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Chinese Physics B

Secure authentication of classical messages with single photons

Tian‐Yin Wang, Wen Qiao-yan, Fu-Chen Zhu

Published Jul 31, 2009• 24 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper proposes a scheme for secure authentication of classical messages with single photons and a hashed function. The security analysis of this scheme is also given, which shows that anyone cannot forge valid message authentication codes (MACs). In addition, the lengths of the authentication key and the MACs are invariable and shorter, in comparison with those presented authentication schemes. Moreover, quantum data storage and entanglement are not required in this scheme. Therefore, this scheme is more efficient and economical.

DOI
10.1088/1674-1056/18/8/016

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This paper proposes a scheme for secure authentication of classical messages with single photons and a hashed function. The security analysis of this scheme is also given, which shows that anyone cannot forge valid message authentication codes (MACs). In addition, the lengths of the authentication key and the MACs are invariable and shorter, in comparison with those presented authentication schemes. Moreover, quantum data storage and entanglement are not required in this scheme. Therefore, this scheme is more efficient and economical.
Quantum authentication protocol can be used to authenticate classical messages in a secure manner. In this paper, by using the cryptographic hash function and non-orthogonal qubits, a quantum authentication protocol of classical messages is proposed. In our protocol, the classical messages and their corresponding tags are encoded as nonorthogonal qubits. The message receiver decodes the classical messages and their corresponding tags from the received qubits by using the authentication key. To verify the validity of the received classical messages, the message receiver verifies whether the hash values of the decoded classical messages are equal to the corresponding tags. Our scheme can be proved to be secure against forgery attack and measurement attack. On the other hand, the authentication key is a binary string, which can be securely obtained and easily saved. What is more, because the authentication key remains secure after executing the authentication protocol, it provides the possibility of reusing the authentication key.
Classical messages can be authenticated by traditional authentication protocols based on hash functions.The security of these protocols depends on long authentication keys, the selection of appropriate hash functions and some assumptions concerning the computational complexity of some algorithms.In this paper, by encoding the classical binary messages and binary keys as nonorthogonal quantum messages and nonorthogonal sets of states, respectively, and using quantum encrypting scheme, a new quantum authentication protocol is proposed.In our protocol, instead of entangled quantum states, the traditional binary bits, which can be easily saved, are encoded as quantum keys.Because the quantum messages are nonorthogonal, any forgery or measurement on the quantum messages will be detected with a certain probability.Our protocol allows the authentication of binary classical messages in a secure manner.
In conventional cryptography, information-theoretically secure message authentication can be achieved by means of universal hash functions, and requires that the two legitimate users share a random secret key, which is at least twice as long as the tag. We address the question of whether quantum resources can offer any advantage over classical unconditionally secure message authentication codes. It is shown that a broad class of symmetric prepare-and-measure quantum message-authentication schemes cannot do better than their classical counterparts.
We construct the first Message Authentication Codes (MACs) that are existentially unforgeable against a quantum chosen message attack. These chosen message attacks model a quantum adversary’s ability to obtain the MAC on a superposition of messages of its choice. We begin by showing that a quantum secure PRF is sufficient for constructing a quantum secure MAC, a fact that is considerably harder to prove than its classical analogue. Next, we show that a variant of Carter-Wegman MACs can be proven to be quantum secure. Unlike the classical settings, we present an attack showing that a pair-wise independent hash family is insufficient to construct a quantum secure one-time MAC, but we prove that a four-wise independent family is sufficient for one-time security. Keywords: Quantum computing, MAC,chosen message attacks, post-quantum security 1
In conventional cryptography, information-theoretically secure message authentication can be achieved by means of universal hash functions, and requires that the two legitimate users share a random secret key, which is at least twice as long as the tag. We address the question of whether quantum resources can offer any advantage over classical unconditionally secure message authentication codes. It is shown that a broad class of symmetric prepare-and-measure quantum message-authentication schemes cannot do better than their classical counterparts.
The rise of quantum computing poses significant challenges to security systems, with traditional message authentication codes (MACs) at unprecedented risk of compromise. This paper proposes a quantum message authentication code (QMAC) leveraging quantum mechanics to achieve robust security. The QMAC uses quantum one-way functions (QOWFs) to convert encrypted classical bits into qubits. This approach fundamentally differs from the computational hardness assumptions of conventional MACs. The QMAC's security is computationally difficulty-independent based on the inherent properties of quantum mechanics, making it impervious to exhaustive search attacks. Additionally, the protocol integrates authentication directly into the secure communication framework, obviating the need for extra particles and reducing computational complexity compared to stabilizer code-based or controlled unitary operations. Through a rigorous security analysis, we demonstrate the resilience of the proposed QMAC protocol against a wide range of adversarial strategies, including interception-resend attacks, identity impersonation, and entanglement-based attacks, among others.