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Lecture notes in computer science

Generalized Approach for Analysing Quantum Key Distribution Experiments

Arpita Maitra, Suvra Sekhar Das

Published Jan 1, 2019• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-35423-7_24

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Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables the generation of secure keys between two distant users. Security proof of QKD against general coherent attacks is challenging, while the one against collective attacks is much easier. As an effective and general solution, the postselection method tries to extend security analyses of collective attacks to be against coherent attacks. However, it gives a bad performance. To overcome this drawback, instead of directly calculating key rate by postselection method, we propose a method correlating the failure probabilities of phase error estimation against collective and coherent attacks, enabling the use of the independent and identically distributed assumption in parameter estimation against coherent attacks. Then the key rate can be obtained by uncertainty relation of entropy. Our method can be applied to various QKD protocols, providing better performance compared with the traditional postselection method. For instance, we give the finite-key analyses of the side-channel-secure (SCS) QKD and the no-phase-postselection (NPP) twin-field (TF) QKD to show their performance improvements with the proposed method.
Abstract Typical security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) require that the emitted signals are independent and identically distributed. In practice, however, this assumption is not met because intrinsic device flaws inevitably introduce correlations between the emitted signals. Although analyses addressing this issue have been recently proposed, they only consider a restrictive scenario in which the correlations have a finite and known maximum length that is much smaller than the total number of emitted signals. While it is expected that the magnitude of the correlations decreases as the pulse separation increases, the assumption that this magnitude is exactly zero after a certain point does not seem to have any physical justification. Concerningly, this means that the available analyses cannot guarantee the security of current QKD implementations. Here, we solve this pressing problem by developing a rigorous framework that, when combined with existing results, can guarantee security against pulse correlations of unbounded length. Our framework is rather general and could be applied to other situations for which the existing analyses consider a scenario that differs slightly from the actual one.
Security analyses in quantum key distribution (QKD) and other adversarial quantum tasks often assume perfect device models. However, real-world implementations often deviate from these models. Thus, it is important to develop security proofs that account for such deviations from ideality. In this work, we extend the idea of squashing maps to develop a general framework for analysing imperfect threshold detectors, treating uncharacterised device parameters such as dark counts and detection efficiencies as adversarially controlled within some ranges. This approach enables a rigorous worst-case analysis with exactly characterised devices, ensuring security proofs remain valid under realistic conditions. Our results strengthen the connection between theoretical security and practical implementations by introducing a flexible framework for integrating detector imperfections into adversarial quantum protocols.