Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

IEEE photonics journal

Quantum Message Authentication Code Independent of Computational Difficulty

Ping Wang, Yuxuan Lu, Yian Lei, Naixue N. Xiong

Published Jan 14, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The rise of quantum computing poses significant challenges to security systems, with traditional message authentication codes (MACs) at unprecedented risk of compromise. This paper proposes a quantum message authentication code (QMAC) leveraging quantum mechanics to achieve robust security. The QMAC uses quantum one-way functions (QOWFs) to convert encrypted classical bits into qubits. This approach fundamentally differs from the computational hardness assumptions of conventional MACs. The QMAC's security is computationally difficulty-independent based on the inherent properties of quantum mechanics, making it impervious to exhaustive search attacks. Additionally, the protocol integrates authentication directly into the secure communication framework, obviating the need for extra particles and reducing computational complexity compared to stabilizer code-based or controlled unitary operations. Through a rigorous security analysis, we demonstrate the resilience of the proposed QMAC protocol against a wide range of adversarial strategies, including interception-resend attacks, identity impersonation, and entanglement-based attacks, among others.

DOI
10.1109/jphot.2026.3654050

Related papers

Quantum message authentication scheme based on remote state preparation

Min-Sung Kang, Yeon-Ho Choi, Yong‐Su Kim +4 more

Abstract We propose a quantum message authentication scheme that provides integrity and origin authentication using a remote state preparation. Authentication is one of the security services that must be provided in secure communication. Quantum message authentication is the base scheme for realizing quantum authentication that is known to be a secure technique even in a forthcoming quantum computer environment. The proposed scheme creates a quantum message authentication code (QMAC) with only a single qubit measurement. It is therefore easy to implement and operate compared to existing technology that normally generates a QMAC with a Bell measurement or controlled unitary operation. For security analysis, we design a quantum random oracle model based on the random oracle model and demonstrate the quantum collision resistance with it. From the analysis, the probability of the quantum collision is 0.69 N per qubit, where N is the size of the message sequence. Since the probability of quantum collision in the case of N ≥ 13 becomes extremely low of under 0.8%, we confirm that the proposed scheme guarantees the integrity and origin authentication of the message.

Physica Scripta•Sep 14, 2018•11 citations

Quantum-Secure Message Authentication Codes.

Dan Boneh, Mark Zhandry

We construct the first Message Authentication Codes (MACs) that are existentially unforgeable against a quantum chosen message attack. These chosen message attacks model a quantum adversary’s ability to obtain the MAC on a superposition of messages of its choice. We begin by showing that a quantum secure PRF is sufficient for constructing a quantum secure MAC, a fact that is considerably harder to prove than its classical analogue. Next, we show that a variant of Carter-Wegman MACs can be proven to be quantum secure. Unlike the classical settings, we present an attack showing that a pair-wise independent hash family is insufficient to construct a quantum secure one-time MAC, but we prove that a four-wise independent family is sufficient for one-time security. Keywords: Quantum computing, MAC,chosen message attacks, post-quantum security 1

Electronic colloquium on computational complexity•Jan 1, 2012•3 citations

Quantum Authentication Protocol of Classical Messages Based on Different Sets of Orthogonal Quantum States

Xiangjun, Chaoyang Li, Dongsheng Chen +1 more

Most of the quantum authentication protocols are used to authenticate quantum messages.In this paper, by using a pair of non-entangled qubits, a quantum authentication protocol of classical messages is proposed.In the pair of qubits, the first one is used to carry a bit message, and the second one is used as a tag to authenticate the classical message.In our protocol, a bit string instead of a sequence of maximally entangled states is used directly as an authentication key, so the authentication key can be easily stored offline.On the other hand, in our protocol, a unitary operation UA is chosen to encrypt the qubits so that the successful probability of all attacks analyzed is less than one.Our quantum authentication protocol is secure against various attacks such as the no-message attack and message attacks.

International Journal of Future Generation Communication and Networking•May 31, 2016•0 citations

Quantum Key Distribution Protocols with Classical Authentication

Jincheng Zhang

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers theoretically unbreakable key exchange, but is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks if the identities of the communicating parties are not rigorously verified. This paper proposes a novel QKD protocol integrating classical authentication to provide a layered security approach. The core concept involves utilizing a QKD system alongside a robust classical authentication mechanism. This layered approach significantly reduces the risk of successful attacks by ensuring that both parties are who they claim to be before key exchange occurs. The protocol's security relies on the assumption that the classical authentication system is itself secure. We detail the protocol's components, focusing on the integration of Bennett-Brassard (BB84) or a similar QKD scheme with a practical authentication protocol, and analyze its security properties. The proposed system is designed to mitigate the threats posed by adversaries who can intercept and manipulate the quantum key exchange without compromising the authentication process. The potential for improved security and resilience is demonstrated, representing a significant advancement in the practical application of QKD.

•Sep 3, 2026•0 citations

Quantum Noise-Based Communication Protocol Security Authentication

Jincheng Zhang

This paper proposes a novel communication protocol security authentication scheme leveraging the inherent randomness of quantum noise. The core claim is to enhance communication security by exploiting this randomness for key generation, information encryption, and ultimately, secure authentication. The proposed mechanism involves designing a protocol where quantum noise is intentionally introduced during key exchange and transmission, fundamentally disrupting traditional cryptographic attacks reliant on predictable patterns. Statistical analysis of the noise patterns then forms the basis for the authentication process, creating a robust and resilient security layer. The novelty lies in moving beyond traditional cryptographic assumptions and directly utilizing the unpredictable nature of quantum phenomena for security. This approach offers a potential defense against attacks that target vulnerabilities in classical cryptographic systems. The paper details the protocol design, focusing on the mathematical formulation of the key generation, encryption, and authentication processes, highlighting the critical role of noise parameters and statistical analysis.

•Sep 4, 2026•0 citations

Quantum authentication of classical messages

Marcos Curty, David J. Santos

Although key distribution is arguably the most studied context on which to apply quantum cryptographic techniques, message authentication, i.e., certifying the identity of the message originator and the integrity of the message sent, can also benefit from the use of quantum resources. Classically, message authentication can be performed by techniques based on hash functions. However, the security of the resulting protocols depends on the selection of appropriate hash functions, and on the use of long authentication keys. In this paper, we propose a quantum authentication procedure that, making use of just one qubit as the authentication key, allows the authentication of binary classical messages in a secure manner.

arXiv:quant-ph/0103122•Physical Review A•Nov 14, 2001•133 citations
The rise of quantum computing poses significant challenges to security systems, with traditional message authentication codes (MACs) at unprecedented risk of compromise. This paper proposes a quantum message authentication code (QMAC) leveraging quantum mechanics to achieve robust security. The QMAC uses quantum one-way functions (QOWFs) to convert encrypted classical bits into qubits. This approach fundamentally differs from the computational hardness assumptions of conventional MACs. The QMAC's security is computationally difficulty-independent based on the inherent properties of quantum mechanics, making it impervious to exhaustive search attacks. Additionally, the protocol integrates authentication directly into the secure communication framework, obviating the need for extra particles and reducing computational complexity compared to stabilizer code-based or controlled unitary operations. Through a rigorous security analysis, we demonstrate the resilience of the proposed QMAC protocol against a wide range of adversarial strategies, including interception-resend attacks, identity impersonation, and entanglement-based attacks, among others.
Abstract We propose a quantum message authentication scheme that provides integrity and origin authentication using a remote state preparation. Authentication is one of the security services that must be provided in secure communication. Quantum message authentication is the base scheme for realizing quantum authentication that is known to be a secure technique even in a forthcoming quantum computer environment. The proposed scheme creates a quantum message authentication code (QMAC) with only a single qubit measurement. It is therefore easy to implement and operate compared to existing technology that normally generates a QMAC with a Bell measurement or controlled unitary operation. For security analysis, we design a quantum random oracle model based on the random oracle model and demonstrate the quantum collision resistance with it. From the analysis, the probability of the quantum collision is 0.69 N per qubit, where N is the size of the message sequence. Since the probability of quantum collision in the case of N ≥ 13 becomes extremely low of under 0.8%, we confirm that the proposed scheme guarantees the integrity and origin authentication of the message.
We construct the first Message Authentication Codes (MACs) that are existentially unforgeable against a quantum chosen message attack. These chosen message attacks model a quantum adversary’s ability to obtain the MAC on a superposition of messages of its choice. We begin by showing that a quantum secure PRF is sufficient for constructing a quantum secure MAC, a fact that is considerably harder to prove than its classical analogue. Next, we show that a variant of Carter-Wegman MACs can be proven to be quantum secure. Unlike the classical settings, we present an attack showing that a pair-wise independent hash family is insufficient to construct a quantum secure one-time MAC, but we prove that a four-wise independent family is sufficient for one-time security. Keywords: Quantum computing, MAC,chosen message attacks, post-quantum security 1
Most of the quantum authentication protocols are used to authenticate quantum messages.In this paper, by using a pair of non-entangled qubits, a quantum authentication protocol of classical messages is proposed.In the pair of qubits, the first one is used to carry a bit message, and the second one is used as a tag to authenticate the classical message.In our protocol, a bit string instead of a sequence of maximally entangled states is used directly as an authentication key, so the authentication key can be easily stored offline.On the other hand, in our protocol, a unitary operation UA is chosen to encrypt the qubits so that the successful probability of all attacks analyzed is less than one.Our quantum authentication protocol is secure against various attacks such as the no-message attack and message attacks.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers theoretically unbreakable key exchange, but is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks if the identities of the communicating parties are not rigorously verified. This paper proposes a novel QKD protocol integrating classical authentication to provide a layered security approach. The core concept involves utilizing a QKD system alongside a robust classical authentication mechanism. This layered approach significantly reduces the risk of successful attacks by ensuring that both parties are who they claim to be before key exchange occurs. The protocol's security relies on the assumption that the classical authentication system is itself secure. We detail the protocol's components, focusing on the integration of Bennett-Brassard (BB84) or a similar QKD scheme with a practical authentication protocol, and analyze its security properties. The proposed system is designed to mitigate the threats posed by adversaries who can intercept and manipulate the quantum key exchange without compromising the authentication process. The potential for improved security and resilience is demonstrated, representing a significant advancement in the practical application of QKD.
This paper proposes a novel communication protocol security authentication scheme leveraging the inherent randomness of quantum noise. The core claim is to enhance communication security by exploiting this randomness for key generation, information encryption, and ultimately, secure authentication. The proposed mechanism involves designing a protocol where quantum noise is intentionally introduced during key exchange and transmission, fundamentally disrupting traditional cryptographic attacks reliant on predictable patterns. Statistical analysis of the noise patterns then forms the basis for the authentication process, creating a robust and resilient security layer. The novelty lies in moving beyond traditional cryptographic assumptions and directly utilizing the unpredictable nature of quantum phenomena for security. This approach offers a potential defense against attacks that target vulnerabilities in classical cryptographic systems. The paper details the protocol design, focusing on the mathematical formulation of the key generation, encryption, and authentication processes, highlighting the critical role of noise parameters and statistical analysis.
Although key distribution is arguably the most studied context on which to apply quantum cryptographic techniques, message authentication, i.e., certifying the identity of the message originator and the integrity of the message sent, can also benefit from the use of quantum resources. Classically, message authentication can be performed by techniques based on hash functions. However, the security of the resulting protocols depends on the selection of appropriate hash functions, and on the use of long authentication keys. In this paper, we propose a quantum authentication procedure that, making use of just one qubit as the authentication key, allows the authentication of binary classical messages in a secure manner.