In this work, we discuss a formal way of dealing with the properties of contextual systems. Our approach is to assume that properties describing the same physical quantity, but belonging to different measurement contexts, are indistinguishable in a strong sense. To construct the formal theoretical structure, we develop a description using quasi-set theory, which is a settheoretical framework built to describe collections of elements that violate Leibnitz’s principle of identity of indiscernibles. This framework allows us to consider a new ontology in order to study the properties of quantum systems. \nThis article is part of the theme issue ‘Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond’.
In this work, we discuss a formal way of dealing with the properties of contextual systems. Our approach is to assume that properties describing the same physical quantity, but belonging to different measurement contexts, are indistinguishable in a strong sense. To construct the formal theoretical structure, we develop a description using quasi-set theory, which is a settheoretical framework built to describe collections of elements that violate Leibnitz’s principle of identity of indiscernibles. This framework allows us to consider a new ontology in order to study the properties of quantum systems. \nThis article is part of the theme issue ‘Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond’.
In this work, we discuss a formal way of dealing with the properties of contextual systems. Our approach is to assume that properties describing the same physical quantity, but belonging to different measurement contexts, are indistinguishable in a strong sense. To construct the formal theoretical structure, we develop a description using quasi-set theory, which is a set-theoretical framework built to describe collections of elements that violate Leibnitz's principle of identity of indiscernibles. This framework allows us to consider a new ontology in order to study the properties of quantum systems. This article is part of the theme issue 'Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond'.
It is well known that in quantum mechanics we cannot always define consistently properties that are context independent.Many approaches exist to describe contextual properties, such as Contextuality by Default (CbD), sheaf theory, topos theory, and non-standard or signed probabilities.In this paper, we propose a treatment of contextual properties that is specific to quantum mechanics, as it relies on the relationship between contextuality and indistinguishability.In particular, we propose that if we assume the ontological thesis that quantum particles or properties can be indistinguishable yet different, no contradiction arising from a Kochen-Specker-type argument appears: when we repeat an experiment, we are in reality performing an experiment measuring a property that is indistinguishable from the first, but not the same.We will discuss how the consequences of this move may help us understand quantum contextuality.
It is well known that in quantum mechanics we cannot always define consistently properties that are context independent. Many approaches exist to describe contextual properties, such as Contextuality by Default (CbD), sheaf theory, topos theory, and non-standard or signed probabilities. In this paper, we propose a treatment of contextual properties that is specific to quantum mechanics, as it relies on the relationship between contextuality and indistinguishability. In particular, we propose that if we assume the ontological thesis that quantum particles or properties can be indistinguishable yet different, no contradiction arising from a Kochen–Specker-type argument appears: when we repeat an experiment, we are in reality performing an experiment measuring a property that is indistinguishable from the first, but not the same. We will discuss how the consequences of this move may help us understand quantum contextuality.
The origin and basis of the notion of quantum contextuality is identified in the Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics, where context is automatically invoked by its requirement that the experimental arrangement involved in any measurements or set of measurements be taken into account while, in general, the outcome of a measurement may depend on other measurements immediately preceding or jointly performed on the same system. For Bohr, the specification of the experimental situation of any measurement is essential to its significance in light of complementarity and the omnipresence of the quantum of action in physics; for Heisenberg, the incompatibility of pairs of sharp measurements belonging to different situations coheres with both the completeness of the quantum state as an objective physical description and the principle of indeterminacy. Here, context in the Copenhagen approach is taken to be the equivalence class of experimental arrangements corresponding to a set of compatible measurements of quantum observables in standard quantum mechanics; the associated form of contextuality in quantum mechanics arises via the non-commutativity in general of sharp observables, proven by von Neumann, that can appear, providing different contexts. This notion is related to theoretical situations explored later by Bell, by Kochen and Specker, and by others in relation to the classification of hidden-variables theories and elsewhere in physics. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond’.
The circumstances of measurement have more direct significance in quantum than in classical physics, where they can be neglected for well-performed measurements. In quantum mechanics, the dispositions of the measuring apparatus-plus-environment of the system measured for a property are a non-trivial part of its formalization as the quantum observable. A straightforward formalization of context, via equivalence classes of measurements corresponding to sets of sharp target observables, was recently given for sharp quantum observables. Here, we show that quantum contextuality, the dependence of measurement outcomes on circumstances external to the measured quantum system, can be manifested not only as the strict exclusivity of different measurements of sharp observables or valuations but via quantitative differences in the property statistics across simultaneous measurements of generalized quantum observables, by formalizing quantum context via coexistent generalized observables rather than only its subset of compatible sharp observables. Here, the question of whether such quantum contextuality follows from basic quantum principles is then addressed, and it is shown that the Principle of Indeterminacy is sufficient for at least one form of non-trivial contextuality. Contextuality is thus seen to be a natural feature of quantum mechanics rather than something arising only from the consideration of impossible measurements, abstract philosophical issues, hidden-variables theories, or other alternative, classical models of quantum behavior.
Russell’s theory of descriptions depends essentially on the concept of identity, in particular to eliminate definite descriptions by contextual definitions. But quantum objects, according to a possible metaphysical interpretation I shall assume without discussion here, seem not to satisfy the standard theory of identity, and do not have individuality in a sense. Even so, physicists refer informally to both ‘a quantum so-and-so’ and, worst, to ‘the quantum so-and-so’, as if these expressions were something like descriptions. In this article, we sketch a possible theory of ‘quantum (definite) descriptions’ using a weaker concept of indiscernibility (or indistinguishability), and advance some consequences such a theory may have for the discussions on the logical foundations of quantum theory.