The “Plug & play” quantum cryptography scheme has significant advantage in real-life applications over other schemes and is adopted in most commercial quantum cryptosystems. Here, we present a rigorous security proof of it.

Conference on Lasers and Electro-OpticsJan 1, 20097 citations

The Security of SARG04 Protocol with An Untrusted Source

Hong Mei Guo, Xiang Peng, Bingjie Xu

We investigate the security of SARG04 protocol with untrusted source. The secure key rate is derived given that several key parameters of the untrusted source are known. Further, a passive scheme is proposed to monitor the untrusted-source parameters.

International Conference on Quantum InformationJan 1, 20110 citations

Quantum Information and Computation

The security of SARG04 protocol in plug and play QKD system with an untrusted source

XuBingjie, PengXiang, Guohong

Published Jul 1, 2012• 0 citations

Publisher

Abstract

DOI: 10.5555/2231016.2231024

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The Security of SARG04 Protocol in Plug and Play Quantum Key Distribution system with an Untrusted Source

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The SARG04 protocol is one of the most frequently used protocol in commercial plug-and-play quantum key distribution (QKD) system, where an eavesdropper can completely control or change the photon number statistics of the QKD source. To ensure the security of SARG04 protocol in plug-and-play QKD system with an unknown and untrusted source, the bounds of a few statistical parameters of the source need to be monitored. An active or a passive source monitor schemes are proposed to verify these parameters. Furthermore, the practical issues due to statistical fluctuation and detection noise in the source monitoring process are quantitatively analyzed. Our simulation results show that the passive scheme can be efficiently applied to plug-and-play system with SARG04 protocol.The SARG04 protocol is one of the most frequently used protocol in commercial plug-and-play quantum key distribution (QKD) system, where an eavesdropper can completely control or change the photon number statistics of the QKD source. To ensure the security of SARG04 protocol in plug-and-play QKD system with an unknown and untrusted source, the bounds of a few statistical parameters of the source need to be monitored. An active or a passive source monitor schemes are proposed to verify these parameters. Furthermore, the practical issues due to statistical fluctuation and detection noise in the source monitoring process are quantitatively analyzed. Our simulation results show that the passive scheme can be efficiently applied to plug-and-play system with SARG04 protocol.

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Sellami Ali, Omer Mahmoud

The experiment of decoy state QKD has been reported using commercial QKD system based on a standard bi-directional `Plug & Play' set-up. By making simple modifications to a commercial quantum key distribution system, decoy state QKD allows us to achieve much better performance than QKD system without decoy state in terms of key generation rate and distance. One decoy state protocol has been implemented. The obtained results demonstrate an unconditionally secure key rate of 0.127 × 10-4 per pulse for a 10 km fiber length.The experiment of decoy state QKD has been reported using commercial QKD system based on a standard bi-directional `Plug & Play' set-up. By making simple modifications to a commercial quantum key distribution system, decoy state QKD allows us to achieve much better performance than QKD system without decoy state in terms of key generation rate and distance. One decoy state protocol has been implemented. The obtained results demonstrate an unconditionally secure key rate of 0.127 × 10-4 per pulse for a 10 km fiber length.

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The security of a standard bidirectional ``plug-and-play'' quantum key distribution (QKD) system has been an open question for a long time. This is mainly because its source is equivalently controlled by an eavesdropper, which means the source is unknown and untrusted. Qualitative discussion on this subject has been made previously. In this paper, we solve this question directly by presenting the quantitative security analysis on a general class of QKD protocols whose sources are unknown and untrusted. The securities of standard Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol, $\text{weak}+\text{vacuum}$ decoy state protocol, and one-decoy state protocol, with unknown and untrusted sources are rigorously proved. We derive rigorous lower bounds to the secure key generation rates of the above three protocols. Our numerical simulation results show that QKD with an untrusted source gives a key generation rate that is close to that with a trusted source.The security of a standard bidirectional ``plug-and-play'' quantum key distribution (QKD) system has been an open question for a long time. This is mainly because its source is equivalently controlled by an eavesdropper, which means the source is unknown and untrusted. Qualitative discussion on this subject has been made previously. In this paper, we solve this question directly by presenting the quantitative security analysis on a general class of QKD protocols whose sources are unknown and untrusted. The securities of standard Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol, $\text{weak}+\text{vacuum}$ decoy state protocol, and one-decoy state protocol, with unknown and untrusted sources are rigorously proved. We derive rigorous lower bounds to the secure key generation rates of the above three protocols. Our numerical simulation results show that QKD with an untrusted source gives a key generation rate that is close to that with a trusted source.

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Quantum Key Distribution with an Untrusted Source

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\text{weak}+\text{vacuum}

decoy state protocol, and one-decoy state protocol, with unknown and untrusted sources are rigorously proved. We derive rigorous lower bounds to the secure key generation rates of the above three protocols. Our numerical simulation results show that QKD with an untrusted source gives a key generation rate that is close to that with a trusted source.