The notions of identity and indistinguishability are a frequent source of misunderstanding, even among researchers working within the same field. The present text is primarily didactic in intent: it aims to show that a large part of such disagreements concerns the association of different meanings with one and the same word. Six notions are introduced and articulated – qualitative identity and numerical identity, haecceity, operational distinguishability, genidentity and permutational indistinguishability – and their content is clarified by examining two paradigmatic examples in parallel: two quantum particles and two occurrences of a word in a text. It is argued that the monadic version of Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles is violated both by bosons, which can occupy one and the same state, and by fermions, for which indistinguishability operates in spite of Pauli’s exclusion principle, as the statistical counts make evident; the status of weaker relational versions of the principle remains contested. In the concluding part, the linguistic example is reread in the light of the conceptuality interpretation of quantum mechanics, for which it ceases to be merely an analogy and becomes a genuine explanation: on this interpretation, absent information can signify an absence of reality rather than mere ignorance.
The notions of identity and indistinguishability are a frequent source of misunderstanding, even among researchers working within the same field. The present text is primarily didactic in intent: it aims to show that a large part of such disagreements concerns the association of different meanings with one and the same word. Six notions are introduced and articulated – qualitative identity and numerical identity, haecceity, operational distinguishability, genidentity and permutational indistinguishability – and their content is clarified by examining two paradigmatic examples in parallel: two quantum particles and two occurrences of a word in a text. It is argued that the monadic version of Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles is violated both by bosons, which can occupy one and the same state, and by fermions, for which indistinguishability operates in spite of Pauli’s exclusion principle, as the statistical counts make evident; the status of weaker relational versions of the principle remains contested. In the concluding part, the linguistic example is reread in the light of the conceptuality interpretation of quantum mechanics, for which it ceases to be merely an analogy and becomes a genuine explanation: on this interpretation, absent information can signify an absence of reality rather than mere ignorance.
This paper is concerned with the question of whether atomic particles of the same species, i. e. with the same intrinsic state-independent properties of mass, spin, electric charge, etc, violate the Leibnizian Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, in the sense that, while there is more than one of them, their state-dependent properties may also all be the same. The answer depends on what exactly the state-dependent properties of atomic particles are taken to be. On the plausible interpretation that these should comprise all monadic and relational properties that can be expressed in terms of physical magnitudes associated with self-adjoint operators that can be defined for the individual particles, then the weakest form of the Principle is shown to be violated for bosons, fermions and higher-order paraparticles, treated in first quantization
Introduction In sections 6 and 7 of their paper in this volume, French and Rickles raise the question of the logical relations between the indistinguishability postulate (IP) and the various senses in which particles might fail to be individuals. In section 6 they refer to the convincing arguments of French and Redhead (1988) and of Butterfield (1993) that IP does not logically entail non-individuality, understood several ways – even though, as all seem to concede, there is something perverse about taking bosons and fermions to be individuals. Going the other way, the possibility of IP violating ‘quons’ (Greenberg, 1991) shows that if non-individuality is taken to mean the absence of continuous distinguishing trajectories, characteristic of standard quantum mechanics (QM), then non-individuality does not entail IP. Nor, as French and Rickles point out, do substance or haecceity views of individuality. But what if we conceive of individuality in terms of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII)? First, French and Redhead (1988) and Butterfield (1993) have given theorems showing that bosons and fermions violate PII, while the former have also demonstrated violations of PII in the case of a certain paraparticle state. But these cases, as I will explain (and as French and Rickles point out), cover just a very few of the possible kinds of quantum particles, and so for each kind the question arises as to whether it violates PII.
The suggestion that particles of the same kind may be indistinguishable in a fundamental sense, even so that challenges to traditional notions of individuality and identity may arise, has first come up in the context of classical statistical mechanics. In particular, the Gibbs paradox has sometimes been interpreted as a sign of the untenability of the classical concept of a particle and as a premonition that quantum theory is needed. This idea of a ‘quantum connection’ stubbornly persists in the literature, even though it has also been criticized frequently. Here we shall argue that although this criticism is justified, the proposed alternative solutions have often been wrong and have not put the paradox in its right perspective. In fact, the Gibbs paradox is unrelated to fundamental issues of particle identity; only distinguishability in a pragmatic sense plays a role (in this we develop ideas of van Kampen [10]), and in principle the paradox always is there as long as the concept of a particle applies at all. In line with this we show that the paradox survives even in quantum mechanics, in spite of the quantum mechanical (anti-)symmetrization postulates.
This thesis examines the concepts of identity and individuality via scientifically-informed philosophical analysis. It has two parts. The first part deals with metaphysical claims that turn out to be, in effect, very general empirical claims extracted from our (supposed, but rationally-accredited) knowledge of the world. I here compare two approaches: a) the Leibniz-Quine view of identity as a derivative relation, and, relatedly, of individuality as dependent on the qualities of things; and b) the view that identity is a non-analysable primitive, and, relatedly, that the individuality of things is not reducible to anything else. The former position, based on the Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernibles as a criterion of individuation, might appear prima facie more plausible. However, I argue that it runs into difficulties both at the level of a priori analysis and in terms of 'fit' with the evidence described by our best science. It is, in fact, not even as compelling from the empiricist point of view as is commonly believed. I therefore argue that the position that identity and individuality are primitive may be preferred. In the second part of the thesis - under the assumption that the proper role of metaphysics is to characterise the best solutions to issues that are left open by current science - I deal with the question regarding whether and how the ultimate constituents of reality can actually be conceived of as primitive individuals. I argue in favour of an ontology of tropes, develop the view in detail and defend it against various criticisms. The fundamental tropes that constitute the basic 'building blocks' of reality are identified with the state-independent properties of elementary particles. The way in which these constitute complex particulars is described, and certain peculiarities having to do with quantum statistics are accounted for. I conclude by suggesting possible avenues for further research.
In this article, we discuss the identity and indistinguishability of quantum systems and the consequent need to introduce an extra postulate in Quantum Mechanics to correctly describe situations involving indistinguishable particles. This is, for electrons, the Pauli Exclusion Principle, or in general, the Symmetrization Postulate. Then, we introduce fermions and bosons and the distributions respectively describing their statistical behaviour in indistinguishable situations. Following that, we discuss the spin-statistics connection, as well as alternative statistics and experimental evidence for all these results, including the use of bunching and antibunching of particles emerging from a beam splitter as a signature for some bosonic or fermionic states.
We extend the work of French and Redhead [1988] further examining the relation of quantum statistics to the assumption that quantum entities have the sort of identity generally assumed for physical objects, more specifically an identity which makes them susceptible to being thought of as conceptually individuatable and labelable even though they cannot be experimentally distinguished. We also further examine the relation of such hypothesized identity of quantum entities to the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. We conclude that although such an assumption of identity is consistent with the facts of quantum statistics, methodological considerations show that we should take quantum entities to be entirely unindividuatable, in the way suggested by a Fock space description.