptographic problem. Informally, the problem of multi-party computation is the following: suppose we have n parties P1, P2,…, Pn where each party Pi has a private input xi. Together, the parties want to compute a function of their inputs (y1, y2,…, yn) = f(x1,x2,…, xn). However, some parties can be corrupted and do not execute a prescribed protocol faithfully. Even worse, they may be controlled by an adversary and attack the protocol in a coordinated manner. Despite the presence of such an adversary, a secure MPC protocol should ensure that each (corrupted) party Pi learn only its output yi but nothing more.
Broadcast in the presence of adversarial faults is one of the simplest special cases of multi-party computation and important component of larger protocols. In short, broadcast allows a party to send the same message to all parties, and all parties to be assured they have received identical messages.
The contribution of this dissertation is twofold. First, we construct broadcast and secure multi-party computation protocols for honest majority in a point-to-point network whose round complexities improve significantly upon prior work. In particular, we give the first expected constant-round authenticated broadcast protocol for honest majority assuming only public-key infrastructure and signatures. Second, we initiate the study of broadcast in radio networks in the presence of adversarial faults. In radio networks, parties communicate through multicasting messages; a message can only be received by the parties within some radius from the sender. Feasibility and impossibility results are given, and our bounds are tight.
Broadcast protocols enable a set of n parties to agree on the input of a designated sender, even facing attacks by malicious parties. In the honest-majority setting, randomization and cryptography were harnessed to achieve low-communication broadcast with sub-quadratic total communication and balanced sub-linear cost per party. However, comparatively little is known in the dishonest-majority setting. Here, the most communication-efficient constructions are based on Dolev and Strong (SICOMP '83), and sub-quadratic broadcast has not been achieved. On the other hand, the only nontrivial ω(n) communication lower bounds are restricted to deterministic protocols, or against strong adaptive adversaries that can perform "after the fact" removal of messages. We provide new communication lower bounds in this space, which hold against arbitrary cryptography and setup assumptions, as well as a simple protocol showing near tightness of our first bound. 1) We demonstrate a tradeoff between resiliency and communication for protocols secure against n−o(n) static corruptions. For example, Ω(n⋅polylog(n)) messages are needed when the number of honest parties is n/polylog(n); Ω(nn) messages are needed for O(n) honest parties; and Ω(n2) messages are needed for O(1) honest parties. Complementarily, we demonstrate broadcast with O(n⋅polylog(n)) total communication facing any constant fraction of static corruptions. 2) Our second bound considers n/2+k corruptions and a weakly adaptive adversary that cannot remove messages "after the fact." We show that any broadcast protocol within this setting can be attacked to force an arbitrary party to send messages to k other parties. This rules out, for example, broadcast facing 51% corruptions in which all non-sender parties have sublinear communication locality.
Broadcast and verifiable secret sharing (VSS) are central building blocks for secure multi-party computation. These protocols are required to be resilient against a Byzantine adversary who controls at most t out of the n parties running the protocol. In this dissertation, we consider the design of fault-tolerant protocols for broadcast and verifiable secret sharing with stronger security guarantees and improved round complexity. Broadcast allows a party to send the same message to all parties, and all parties are assured they have received identical messages. Given a public-key infrastructure (PKI) and digital signatures, it is possible to construct broadcast protocols tolerating any number of corrupted parties. We address two important issues related to broadcast: (1) Almost all existing protocols do not distinguish between corrupted parties (who do not follow the protocol) and honest parties whose secret (signing) keys have been compromised (but who continue to behave honestly); (2) all existing protocols for broadcast are insecure against an adaptive adversary who can choose which parties to corrupt as the protocol progresses. We propose new security models that capture these issues, and present tight feasibility and impossibility results. In the problem of verifiable secret sharing, there is a designated player who shares a secret during an initial sharing phase such that the secret is hidden from an adversary that corrupts at most t parties. In a subsequent reconstruction phase of the protocol, a unique secret, well-defined by the view of honest players in the sharing phase, is reconstructed. The round complexity of VSS protocols is a very important metric of their efficiency. We show two improvements regarding the round complexity of information-theoretic VSS. First, we construct an efficient perfectly secure VSS protocol tolerating t < n/3 corrupted parties that is simultaneously optimal in both the number of rounds and the number of invocations of broadcast. Second, we construct a statistically secure VSS protocol tolerating t < n/2 corrupted parties that has optimal round complexity, and an efficient statistical VSS protocol tolerating t < n/2 corrupted parties that requires one additional round.
Abstract. Byzantine broadcast is a distributed primitive that allows a specific party (called “sender”) to consistently distribute a value v among n parties in the presence of potential misbehavior of up to t of the parties. Broadcast requires that correct parties always agree on the same value and if the sender is correct, then the agreed value is v. Broadcast without a setup (i.e., from scratch) is achievable from point-to-point channels if and only if t < n/3. In case t ≥ n/3 a trusted setup is required. The setup may be assumed to be given initially or generated by the parties in a setup phase. It is known that generating setup for protocols with cryptographic security is relatively simple and only consists of setting up a public-key infrastructure. However, generating setup for information-theoretically secure protocols is much more involved. In this paper we study the complexity of setup generation for information-theoretic protocols using point-to-point channels and temporarily available broadcast channels. We optimize the number of rounds in which the temporary broadcast channels are used while minimizing the number of bits broadcast with them. We give the first information-theoretically secure broadcast protocol tolerating t < n/2 that uses the temporary broadcast channels during only 1 round in the setup phase. Furthermore, only O(n 3) bits need to be broadcast with the temporary broadcast channels during that round, independently of the security parameter employed. The broadcast protocol presented in this paper allows to construct the first informationtheoretically secure MPC protocol which uses a broadcast channel during only one round. Additionally, the presented broadcast protocol supports refreshing, which allows to broadcast an a priori unknown number of times given a fixed-size setup.