Primitive Ontology アプローチのGRW理論とBohm力学の問題点

紘平森田, Morita Kohei

Published Aug 8, 2019• 0 citations

Abstract

GRW theory and Bohmian mechanics are typical interpretations of quantum mechanics. One of the problems for these interpretations arises from the gap of the space-dimensionality. Quantum mechanics is high dimensional, but its experiences appear in our three dimensional space. Primitive ontology has been proposed, in order to fill the gap, but Ney recently criticized this approach. Admittedly, the primitive ontology approach is not sufficient at all. But her criticism remains ambiguous, or at least not enough. Instead of her criticism, this article reveals that the main drawbacks for primitive ontology lie in the relationships with classical mechanics.

DOI: 10.18999/nagjp.14.9

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