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Nature Physics

Leibniz’s principle of indistinguishability

Mark Buchanan

Published Nov 1, 2019• 3 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1038/s41567-019-0711-5

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The notions of identity and indistinguishability are a frequent source of misunderstanding, even among researchers working within the same field. The present text is primarily didactic in intent: it aims to show that a large part of such disagreements concerns the association of different meanings with one and the same word. Six notions are introduced and articulated – qualitative identity and numerical identity, haecceity, operational distinguishability, genidentity and permutational indistinguishability – and their content is clarified by examining two paradigmatic examples in parallel: two quantum particles and two occurrences of a word in a text. It is argued that the monadic version of Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles is violated both by bosons, which can occupy one and the same state, and by fermions, for which indistinguishability operates in spite of Pauli’s exclusion principle, as the statistical counts make evident; the status of weaker relational versions of the principle remains contested. In the concluding part, the linguistic example is reread in the light of the conceptuality interpretation of quantum mechanics, for which it ceases to be merely an analogy and becomes a genuine explanation: on this interpretation, absent information can signify an absence of reality rather than mere ignorance.

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The notions of identity and indistinguishability are a frequent source of misunderstanding, even among researchers working within the same field. The present text is primarily didactic in intent: it aims to show that a large part of such disagreements concerns the association of different meanings with one and the same word. Six notions are introduced and articulated – qualitative identity and numerical identity, haecceity, operational distinguishability, genidentity and permutational indistinguishability – and their content is clarified by examining two paradigmatic examples in parallel: two quantum particles and two occurrences of a word in a text. It is argued that the monadic version of Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles is violated both by bosons, which can occupy one and the same state, and by fermions, for which indistinguishability operates in spite of Pauli’s exclusion principle, as the statistical counts make evident; the status of weaker relational versions of the principle remains contested. In the concluding part, the linguistic example is reread in the light of the conceptuality interpretation of quantum mechanics, for which it ceases to be merely an analogy and becomes a genuine explanation: on this interpretation, absent information can signify an absence of reality rather than mere ignorance.
In a series of recent papers, Simon Saunders, Fred Muller, and Michael Seevinck have collectively argued, against the folklore, that some nontrivial version of Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles is upheld in quantum mechanics. They argue that all particles—fermions, paraparticles, anyons, even bosons—may be weakly discerned by some physical relation. Here I show that their arguments make illegitimate appeal to nonsymmetric, that is, permutation-noninvariant, quantities and that therefore their conclusions do not go through. However, I show that alternative, symmetric quantities may be found to do the required work. I conclude that the Saunders-Muller-Seevinck heterodoxy can be saved.