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Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics

Quantum Key Distribution with an Untrusted Source

Yi Bing Zhao, Bing Qi, Hoi‐Kwong Lo

Published Jan 1, 2009• 7 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The “Plug & play” quantum cryptography scheme has significant advantage in real-life applications over other schemes and is adopted in most commercial quantum cryptosystems. Here, we present a rigorous security proof of it.
DOI
10.1364/iqec.2009.itui3

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