Physics Today
Interpretations of quantum mechanics
Jean Bricmont
Published Oct 1, 2019• 2 citations
Abstract
Bricmont replies: I find it odd, as the reviewer of a book, to be criticized because I did not discuss a theory that was not mentioned in the book. But I’ll answer Robert Griffiths point by point.In Bohmian mechanics (BM), it is simply a mathematical fact, noted by John Bell in chapter 14 of reference 1 of the Griffiths letter, that in the delayed double-slit experiment Griffith describes, particles cannot cross a symmetry plane but instead bounce back from it.11. J. Bricmont, S. Goldstein, D. Hemmick, J. Stat. Phys. (2019), doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10955-019-02361-w. Offering a different theory in which particles follow a different trajectory does not refute that fact.In standard quantum mechanics (QM), particles do not have trajectories; that fact was emphasized by, among others, Richard Feynman22. R. Feynman, The Character of Physical Law, MIT Press (1967), p. 145. and Lev Landau and Evgeny Lifshitz.33. L. D. Landau, E. M. Lifshitz, Quantum Mechanics: Non-Relativistic Theory, 2nd ed., J. B. Sykes, J. S. Bell, trans., Pergamon Press (1965), p. 2.The theory by Griffiths, based on the idea of “consistent histories,” is therefore not standard QM but is instead, like BM, an attempt to complete QM, by adding histories that consist of real events that occur independently of any measurements made on the quantum system (a measurement means an interaction with that system that may affect what would happen to it in the absence of measurements). Unfortunately, Griffiths’s attempt runs into contradictions, as shown in particular by Sheldon Goldstein in his two-part feature for Physics Today (March 1998, page 42, and April 1998, page 38).Griffiths misses the first step in Bell’s proof of nonlocality: the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) dilemma that perfect correlations between distant events cannot be explained unless one supposes either that some form of action at a distance occurs or that the events are predetermined by antecedent causes. The latter assumption is not a “classical” one; it is one part of the EPR dilemma. But Bell showed with his inequalities that the assumption leads to a contradiction. Hence, nonlocality follows. For more details, see, for example, references 11. J. Bricmont, S. Goldstein, D. Hemmick, J. Stat. Phys. (2019), doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10955-019-02361-w. and 44. R. Tumulka, “The assumptions of Bell’s proof,” International Journal of Quantum Foundations (21 December 2014). and Travis Norsen’s book.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<1. J. Bricmont, S. Goldstein, D. Hemmick, J. Stat. Phys. (2019), doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10955-019-02361-w. Google ScholarCrossref2. R. Feynman, The Character of Physical Law, MIT Press (1967), p. 145. Google Scholar3. L. D. Landau, E. M. Lifshitz, Quantum Mechanics: Non-Relativistic Theory, 2nd ed., J. B. Sykes, J. S. Bell, trans., Pergamon Press (1965), p. 2. Google Scholar4. R. Tumulka, “The assumptions of Bell’s proof,” International Journal of Quantum Foundations (21 December 2014). Google Scholar© 2019 American Institute of Physics.
- DOI
- 10.1063/pt.3.4307
Related papers
Interpretations of quantum mechanics
Robert B. Griffiths
Jean Bricmont’s review of Travis Norsen’s Foundations of Quantum Mechanics: An Exploration of the Physical Meaning of Quantum Theory (Physics Today, April 2018, page 58) stresses the virtues of Louis de Broglie and David Bohm’s pilot-wave interpretation of quantum mechanics, also referred to as Bohmian mechanics (BM), but the review omits mention of some of that interpretation’s rather serious defects. As Bricmont notes, in BM the standard Schrödinger wavefunction ψ(r, t) for a particle is augmented with a classical trajectory r(t) that is interpreted as the actual precise physical position of the particle as a function of time. Sometimes that Bohmian trajectory can provide a helpful intuitive picture, but in other cases it is quite misleading.John Bell presented an example of how Bohmian trajectories can mislead: a modified double-slit experiment with a lens placed right after each slit so that the emerging beams cross on their way to two distant detectors located beyond the crossing point.11. J. S. Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics: Collected Papers on Quantum Philosophy, Cambridge U. Press (1987). The beam from the lower slit arrives at the upper detector, and that from the upper slit at the lower detector. If a particle arrives at the upper detector, which slit did it pass through?Bell claims that the naive answer—that the particle came from the lower slit, based on the intuition that particles move in straight lines in a vacuum—is wrong. He notes that a Bohmian particle cannot cross the symmetry plane separating the upper slit and detector from their lower counterparts, and thus a particle arriving at the upper detector actually came from the upper slit: first it moved downward, but when it arrived in the region where the beams cross, it “bounced” back upward toward the upper detector.Years ago I published an analysis that contradicted Bell and showed that the answer he regarded as naive—the particle passes through the crossing region without bouncing—was perfectly good quantum mechanics.22. R. B. Griffiths, Phys. Lett. A 261, 227 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0375-9601(99)00542-3 I am still waiting for someone in the Bohmian community to publish a reply.Norsen is troubled because the nonlocal, often superluminal influences needed to make sense of BM are hard to reconcile with special relativity. Indeed, the widely accepted no-signaling principle of quantum mechanics asserts that those influences cannot transmit information, so a direct experimental detection of them is out of reach. Defenders of BM say they know that nonlocal influences exist because quantum mechanics violates Bell’s inequalities. But as I and others have pointed out, the hidden variables used in derivations of Bell inequalities are fundamentally classical,33. See R. B. Griffiths, Found. Phys. 41, 705 (2011), and references therein. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-010-9512-5 in contrast to the representation of quantum properties by Hilbert subspaces, as introduced by John von Neumann.44. J. von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, R. T. Beyer, trans., Princeton U. Press (1955), chap. 3.5. Projectors on those subspaces do not generally commute, which clearly distinguishes quantum physics from classical. Thus that feature, rather than a failure of locality, is why Bell’s inequalities do not agree with quantum theory and experiment.The BM particle trajectories are instances of classical hidden variables, so the nonlocality of the pilot-wave interpretation of quantum mechanics is not surprising. Indeed, when proper account is taken of noncommutativity, one can show that quantum theory satisfies a principle of locality that Albert Einstein might well have agreed with: Objective properties of an isolated individual system do not change when something is done to another, noninteracting system.33. See R. B. Griffiths, Found. Phys. 41, 705 (2011), and references therein. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-010-9512-5 Thus a consistent Hilbert-space formulation of quantum theory without hidden variables removes any worry about a conflict with special relativity.Although Bohmian mechanics was worthy of consideration and has been useful in the development of quantum foundations, ignoring more recent developments is not the way to honor the memory of one of the great physicists of the last century. I hope that a second edition of Norsen’s well-written book will take account of more recent work.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. J. S. Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics: Collected Papers on Quantum Philosophy, Cambridge U. Press (1987). Google Scholar2. R. B. Griffiths, Phys. Lett. A 261, 227 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0375-9601(99)00542-3, Google ScholarCrossref3. See R. B. Griffiths, Found. Phys. 41, 705 (2011), and references therein. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-010-9512-5, Google ScholarCrossref4. J. von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, R. T. Beyer, trans., Princeton U. Press (1955), chap. 3.5. Google Scholar© 2019 American Institute of Physics.
Physics Today•Oct 1, 2019•5 citations
Measured responses to quantum Bayesianism
Michael Nauenberg
Some time ago, John Bell and I wrote a tongue-in-cheek article on the interpretation of quantum mechanics;11. J. S. Bell, M. Nauenberg, in Preludes in Theoretical Physics, A. de Shalit, H. Feshbach, L. van Hove, eds., North Holland, Amsterdam (1966), p. 270;reprinted in J. S. Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge U. Press, New York (1987), p. 24. in it we remarked that only a minority of physicists had any interest in the topic and that the typical physicist thought he would understand it “if ever he can spare twenty minutes to think about it.” According to David Mermin, however, that situation has changed dramatically, and “new interpretations [of quantum mechanics] appear every year.”Actually, most textbooks on the subject continue to be based on the well-established Born interpretation of quantum mechanics, which postulates that the absolute square of the Schrödinger wavefunction, projected onto a particular quantum state, gives the probability for the occurrence of that state after an appropriate measurement has been made. Mermin indicated that the problem with the Born interpretation involves a confusion, “prevalent among physicists,” regarding the nature of probability. He presented his preference for a “personalist Bayesian view,” which leads separate “agents,” like Eugene Wigner and his friend, to make different probability assignments based on their beliefs. But as Richard Feynman remarked, “Nature does not know what you are looking at, and she behaves the way she is going to behave whether you bother to take down the data or not.”22. R. P. Feynman, R. B. Leighton, M. Sands, The Feynman Lectures on Physics, vol. 3, Addison-Wesley, Redwood City, CA (1989), p. 3–7.Indeed, as applied to experiments, probability simply corresponds to the relative frequency for the occurrence of a given final state after identical states are prepared initially and measurements are made by appropriate detectors—devices that, through an irreversible macroscopic process, provide a permanent record of the outcome. Hence, the results of an experiment are independent of any observers, whose only role is to set up appropriate measurement devices, calculate the probabilities from quantum theory, and then write papers based on the recorded results.As Max Born also emphasized, in classical mechanics the situation is analogous, when one takes into account that in practice initial conditions in an experiment are known only imprecisely.33. M. Born, Dan. Mat. Fys. Medd. 30 (2), 1 (1955). Hence the observed evolution of the system is also determined by a probability function that satisfies the Liouville equation. But in that case, after a measurement is performed, no one talks about the “collapse” of this classical function, whereas in quantum mechanics it is common to use that controversial expression for the Schrödinger wavefunction.Mermin discussed a “shifty split” between the classical and the quantum domain, a split that supposedly “haunts quantum mechanics.” He claimed that “regardless of what is split from what, all versions of the shifty split are vague and ambiguous.” However, that is not always the case, as a simple example shows. Consider an initial quantum wavepacket for a particle under an attractive central force that varies inversely with the square of the radial distance—the classic problem of planetary motion from the viewpoint of quantum mechanics, for example, or an excited electron in a Rydberg atom. For a finite time, the wavepacket will follow a classical Keplerian elliptic orbit, but like the Liouville distribution for the analogous classical problem, from the outset it will disperse due to the spread in initial position and momentum.For the classical distribution to be in close correspondence with the quantum wavepacket, its initial spread is assumed to satisfy the uncertainty relation. Eventually, however, the head of the wavepacket, like in the classical distribution, will catch up with its tail. Afterwards, further spreading of the wavepacket leads to interference effects between the two components, and the classical–quantum correspondence ceases to be valid. The time when such interference effects first appear is of order nτ/3, where n is the mean principal quantum number of the wavepacket and τ is the Kepler period.44. M. Nauenberg, Phys. Rev. A 40, 1133 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.40.1133 Experimentally, that transition has been observed to agree with theory in Rydberg atoms55. M. Nauenberg, C. Stroud, J. Yeazell, Sci. Am., June 1994, p. 44. https://doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican0694-44 for n = 100, τ = 152 picoseconds, and nothing shifty about this classical–quantum correspondence is found. For planetary orbits, however, n is of order 1070, and therefore the answer to Albert Einstein’s often repeated remark “Is the moon there when nobody looks?” (see David Mermin, Physics Today, April 1985, page 38) is yes.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. J. S. Bell, M. Nauenberg, in Preludes in Theoretical Physics, A. de Shalit, H. Feshbach, L. van Hove, eds., North Holland, Amsterdam (1966), p. 270; Google Scholarreprinted in J. S. Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge U. Press, New York (1987), p. 24. Google Scholar2. R. P. Feynman, R. B. Leighton, M. Sands, The Feynman Lectures on Physics, vol. 3, Addison-Wesley, Redwood City, CA (1989), p. 3–7. Google Scholar3. M. Born, Dan. Mat. Fys. Medd. 30 (2), 1 (1955). Google Scholar4. M. Nauenberg, Phys. Rev. A 40, 1133 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.40.1133, Google ScholarCrossref, CAS5. M. Nauenberg, C. Stroud, J. Yeazell, Sci. Am., June 1994, p. 44. https://doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican0694-44, Google ScholarCrossref© 2012 American Institute of Physics.
Physics Today•Nov 30, 2012•0 citations
More on the quantum measurement problem
Gregory N. Derry
Although I have neither an objection to nor an endorsement of David Mermin’s major premise in his Quick Study, “There is no quantum measurement problem” (Physics Today, June 2022, page 62), I would like to make several contextual points.Mermin’s argument has an extensive history, along with a comparable history of rebuttal. Five decades ago Max Jammer wrote that “measurements in quantum mechanics are no more or less problematic than in classical physics, for the Hilbert space vector is only a purely formal device for relating the statistics associated with these arrangements to the physics of observations in classical physics.” That seems like a condensed version of the argument Mermin presents. On the following page, however, Jammer notes that a “problematic aspect whose serious implications were only gradually understood was the fact that as long as a quantum mechanical one-body or many-body system does not interact with macroscopic objects, as long as its motion is described by the deterministic Schrödinger time-dependent equation, no events could be considered to take place in the system.”11. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474.Niels Bohr giving a lecture in Copenhagen in April 1929. (Photograph by Samuel Goudsmit, courtesy of the AIP Emilio Segrè Visual Archives, Goudsmit Collection.)PPT|High resolutionRegarding the quotations from Niels Bohr, Mermin’s point is entirely valid and represents Bohr’s position accurately, but Bohr’s thought is always subtle and difficult to capture completely. Another quotation from Bohr, which is consistent with everything else he wrote, is, “The decisive point is that in neither case does the appropriate widening of our conceptual framework imply any appeal to the observing subject, which would hinder unambiguous communication of experience.”22. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. That quotation seems inconsistent with Mermin’s paragraph that includes the passage “Why should I insist that my interpretation of science, which I use to make sense of the world that I experience, should never make any mention of me?” Bohr always insisted that his framework was a rational “generalization” of classical objectivity.The last and most conceptually important point concerns the ontological status of probability. I don’t necessarily disagree with Mermin and Bruno de Finetti, but it is by no means obvious that they are correct either. David Hawkins, for example, begins 50 pages of rigorous analysis with a brief statement of a major premise.The obvious and natural interpretation of probability in this context is that it introduces, not something that has to do with the nature of the physical system, but something that has to do with the incompleteness of our knowledge….But this opinion turns out to be false. Ignorance of dynamical regularity may be a motive for resorting to probabilities, but it does not explain the probabilities to which we resort.33. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135.Another example can be found in Jammer’s well-known historical account of quantum theory: “For Einstein the notion of probability … was the traditional conception of classical physics, a mathematical objectivization of the human deficiency of complete or exact knowledge but ultimately a creation of the human mind…. For Born probability, as far as it was related to the wave function, was not merely a mathematical fiction but something endowed with physical reality.”44. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286.Of course, such examples don’t mean that Mermin’s position is incorrect, but I do think that they demand a better argument than a comparison to “Fairies and Witches.” I am confident that Mermin has such an argument, and I look forward to reading it as I continue working toward a coherent position on the unresolved interpretational issues of quantum theory.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474. Google Scholar2. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. Google Scholar3. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135. Google Scholar4. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286. Google Scholar© 2022 American Institute of Physics.
Physics Today•Nov 1, 2022•2 citations
Measured responses to quantum Bayesianism
N. David Mermin
Mermin replies: Robert Griffiths takes my joke about an undergraduate collapsing a wavepacket to be an attempt to solve the measurement problem. The actual QBist solution—versions of which predate QBism (see, for example, reference 11. J. B. Hartle, Am. J. Phys. 36, 704 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1975096)—is that a quantum state is not an objective property of the world but a compendium of probabilities constructed by an agent. When an agent updates her state assignment, nothing changes in her external world. The only change is in the agent’s expectations for her subsequent experience of that world, and therefore there is no measurement problem. Consistent historians agree that collapse is not a physical process, but for entirely different reasons.QBism takes the “mysterious whatever-it-is” that Griffiths criticizes in quantum orthodoxy to be the experience induced in an agent by the world. That, and the fact that different agents may have different experiences, drains the swamp, slays the dragon, and quiets the maddening paradoxes.QBists hold that any agent can indeed apply quantum mechanics to her own external world, from quarks to quasars. Only an agent’s personal, directly perceived experience is boxed off from the domain of applicability. That exclusion disagrees with most versions of the many-worlds interpretation, but it does not limit the scope of science: Alice can apply quantum mechanics to the experience of another agent, Bob, as represented through his words, writings, or drawings, all of which do belong to her external world.The way in which Bob’s experience impinges on Alice resonates with Niels Bohr’s emphasis on the need to state results of experiments in ordinary language. It also addresses Ching Hung Woo’s question of how different agents can come to agreement on their state assignments.Griffiths correctly notes that QBism violates the first desideratum he quotes from my 15-year-old “Ithaca interpretation.” Like Barack Obama’s view of marriage, my thinking about quantum foundations has evolved. But Griffiths wrongly claims that QBism rejects the other desideratum he quotes: locality. Actually, QBism insists on it. The absurdity of quantum nonlocality provides an independent argument that quantum states cannot be objective internal properties of the systems they describe, whether or not one regards probabilities as subjective. Griffiths is probably right, however, that John Bell would not have been pleased with how QBists fix his shifty split.I would not call QBism an “antiquated approach.” It is younger than Griffiths’ consistent histories and, as I have remarked upon elsewhere,22. M. Schlosshauer, ed., Elegance and Enigma: The Quantum Interviews, Springer, Berlin (2011), pp. 177, 280. taking reality itself to be relative to what he calls a framework, is vastly more radical than taking quantum state assignments to be relative to an agent.But foreshadowings of QBism can indeed be found in antiquity. Since writing my commentary, I came across another striking anticipation in a 1931 letter from Erwin Schrödinger to Arnold Sommerfeld:33. K. von Meyenn, ed., Eine Entdeckung von ganz außerordentlicher Tragweite: Schrödingers Briefwechsel zur Wellenmechanik und zum Katzenparadoxon, Springer, Berlin (2011), p. 490. “Quantum mechanics forbids statements about what really exists—statements about the object. It deals only with the object–subject relation. Although this holds, after all, for any description of nature, it appears to hold in a much more radical and far-reaching sense in quantum mechanics” (translated by N. D. Mermin and Ruediger Schack).When Bell and Michael Nauenberg wrote their delightful article in 1966, there was indeed much less interest in quantum foundations than there is today. Most textbooks have wisely steered clear of the many contemporary interpretive positions, since none of them are held by more than a fraction of those physicists with an interest in such issues.QBists do not reject the Born rule for calculating probabilities, but they do reject the objective frequentist interpretation of those probabilities presented by Nauenberg and held by most physicists. The frequentist view is notoriously circular. It defines probability using such notions as “equally probable,” “unlikely,” or (with Nauenberg) “identically prepared,” none of which make sense without a prior definition of probability. “Identically prepared” might seem safe from circularity, but two different preparations cannot be strictly identical. It would be more accurate to say they must differ in unimportant ways. Unimportant for what? For the probabilities of the outcomes.When I started to learn about subjective probability, I was surprised to discover that most of the books were not in Cornell University’s physics or mathematics libraries but in the business school library. In our recent election, Americans have been told that business experience is necessary for being president; I would suggest that it may be even more helpful for understanding quantum mechanics.I cannot tell from Nauenberg’s remarks about the Liouville equation whether he agrees with the view of QBists (and many others) that the collapse of the wavefunction is no more than the updating of a collection of probability distributions.Nauenberg’s example of the Rydberg atom does not contradict the QBist resolution of Bell’s shifty split. The Rydberg atom is part of the world external to the agent, and therefore on the quantum side of her split. There are indeed circumstances under which fully quantum mechanical behavior can look very classical.Art Hobson repeats the common view that only mixed states can be associated with subjective probabilities. QBism takes that to be the very mistake that got us lost for so long in the quantum swamp. Hobson also believes that wavefunctions were collapsing before there were physicists. Does he believe that probabilities were updating before there were statisticians?Hobson wrongly claims that Chris Fuchs “might dispute the notion that some kind of physical reality actually exists.” What he and other QBists do deny is that there are properties of the external world—“elements of reality”—that underlie quantum state assignments. (The argument of Matthew Pusey and coauthors that Hobson cites, implying that quantum states are physically real, relies on such hidden variables.) An agent’s state assignment rests entirely on her experience of the external world. It is neither solipsistic nor superstitious to maintain that any agent’s experience comes fully into being only at the moment it is experienced.Hobson’s treatment of Eugene Wigner and his friend relies on decoherence producing an objective mixed state, which both of them must agree on. But since quantum mechanics holds all the way out to infinity (as Griffiths puts it), even from an objective view of quantum states, that switch from superposition to either/or is at best a FAPP solution, to use Bell’s wonderfully sardonic abbreviation of “for all practical purposes.”QBism does not, as Hobson concludes, give up on a realist interpretation of nature. But it does warn us not to confuse nature with the abstractions we have ingeniously constructed to help any agent deal with the very real impact of nature on his or her own internal experience (see my Reference Frame, Physics Today, May 2009, page 8).I’m glad that Blake Stacey has called attention to some of the more applied spinoffs of QBism. I’m also pleased that he mentions Bruno de Finetti, one of the great 20th-century pioneers of subjective probability. Indeed, since there are objective as well as subjective Bayesians, if I had my way, the B in QBism would stand not for Thomas Bayes, but for Bruno de Finetti, who put the crucial point like this: “The abandonment of superstitious beliefs about the existence of Phlogiston, the Cosmic Ether, Absolute Space and Time … , or Fairies and Witches, was an essential step along the road to scientific thinking. Probability, too, if regarded as something endowed with some kind of objective existence, is no less a misleading misconception, an illusory attempt to exteriorize or materialize our [actual (vero)] probabilistic beliefs.”44. B. de Finetti, Theory of Probability, Interscience, New York (1990), preface.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. J. B. Hartle, Am. J. Phys. 36, 704 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1975096, Google ScholarCrossref2. M. Schlosshauer, ed., Elegance and Enigma: The Quantum Interviews, Springer, Berlin (2011), pp. 177, 280. Google ScholarCrossref3. K. von Meyenn, ed., Eine Entdeckung von ganz außerordentlicher Tragweite: Schrödingers Briefwechsel zur Wellenmechanik und zum Katzenparadoxon, Springer, Berlin (2011), p. 490. Google ScholarCrossref4. B. de Finetti, Theory of Probability, Interscience, New York (1990), preface. Google Scholar© 2012 American Institute of Physics.
Physics Today•Nov 30, 2012•6 citations
Time-symmetric quantum mechanics questioned and defended
Robert B. Griffiths
Readers of the article by Yakir Aharonov, Sandu Popescu, and Jeff Tollaksen might be interested in an alternative time-symmetric formulation of quantum mechanics, known as “consistent histories,” that was developed over roughly the same time period as Aharonov’s work (see the article by Robert Griffiths and Roland Omnès, PHYSICS TODAY, August 1999, page 26). Closely related is the “decoherent histories” approach of Murray Gell-Mann and James Hartle,11. M. Gell-Mann, J. B. Hartle, in Complexity, Entropy and the Physics of InformationW. H. Zurek,ed.,Addison-Wesley, Redwood City, CA (1990), p. 425. but as that is not usually formulated in a way that is transparently time-symmetric, the following remarks refer to the consistent histories approach; see reference 22. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory, Cambridge U. Press, New York (2002); available online at http://quantum.phys.cmu.edu/CQT. for an up-to-date formulation.Both the consistent histories approach and that of Aharonov and coworkers pay attention to events at several different times, are formulated in a way that is time-symmetrical, and address a number of quantum paradoxes. Both are consistent with the calculational procedures taught to students in a typical quantum mechanics course, so they are “standard quantum mechanics,” without the additional variables of de Broglie–Bohm or the additional collapses of Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber. And both approaches do not accept the “shut up and calculate” mentality that alas continues to dominate much classroom instruction. So far as I can tell, all the results mentioned by Aharonov and coauthors and in the earlier work they cite are fairly readily translated into the language of consistent histories, though the reverse is not true (see below); therefore, the consistent histories view is more general.In the treatment by Aharonov and coauthors, measurement, as in textbook quantum theory, remains a black box: It collapses the wavefunction, but nothing more can be said. And for good reason: The textbook approach of introducing probabilities by reference to measurement yields what appear to be insoluble difficulties if one attempts to apply quantum theory to the measurement process itself—that is, to actual apparatus constructed out of entities that are quantum mechanical. In the consistent histories approach, that difficulty does not arise, because it treats quantum dynamics as fundamentally probabilistic, not deterministic, and the same rules apply to measurements as to all other physical processes. Speaking metaphorically, the probabilistic approach used in consistent histories allows one to open the black measurement box and watch the quantum gears turn.The other major difference between the two approaches is their treatment of quantum paradoxes. We owe many of the most striking and delightful paradoxes of quantum theory to Aharonov and his coworkers, and he and Daniel Rohrlich have written a book on the topic.33. Y. Aharonov, D. Rohrlich, Quantum Paradoxes: Quantum Theory for the Perplexed, Wiley, Weinheim, Germany (2005) . But he leaves the paradoxes largely unresolved; the reader is encouraged to study but not unravel them. The consistent histories approach is exactly opposite: Paradoxes should be—and a large number of them have been—resolved by the correct application of well-formulated and fully consistent quantum principles (see reference 22. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory, Cambridge U. Press, New York (2002); available online at http://quantum.phys.cmu.edu/CQT. , chapters 19–25).Students new to quantum theory are often confused and deserve reasoned responses to their queries. Although paradoxes are valuable illustrations of how the quantum world differs from our everyday experience, I prefer to provide students with the conceptual tools needed to resolve and make sense of them. In particular, students benefit from learning a fully consistent approach to probabilities in the quantum domain, one not based on measurements but on general quantum principles. A colleague and I have just finished using that approach in teaching the first term of our introductory graduate quantum mechanics course. Although it requires extra time and effort to learn how to think about quantum processes rather than just do calculations, the reward comes in a deeper understanding of how the real (quantum) world works.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. M. Gell-Mann, J. B. Hartle, in Complexity, Entropy and the Physics of InformationW. H. Zurek,ed.,Addison-Wesley, Redwood City, CA (1990), p. 425. Google Scholar2. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory, Cambridge U. Press, New York (2002); available online at http://quantum.phys.cmu.edu/CQT. Google Scholar3. Y. Aharonov, D. Rohrlich, Quantum Paradoxes: Quantum Theory for the Perplexed, Wiley, Weinheim, Germany (2005) . Google ScholarCrossref© 2011 American Institute of Physics.
Physics Today•May 1, 2011•1 citation
Approaches for improving students' understanding of quantum mechanics
Robert B. Griffiths
In the first sentence of their article “Improving Students’ Understanding of Quantum Mechanics” ( Physics Today, August 2006, page 43), Chandralekha Singh, Mario Belloni, and Wolfgang Christian refer to Richard Feynman's well-known assertion that nobody understands quantum mechanics. But thereafter they ignore it, and apparently assume that student misconceptions when learning quantum mechanics are not connected with foundational issues. I argue the contrary, that Feynman's statement should be a central concern in all efforts to improve quantum pedagogy. If we teachers do not understand a topic, we pass our own misconceptions on to our students and make the subject much more difficult for them.Many conceptual difficulties, including those Feynman was referring to, arise from the problem of introducing probabilities into quantum theory in a useful and consistent way. Textbooks avoid the problem by assigning probabilities to macroscopic measurement outcomes rather than to microscopic quantum systems. Although that approach avoids inconsistencies, it gives rise to some serious misconceptions: Measurements are somehow special and unrelated to other quantum phenomena; they require a “classical” apparatus that functions outside the scope of quantum mechanics (where is one to find such a thing nowadays?); they produce physical effects at long distances; one can say nothing sensible about what a quantum system is doing in the absence of measurements; measurements can be used to predict the future of the measured system but tell us nothing about its past; and so forth. These misconceptions are not unrelated to those that Singh and coauthors have reported.Students learning quantum mechanics could benefit greatly if their instructors used advances in our understanding that have occurred during the 40 years since Feynman unashamedly confessed his perplexity. He seems to have reacted favorably to a preliminary version of the new ideas (see the letter from Murray Gell-Mann and James Hartle in Physics Today, February 1999, page 11), so he might have appreciated the more mature form now available. In brief, we now know how to consistently assign probabilities directly to microscopic systems without referring to measurements, and we can show that under appropriate conditions a properly constructed measurement apparatus, described in fully quantum terms, will reveal properties the measured system possessed before the measurement took place. In such circumstances the probabilities of measurement outcomes are the same as those of the measured properties, and measurements are no longer an essential conceptual tool: One can think directly in physical terms about what the quantum system is doing at different times. This gets rid of a major source of student difficulties and misconceptions.Consider the example reported by Singh and coauthors in which students used a calculation employing 〈A〉 = 〈ψ|A|ψ〉 to find the expectation of an observable A, rather than simply using a probability distribution they had worked out previously. (In that article, A was the energy, but the same principle applies to any observable.) This failure is not surprising given that textbooks lack a good discussion of how to assign probability distributions to observables. So the student memorizes an independent formula 〈A〉 = 〈ψ|A|ψ〉, which is a good way of calculating something that comes up in homework and exams, but whose physical significance is not particularly clear (to student or instructor). What the student should be taught is that A is the quantum counterpart of a random variable in ordinary probability theory, and its average can be obtained from its probability distribution in exactly the same way. Defining 〈A〉 in this manner before introducing 〈ψ|A|ψ〉 as a convenient formula for calculating it would make things clearer. But quantum textbooks do not contain the necessary tools, and for good reason. With two noncommuting observables A and B, it is easy to poke either of them into the 〈ψ|A|ψ〉 formula, whereas assigning probabilities leads into a vast swamp, which work on quantum foundations has shown to be filled with nasty paradoxes ready to bite the unwary. Retreating to macroscopic measurements allows textbook writers to avoid the swamp, but with a serious loss in clarity of thought and physical intuition. It is better to drain the swamp of its root cause: a failed attempt to meld classical and quantum modes of reasoning, instead of consistently applying quantum concepts at all levels, microscopic and macroscopic, which is something we now know how to do.Another misconception reported in the Physics Today article, that measurement of a physical observable causes the system to be stuck forever in the measured eigenstate, is hardly surprising when students are taught that measurements and wavefunction collapse are part of the axiomatic, and thus unanalyzable, structure of quantum theory. Instead, they need to think about measurements as quantum physical processes, governed by the same laws as the rest of the quantum world, and learn how to use conditional probabilities to relate measurement outcomes to the past as well as the future behavior of a measured system. Once again, outdated ideas make the subject harder to learn.For 10 years I have been teaching advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate quantum mechanics courses and courses in quantum information, using the new perspective in which quantum mechanics is based on probabilistic laws of universal validity, with measurements being only one application. Reactions have generally been positive, though the students show signs of shock when I tell them that by the end of the course, provided they do their homework, they will understand some aspects of quantum mechanics better than Feynman did. Presenting the new ideas takes somewhat longer than the material they replace, but not enormously so. Some time will be regained in courses that include an introduction to quantum entanglement and Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen, since circuitous arguments invoking Bell's inequality and the like, which can leave students quite confused, are replaced by a short, clear treatment of the essentials.Although I can see the value of computer simulations of Schrödinger's equation, I think it is more effective to first introduce students to basic quantum dynamics, both unitary and stochastic, through the use of “toy models.” I included various examples in Consistent Quantum Theory . 1 1. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory, Cambridge U. Press, New York (2002). Some chapters and a few exercises are available at http://quantum.phys.cmu.edu. The properties of such models are easily worked out with a pencil on a small sheet of paper, like the back of an envelope. Working through them helps students master new concepts and get rid of certain misconceptions about quantum measurements. The fact that students in my courses have been able to learn how to apply probabilities consistently to microscopic systems, in a way that disposes of numerous difficulties and conceptual paradoxes, suggests it might be worthwhile for other teachers to invest some time in learning post-Feynman ideas. The main difficulty is the absence of a textbook. I have used reference 1 as a supplement, though it is not ideal. It has no exercises, although a few are available on the corresponding website. I would be happy to hear from anyone skilled in textbook writing who wants to revise an older one or start something new.In conclusion, I strongly favor every effort to improve students’ understanding of quantum mechanics, and I consider the research reported by Singh and coauthors a valuable contribution to that end. However, if we want our students to genuinely understand quantum mechanics and not simply calculate things, I believe a much bigger step forward is possible by combining the efforts reported in the article with advances in quantum foundations.REFERENCESection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCE <<1. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory, Cambridge U. Press, New York (2002). Some chapters and a few exercises are available at http://quantum.phys.cmu.edu. Google Scholar© 2007 American Institute of Physics.
Physics Today•Mar 1, 2007•0 citations
Bricmont replies: I find it odd, as the reviewer of a book, to be criticized because I did not discuss a theory that was not mentioned in the book. But I’ll answer Robert Griffiths point by point.In Bohmian mechanics (BM), it is simply a mathematical fact, noted by John Bell in chapter 14 of reference 1 of the Griffiths letter, that in the delayed double-slit experiment Griffith describes, particles cannot cross a symmetry plane but instead bounce back from it.11. J. Bricmont, S. Goldstein, D. Hemmick, J. Stat. Phys. (2019), doi:
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10955-019-02361-w. Offering a different theory in which particles follow a different trajectory does not refute that fact.In standard quantum mechanics (QM), particles do not have trajectories; that fact was emphasized by, among others, Richard Feynman22. R. Feynman, The Character of Physical Law, MIT Press (1967), p. 145. and Lev Landau and Evgeny Lifshitz.33. L. D. Landau, E. M. Lifshitz, Quantum Mechanics: Non-Relativistic Theory, 2nd ed., J. B. Sykes, J. S. Bell, trans., Pergamon Press (1965), p. 2.The theory by Griffiths, based on the idea of “consistent histories,” is therefore not standard QM but is instead, like BM, an attempt to complete QM, by adding histories that consist of real events that occur independently of any measurements made on the quantum system (a measurement means an interaction with that system that may affect what would happen to it in the absence of measurements). Unfortunately, Griffiths’s attempt runs into contradictions, as shown in particular by Sheldon Goldstein in his two-part feature for Physics Today (March 1998, page 42, and April 1998, page 38).Griffiths misses the first step in Bell’s proof of nonlocality: the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) dilemma that perfect correlations between distant events cannot be explained unless one supposes either that some form of action at a distance occurs or that the events are predetermined by antecedent causes. The latter assumption is not a “classical” one; it is one part of the EPR dilemma. But Bell showed with his inequalities that the assumption leads to a contradiction. Hence, nonlocality follows. For more details, see, for example, references 11. J. Bricmont, S. Goldstein, D. Hemmick, J. Stat. Phys. (2019), doi:
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10955-019-02361-w. and 44. R. Tumulka, “The assumptions of Bell’s proof,” International Journal of Quantum Foundations (21 December 2014). and Travis Norsen’s book.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<1. J. Bricmont, S. Goldstein, D. Hemmick, J. Stat. Phys. (2019), doi:
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10955-019-02361-w. Google ScholarCrossref2. R. Feynman, The Character of Physical Law, MIT Press (1967), p. 145. Google Scholar3. L. D. Landau, E. M. Lifshitz, Quantum Mechanics: Non-Relativistic Theory, 2nd ed., J. B. Sykes, J. S. Bell, trans., Pergamon Press (1965), p. 2. Google Scholar4. R. Tumulka, “The assumptions of Bell’s proof,” International Journal of Quantum Foundations (21 December 2014). Google Scholar© 2019 American Institute of Physics.
Jean Bricmont’s review of Travis Norsen’s Foundations of Quantum Mechanics: An Exploration of the Physical Meaning of Quantum Theory (Physics Today, April 2018, page 58) stresses the virtues of Louis de Broglie and David Bohm’s pilot-wave interpretation of quantum mechanics, also referred to as Bohmian mechanics (BM), but the review omits mention of some of that interpretation’s rather serious defects. As Bricmont notes, in BM the standard Schrödinger wavefunction ψ(r, t) for a particle is augmented with a classical trajectory r(t) that is interpreted as the actual precise physical position of the particle as a function of time. Sometimes that Bohmian trajectory can provide a helpful intuitive picture, but in other cases it is quite misleading.John Bell presented an example of how Bohmian trajectories can mislead: a modified double-slit experiment with a lens placed right after each slit so that the emerging beams cross on their way to two distant detectors located beyond the crossing point.11. J. S. Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics: Collected Papers on Quantum Philosophy, Cambridge U. Press (1987). The beam from the lower slit arrives at the upper detector, and that from the upper slit at the lower detector. If a particle arrives at the upper detector, which slit did it pass through?Bell claims that the naive answer—that the particle came from the lower slit, based on the intuition that particles move in straight lines in a vacuum—is wrong. He notes that a Bohmian particle cannot cross the symmetry plane separating the upper slit and detector from their lower counterparts, and thus a particle arriving at the upper detector actually came from the upper slit: first it moved downward, but when it arrived in the region where the beams cross, it “bounced” back upward toward the upper detector.Years ago I published an analysis that contradicted Bell and showed that the answer he regarded as naive—the particle passes through the crossing region without bouncing—was perfectly good quantum mechanics.22. R. B. Griffiths, Phys. Lett. A 261, 227 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0375-9601(99)00542-3 I am still waiting for someone in the Bohmian community to publish a reply.Norsen is troubled because the nonlocal, often superluminal influences needed to make sense of BM are hard to reconcile with special relativity. Indeed, the widely accepted no-signaling principle of quantum mechanics asserts that those influences cannot transmit information, so a direct experimental detection of them is out of reach. Defenders of BM say they know that nonlocal influences exist because quantum mechanics violates Bell’s inequalities. But as I and others have pointed out, the hidden variables used in derivations of Bell inequalities are fundamentally classical,33. See R. B. Griffiths, Found. Phys. 41, 705 (2011), and references therein. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-010-9512-5 in contrast to the representation of quantum properties by Hilbert subspaces, as introduced by John von Neumann.44. J. von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, R. T. Beyer, trans., Princeton U. Press (1955), chap. 3.5. Projectors on those subspaces do not generally commute, which clearly distinguishes quantum physics from classical. Thus that feature, rather than a failure of locality, is why Bell’s inequalities do not agree with quantum theory and experiment.The BM particle trajectories are instances of classical hidden variables, so the nonlocality of the pilot-wave interpretation of quantum mechanics is not surprising. Indeed, when proper account is taken of noncommutativity, one can show that quantum theory satisfies a principle of locality that Albert Einstein might well have agreed with: Objective properties of an isolated individual system do not change when something is done to another, noninteracting system.33. See R. B. Griffiths, Found. Phys. 41, 705 (2011), and references therein. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-010-9512-5 Thus a consistent Hilbert-space formulation of quantum theory without hidden variables removes any worry about a conflict with special relativity.Although Bohmian mechanics was worthy of consideration and has been useful in the development of quantum foundations, ignoring more recent developments is not the way to honor the memory of one of the great physicists of the last century. I hope that a second edition of Norsen’s well-written book will take account of more recent work.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. J. S. Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics: Collected Papers on Quantum Philosophy, Cambridge U. Press (1987). Google Scholar2. R. B. Griffiths, Phys. Lett. A 261, 227 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0375-9601(99)00542-3, Google ScholarCrossref3. See R. B. Griffiths, Found. Phys. 41, 705 (2011), and references therein. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-010-9512-5, Google ScholarCrossref4. J. von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, R. T. Beyer, trans., Princeton U. Press (1955), chap. 3.5. Google Scholar© 2019 American Institute of Physics.
Some time ago, John Bell and I wrote a tongue-in-cheek article on the interpretation of quantum mechanics;11. J. S. Bell, M. Nauenberg, in Preludes in Theoretical Physics, A. de Shalit, H. Feshbach, L. van Hove, eds., North Holland, Amsterdam (1966), p. 270;reprinted in J. S. Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge U. Press, New York (1987), p. 24. in it we remarked that only a minority of physicists had any interest in the topic and that the typical physicist thought he would understand it “if ever he can spare twenty minutes to think about it.” According to David Mermin, however, that situation has changed dramatically, and “new interpretations [of quantum mechanics] appear every year.”Actually, most textbooks on the subject continue to be based on the well-established Born interpretation of quantum mechanics, which postulates that the absolute square of the Schrödinger wavefunction, projected onto a particular quantum state, gives the probability for the occurrence of that state after an appropriate measurement has been made. Mermin indicated that the problem with the Born interpretation involves a confusion, “prevalent among physicists,” regarding the nature of probability. He presented his preference for a “personalist Bayesian view,” which leads separate “agents,” like Eugene Wigner and his friend, to make different probability assignments based on their beliefs. But as Richard Feynman remarked, “Nature does not know what you are looking at, and she behaves the way she is going to behave whether you bother to take down the data or not.”22. R. P. Feynman, R. B. Leighton, M. Sands, The Feynman Lectures on Physics, vol. 3, Addison-Wesley, Redwood City, CA (1989), p. 3–7.Indeed, as applied to experiments, probability simply corresponds to the relative frequency for the occurrence of a given final state after identical states are prepared initially and measurements are made by appropriate detectors—devices that, through an irreversible macroscopic process, provide a permanent record of the outcome. Hence, the results of an experiment are independent of any observers, whose only role is to set up appropriate measurement devices, calculate the probabilities from quantum theory, and then write papers based on the recorded results.As Max Born also emphasized, in classical mechanics the situation is analogous, when one takes into account that in practice initial conditions in an experiment are known only imprecisely.33. M. Born, Dan. Mat. Fys. Medd. 30 (2), 1 (1955). Hence the observed evolution of the system is also determined by a probability function that satisfies the Liouville equation. But in that case, after a measurement is performed, no one talks about the “collapse” of this classical function, whereas in quantum mechanics it is common to use that controversial expression for the Schrödinger wavefunction.Mermin discussed a “shifty split” between the classical and the quantum domain, a split that supposedly “haunts quantum mechanics.” He claimed that “regardless of what is split from what, all versions of the shifty split are vague and ambiguous.” However, that is not always the case, as a simple example shows. Consider an initial quantum wavepacket for a particle under an attractive central force that varies inversely with the square of the radial distance—the classic problem of planetary motion from the viewpoint of quantum mechanics, for example, or an excited electron in a Rydberg atom. For a finite time, the wavepacket will follow a classical Keplerian elliptic orbit, but like the Liouville distribution for the analogous classical problem, from the outset it will disperse due to the spread in initial position and momentum.For the classical distribution to be in close correspondence with the quantum wavepacket, its initial spread is assumed to satisfy the uncertainty relation. Eventually, however, the head of the wavepacket, like in the classical distribution, will catch up with its tail. Afterwards, further spreading of the wavepacket leads to interference effects between the two components, and the classical–quantum correspondence ceases to be valid. The time when such interference effects first appear is of order nτ/3, where n is the mean principal quantum number of the wavepacket and τ is the Kepler period.44. M. Nauenberg, Phys. Rev. A 40, 1133 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.40.1133 Experimentally, that transition has been observed to agree with theory in Rydberg atoms55. M. Nauenberg, C. Stroud, J. Yeazell, Sci. Am., June 1994, p. 44. https://doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican0694-44 for n = 100, τ = 152 picoseconds, and nothing shifty about this classical–quantum correspondence is found. For planetary orbits, however, n is of order 1070, and therefore the answer to Albert Einstein’s often repeated remark “Is the moon there when nobody looks?” (see David Mermin, Physics Today, April 1985, page 38) is yes.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. J. S. Bell, M. Nauenberg, in Preludes in Theoretical Physics, A. de Shalit, H. Feshbach, L. van Hove, eds., North Holland, Amsterdam (1966), p. 270; Google Scholarreprinted in J. S. Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge U. Press, New York (1987), p. 24. Google Scholar2. R. P. Feynman, R. B. Leighton, M. Sands, The Feynman Lectures on Physics, vol. 3, Addison-Wesley, Redwood City, CA (1989), p. 3–7. Google Scholar3. M. Born, Dan. Mat. Fys. Medd. 30 (2), 1 (1955). Google Scholar4. M. Nauenberg, Phys. Rev. A 40, 1133 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.40.1133, Google ScholarCrossref, CAS5. M. Nauenberg, C. Stroud, J. Yeazell, Sci. Am., June 1994, p. 44. https://doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican0694-44, Google ScholarCrossref© 2012 American Institute of Physics.
Although I have neither an objection to nor an endorsement of David Mermin’s major premise in his Quick Study, “There is no quantum measurement problem” (Physics Today, June 2022, page 62), I would like to make several contextual points.Mermin’s argument has an extensive history, along with a comparable history of rebuttal. Five decades ago Max Jammer wrote that “measurements in quantum mechanics are no more or less problematic than in classical physics, for the Hilbert space vector is only a purely formal device for relating the statistics associated with these arrangements to the physics of observations in classical physics.” That seems like a condensed version of the argument Mermin presents. On the following page, however, Jammer notes that a “problematic aspect whose serious implications were only gradually understood was the fact that as long as a quantum mechanical one-body or many-body system does not interact with macroscopic objects, as long as its motion is described by the deterministic Schrödinger time-dependent equation, no events could be considered to take place in the system.”11. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474.Niels Bohr giving a lecture in Copenhagen in April 1929. (Photograph by Samuel Goudsmit, courtesy of the AIP Emilio Segrè Visual Archives, Goudsmit Collection.)PPT|High resolutionRegarding the quotations from Niels Bohr, Mermin’s point is entirely valid and represents Bohr’s position accurately, but Bohr’s thought is always subtle and difficult to capture completely. Another quotation from Bohr, which is consistent with everything else he wrote, is, “The decisive point is that in neither case does the appropriate widening of our conceptual framework imply any appeal to the observing subject, which would hinder unambiguous communication of experience.”22. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. That quotation seems inconsistent with Mermin’s paragraph that includes the passage “Why should I insist that my interpretation of science, which I use to make sense of the world that I experience, should never make any mention of me?” Bohr always insisted that his framework was a rational “generalization” of classical objectivity.The last and most conceptually important point concerns the ontological status of probability. I don’t necessarily disagree with Mermin and Bruno de Finetti, but it is by no means obvious that they are correct either. David Hawkins, for example, begins 50 pages of rigorous analysis with a brief statement of a major premise.The obvious and natural interpretation of probability in this context is that it introduces, not something that has to do with the nature of the physical system, but something that has to do with the incompleteness of our knowledge….But this opinion turns out to be false. Ignorance of dynamical regularity may be a motive for resorting to probabilities, but it does not explain the probabilities to which we resort.33. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135.Another example can be found in Jammer’s well-known historical account of quantum theory: “For Einstein the notion of probability … was the traditional conception of classical physics, a mathematical objectivization of the human deficiency of complete or exact knowledge but ultimately a creation of the human mind…. For Born probability, as far as it was related to the wave function, was not merely a mathematical fiction but something endowed with physical reality.”44. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286.Of course, such examples don’t mean that Mermin’s position is incorrect, but I do think that they demand a better argument than a comparison to “Fairies and Witches.” I am confident that Mermin has such an argument, and I look forward to reading it as I continue working toward a coherent position on the unresolved interpretational issues of quantum theory.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474. Google Scholar2. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. Google Scholar3. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135. Google Scholar4. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286. Google Scholar© 2022 American Institute of Physics.
Mermin replies: Robert Griffiths takes my joke about an undergraduate collapsing a wavepacket to be an attempt to solve the measurement problem. The actual QBist solution—versions of which predate QBism (see, for example, reference 11. J. B. Hartle, Am. J. Phys. 36, 704 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1975096)—is that a quantum state is not an objective property of the world but a compendium of probabilities constructed by an agent. When an agent updates her state assignment, nothing changes in her external world. The only change is in the agent’s expectations for her subsequent experience of that world, and therefore there is no measurement problem. Consistent historians agree that collapse is not a physical process, but for entirely different reasons.QBism takes the “mysterious whatever-it-is” that Griffiths criticizes in quantum orthodoxy to be the experience induced in an agent by the world. That, and the fact that different agents may have different experiences, drains the swamp, slays the dragon, and quiets the maddening paradoxes.QBists hold that any agent can indeed apply quantum mechanics to her own external world, from quarks to quasars. Only an agent’s personal, directly perceived experience is boxed off from the domain of applicability. That exclusion disagrees with most versions of the many-worlds interpretation, but it does not limit the scope of science: Alice can apply quantum mechanics to the experience of another agent, Bob, as represented through his words, writings, or drawings, all of which do belong to her external world.The way in which Bob’s experience impinges on Alice resonates with Niels Bohr’s emphasis on the need to state results of experiments in ordinary language. It also addresses Ching Hung Woo’s question of how different agents can come to agreement on their state assignments.Griffiths correctly notes that QBism violates the first desideratum he quotes from my 15-year-old “Ithaca interpretation.” Like Barack Obama’s view of marriage, my thinking about quantum foundations has evolved. But Griffiths wrongly claims that QBism rejects the other desideratum he quotes: locality. Actually, QBism insists on it. The absurdity of quantum nonlocality provides an independent argument that quantum states cannot be objective internal properties of the systems they describe, whether or not one regards probabilities as subjective. Griffiths is probably right, however, that John Bell would not have been pleased with how QBists fix his shifty split.I would not call QBism an “antiquated approach.” It is younger than Griffiths’ consistent histories and, as I have remarked upon elsewhere,22. M. Schlosshauer, ed., Elegance and Enigma: The Quantum Interviews, Springer, Berlin (2011), pp. 177, 280. taking reality itself to be relative to what he calls a framework, is vastly more radical than taking quantum state assignments to be relative to an agent.But foreshadowings of QBism can indeed be found in antiquity. Since writing my commentary, I came across another striking anticipation in a 1931 letter from Erwin Schrödinger to Arnold Sommerfeld:33. K. von Meyenn, ed., Eine Entdeckung von ganz außerordentlicher Tragweite: Schrödingers Briefwechsel zur Wellenmechanik und zum Katzenparadoxon, Springer, Berlin (2011), p. 490. “Quantum mechanics forbids statements about what really exists—statements about the object. It deals only with the object–subject relation. Although this holds, after all, for any description of nature, it appears to hold in a much more radical and far-reaching sense in quantum mechanics” (translated by N. D. Mermin and Ruediger Schack).When Bell and Michael Nauenberg wrote their delightful article in 1966, there was indeed much less interest in quantum foundations than there is today. Most textbooks have wisely steered clear of the many contemporary interpretive positions, since none of them are held by more than a fraction of those physicists with an interest in such issues.QBists do not reject the Born rule for calculating probabilities, but they do reject the objective frequentist interpretation of those probabilities presented by Nauenberg and held by most physicists. The frequentist view is notoriously circular. It defines probability using such notions as “equally probable,” “unlikely,” or (with Nauenberg) “identically prepared,” none of which make sense without a prior definition of probability. “Identically prepared” might seem safe from circularity, but two different preparations cannot be strictly identical. It would be more accurate to say they must differ in unimportant ways. Unimportant for what? For the probabilities of the outcomes.When I started to learn about subjective probability, I was surprised to discover that most of the books were not in Cornell University’s physics or mathematics libraries but in the business school library. In our recent election, Americans have been told that business experience is necessary for being president; I would suggest that it may be even more helpful for understanding quantum mechanics.I cannot tell from Nauenberg’s remarks about the Liouville equation whether he agrees with the view of QBists (and many others) that the collapse of the wavefunction is no more than the updating of a collection of probability distributions.Nauenberg’s example of the Rydberg atom does not contradict the QBist resolution of Bell’s shifty split. The Rydberg atom is part of the world external to the agent, and therefore on the quantum side of her split. There are indeed circumstances under which fully quantum mechanical behavior can look very classical.Art Hobson repeats the common view that only mixed states can be associated with subjective probabilities. QBism takes that to be the very mistake that got us lost for so long in the quantum swamp. Hobson also believes that wavefunctions were collapsing before there were physicists. Does he believe that probabilities were updating before there were statisticians?Hobson wrongly claims that Chris Fuchs “might dispute the notion that some kind of physical reality actually exists.” What he and other QBists do deny is that there are properties of the external world—“elements of reality”—that underlie quantum state assignments. (The argument of Matthew Pusey and coauthors that Hobson cites, implying that quantum states are physically real, relies on such hidden variables.) An agent’s state assignment rests entirely on her experience of the external world. It is neither solipsistic nor superstitious to maintain that any agent’s experience comes fully into being only at the moment it is experienced.Hobson’s treatment of Eugene Wigner and his friend relies on decoherence producing an objective mixed state, which both of them must agree on. But since quantum mechanics holds all the way out to infinity (as Griffiths puts it), even from an objective view of quantum states, that switch from superposition to either/or is at best a FAPP solution, to use Bell’s wonderfully sardonic abbreviation of “for all practical purposes.”QBism does not, as Hobson concludes, give up on a realist interpretation of nature. But it does warn us not to confuse nature with the abstractions we have ingeniously constructed to help any agent deal with the very real impact of nature on his or her own internal experience (see my Reference Frame, Physics Today, May 2009, page 8).I’m glad that Blake Stacey has called attention to some of the more applied spinoffs of QBism. I’m also pleased that he mentions Bruno de Finetti, one of the great 20th-century pioneers of subjective probability. Indeed, since there are objective as well as subjective Bayesians, if I had my way, the B in QBism would stand not for Thomas Bayes, but for Bruno de Finetti, who put the crucial point like this: “The abandonment of superstitious beliefs about the existence of Phlogiston, the Cosmic Ether, Absolute Space and Time … , or Fairies and Witches, was an essential step along the road to scientific thinking. Probability, too, if regarded as something endowed with some kind of objective existence, is no less a misleading misconception, an illusory attempt to exteriorize or materialize our [actual (vero)] probabilistic beliefs.”44. B. de Finetti, Theory of Probability, Interscience, New York (1990), preface.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. J. B. Hartle, Am. J. Phys. 36, 704 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1975096, Google ScholarCrossref2. M. Schlosshauer, ed., Elegance and Enigma: The Quantum Interviews, Springer, Berlin (2011), pp. 177, 280. Google ScholarCrossref3. K. von Meyenn, ed., Eine Entdeckung von ganz außerordentlicher Tragweite: Schrödingers Briefwechsel zur Wellenmechanik und zum Katzenparadoxon, Springer, Berlin (2011), p. 490. Google ScholarCrossref4. B. de Finetti, Theory of Probability, Interscience, New York (1990), preface. Google Scholar© 2012 American Institute of Physics.
Readers of the article by Yakir Aharonov, Sandu Popescu, and Jeff Tollaksen might be interested in an alternative time-symmetric formulation of quantum mechanics, known as “consistent histories,” that was developed over roughly the same time period as Aharonov’s work (see the article by Robert Griffiths and Roland Omnès, PHYSICS TODAY, August 1999, page 26). Closely related is the “decoherent histories” approach of Murray Gell-Mann and James Hartle,11. M. Gell-Mann, J. B. Hartle, in Complexity, Entropy and the Physics of InformationW. H. Zurek,ed.,Addison-Wesley, Redwood City, CA (1990), p. 425. but as that is not usually formulated in a way that is transparently time-symmetric, the following remarks refer to the consistent histories approach; see reference 22. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory, Cambridge U. Press, New York (2002); available online at http://quantum.phys.cmu.edu/CQT. for an up-to-date formulation.Both the consistent histories approach and that of Aharonov and coworkers pay attention to events at several different times, are formulated in a way that is time-symmetrical, and address a number of quantum paradoxes. Both are consistent with the calculational procedures taught to students in a typical quantum mechanics course, so they are “standard quantum mechanics,” without the additional variables of de Broglie–Bohm or the additional collapses of Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber. And both approaches do not accept the “shut up and calculate” mentality that alas continues to dominate much classroom instruction. So far as I can tell, all the results mentioned by Aharonov and coauthors and in the earlier work they cite are fairly readily translated into the language of consistent histories, though the reverse is not true (see below); therefore, the consistent histories view is more general.In the treatment by Aharonov and coauthors, measurement, as in textbook quantum theory, remains a black box: It collapses the wavefunction, but nothing more can be said. And for good reason: The textbook approach of introducing probabilities by reference to measurement yields what appear to be insoluble difficulties if one attempts to apply quantum theory to the measurement process itself—that is, to actual apparatus constructed out of entities that are quantum mechanical. In the consistent histories approach, that difficulty does not arise, because it treats quantum dynamics as fundamentally probabilistic, not deterministic, and the same rules apply to measurements as to all other physical processes. Speaking metaphorically, the probabilistic approach used in consistent histories allows one to open the black measurement box and watch the quantum gears turn.The other major difference between the two approaches is their treatment of quantum paradoxes. We owe many of the most striking and delightful paradoxes of quantum theory to Aharonov and his coworkers, and he and Daniel Rohrlich have written a book on the topic.33. Y. Aharonov, D. Rohrlich, Quantum Paradoxes: Quantum Theory for the Perplexed, Wiley, Weinheim, Germany (2005) . But he leaves the paradoxes largely unresolved; the reader is encouraged to study but not unravel them. The consistent histories approach is exactly opposite: Paradoxes should be—and a large number of them have been—resolved by the correct application of well-formulated and fully consistent quantum principles (see reference 22. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory, Cambridge U. Press, New York (2002); available online at http://quantum.phys.cmu.edu/CQT. , chapters 19–25).Students new to quantum theory are often confused and deserve reasoned responses to their queries. Although paradoxes are valuable illustrations of how the quantum world differs from our everyday experience, I prefer to provide students with the conceptual tools needed to resolve and make sense of them. In particular, students benefit from learning a fully consistent approach to probabilities in the quantum domain, one not based on measurements but on general quantum principles. A colleague and I have just finished using that approach in teaching the first term of our introductory graduate quantum mechanics course. Although it requires extra time and effort to learn how to think about quantum processes rather than just do calculations, the reward comes in a deeper understanding of how the real (quantum) world works.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. M. Gell-Mann, J. B. Hartle, in Complexity, Entropy and the Physics of InformationW. H. Zurek,ed.,Addison-Wesley, Redwood City, CA (1990), p. 425. Google Scholar2. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory, Cambridge U. Press, New York (2002); available online at http://quantum.phys.cmu.edu/CQT. Google Scholar3. Y. Aharonov, D. Rohrlich, Quantum Paradoxes: Quantum Theory for the Perplexed, Wiley, Weinheim, Germany (2005) . Google ScholarCrossref© 2011 American Institute of Physics.
In the first sentence of their article “Improving Students’ Understanding of Quantum Mechanics” ( Physics Today, August 2006, page 43), Chandralekha Singh, Mario Belloni, and Wolfgang Christian refer to Richard Feynman's well-known assertion that nobody understands quantum mechanics. But thereafter they ignore it, and apparently assume that student misconceptions when learning quantum mechanics are not connected with foundational issues. I argue the contrary, that Feynman's statement should be a central concern in all efforts to improve quantum pedagogy. If we teachers do not understand a topic, we pass our own misconceptions on to our students and make the subject much more difficult for them.Many conceptual difficulties, including those Feynman was referring to, arise from the problem of introducing probabilities into quantum theory in a useful and consistent way. Textbooks avoid the problem by assigning probabilities to macroscopic measurement outcomes rather than to microscopic quantum systems. Although that approach avoids inconsistencies, it gives rise to some serious misconceptions: Measurements are somehow special and unrelated to other quantum phenomena; they require a “classical” apparatus that functions outside the scope of quantum mechanics (where is one to find such a thing nowadays?); they produce physical effects at long distances; one can say nothing sensible about what a quantum system is doing in the absence of measurements; measurements can be used to predict the future of the measured system but tell us nothing about its past; and so forth. These misconceptions are not unrelated to those that Singh and coauthors have reported.Students learning quantum mechanics could benefit greatly if their instructors used advances in our understanding that have occurred during the 40 years since Feynman unashamedly confessed his perplexity. He seems to have reacted favorably to a preliminary version of the new ideas (see the letter from Murray Gell-Mann and James Hartle in Physics Today, February 1999, page 11), so he might have appreciated the more mature form now available. In brief, we now know how to consistently assign probabilities directly to microscopic systems without referring to measurements, and we can show that under appropriate conditions a properly constructed measurement apparatus, described in fully quantum terms, will reveal properties the measured system possessed before the measurement took place. In such circumstances the probabilities of measurement outcomes are the same as those of the measured properties, and measurements are no longer an essential conceptual tool: One can think directly in physical terms about what the quantum system is doing at different times. This gets rid of a major source of student difficulties and misconceptions.Consider the example reported by Singh and coauthors in which students used a calculation employing 〈A〉 = 〈ψ|A|ψ〉 to find the expectation of an observable A, rather than simply using a probability distribution they had worked out previously. (In that article, A was the energy, but the same principle applies to any observable.) This failure is not surprising given that textbooks lack a good discussion of how to assign probability distributions to observables. So the student memorizes an independent formula 〈A〉 = 〈ψ|A|ψ〉, which is a good way of calculating something that comes up in homework and exams, but whose physical significance is not particularly clear (to student or instructor). What the student should be taught is that A is the quantum counterpart of a random variable in ordinary probability theory, and its average can be obtained from its probability distribution in exactly the same way. Defining 〈A〉 in this manner before introducing 〈ψ|A|ψ〉 as a convenient formula for calculating it would make things clearer. But quantum textbooks do not contain the necessary tools, and for good reason. With two noncommuting observables A and B, it is easy to poke either of them into the 〈ψ|A|ψ〉 formula, whereas assigning probabilities leads into a vast swamp, which work on quantum foundations has shown to be filled with nasty paradoxes ready to bite the unwary. Retreating to macroscopic measurements allows textbook writers to avoid the swamp, but with a serious loss in clarity of thought and physical intuition. It is better to drain the swamp of its root cause: a failed attempt to meld classical and quantum modes of reasoning, instead of consistently applying quantum concepts at all levels, microscopic and macroscopic, which is something we now know how to do.Another misconception reported in the Physics Today article, that measurement of a physical observable causes the system to be stuck forever in the measured eigenstate, is hardly surprising when students are taught that measurements and wavefunction collapse are part of the axiomatic, and thus unanalyzable, structure of quantum theory. Instead, they need to think about measurements as quantum physical processes, governed by the same laws as the rest of the quantum world, and learn how to use conditional probabilities to relate measurement outcomes to the past as well as the future behavior of a measured system. Once again, outdated ideas make the subject harder to learn.For 10 years I have been teaching advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate quantum mechanics courses and courses in quantum information, using the new perspective in which quantum mechanics is based on probabilistic laws of universal validity, with measurements being only one application. Reactions have generally been positive, though the students show signs of shock when I tell them that by the end of the course, provided they do their homework, they will understand some aspects of quantum mechanics better than Feynman did. Presenting the new ideas takes somewhat longer than the material they replace, but not enormously so. Some time will be regained in courses that include an introduction to quantum entanglement and Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen, since circuitous arguments invoking Bell's inequality and the like, which can leave students quite confused, are replaced by a short, clear treatment of the essentials.Although I can see the value of computer simulations of Schrödinger's equation, I think it is more effective to first introduce students to basic quantum dynamics, both unitary and stochastic, through the use of “toy models.” I included various examples in Consistent Quantum Theory . 1 1. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory, Cambridge U. Press, New York (2002). Some chapters and a few exercises are available at http://quantum.phys.cmu.edu. The properties of such models are easily worked out with a pencil on a small sheet of paper, like the back of an envelope. Working through them helps students master new concepts and get rid of certain misconceptions about quantum measurements. The fact that students in my courses have been able to learn how to apply probabilities consistently to microscopic systems, in a way that disposes of numerous difficulties and conceptual paradoxes, suggests it might be worthwhile for other teachers to invest some time in learning post-Feynman ideas. The main difficulty is the absence of a textbook. I have used reference 1 as a supplement, though it is not ideal. It has no exercises, although a few are available on the corresponding website. I would be happy to hear from anyone skilled in textbook writing who wants to revise an older one or start something new.In conclusion, I strongly favor every effort to improve students’ understanding of quantum mechanics, and I consider the research reported by Singh and coauthors a valuable contribution to that end. However, if we want our students to genuinely understand quantum mechanics and not simply calculate things, I believe a much bigger step forward is possible by combining the efforts reported in the article with advances in quantum foundations.REFERENCESection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCE <<1. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory, Cambridge U. Press, New York (2002). Some chapters and a few exercises are available at http://quantum.phys.cmu.edu. Google Scholar© 2007 American Institute of Physics.