It is well known that in quantum mechanics we cannot always define consistently properties that are context independent.Many approaches exist to describe contextual properties, such as Contextuality by Default (CbD), sheaf theory, topos theory, and non-standard or signed probabilities.In this paper, we propose a treatment of contextual properties that is specific to quantum mechanics, as it relies on the relationship between contextuality and indistinguishability.In particular, we propose that if we assume the ontological thesis that quantum particles or properties can be indistinguishable yet different, no contradiction arising from a Kochen-Specker-type argument appears: when we repeat an experiment, we are in reality performing an experiment measuring a property that is indistinguishable from the first, but not the same.We will discuss how the consequences of this move may help us understand quantum contextuality.
It is well known that in quantum mechanics we cannot always define consistently properties that are context independent.Many approaches exist to describe contextual properties, such as Contextuality by Default (CbD), sheaf theory, topos theory, and non-standard or signed probabilities.In this paper, we propose a treatment of contextual properties that is specific to quantum mechanics, as it relies on the relationship between contextuality and indistinguishability.In particular, we propose that if we assume the ontological thesis that quantum particles or properties can be indistinguishable yet different, no contradiction arising from a Kochen-Specker-type argument appears: when we repeat an experiment, we are in reality performing an experiment measuring a property that is indistinguishable from the first, but not the same.We will discuss how the consequences of this move may help us understand quantum contextuality.
It is well known that in quantum mechanics we cannot always define consistently properties that are context independent. Many approaches exist to describe contextual properties, such as Contextuality by Default (CbD), sheaf theory, topos theory, and non-standard or signed probabilities. In this paper, we propose a treatment of contextual properties that is specific to quantum mechanics, as it relies on the relationship between contextuality and indistinguishability. In particular, we propose that if we assume the ontological thesis that quantum particles or properties can be indistinguishable yet different, no contradiction arising from a Kochen–Specker-type argument appears: when we repeat an experiment, we are in reality performing an experiment measuring a property that is indistinguishable from the first, but not the same. We will discuss how the consequences of this move may help us understand quantum contextuality.
The presence of contextuality in quantum theory was first highlighted by Bell, Kochen and Specker, who discovered that for quantum systems of three or more dimensions, measurements could not be viewed as deterministically revealing pre-existing properties of the system. More precisely, no model can assign deterministic outcomes to the projectors of a quantum measurement in a way that depends only on the projector and not the context (the full set of projectors) in which it appeared, despite the fact that the Born rule probabilities associated with projectors are independent of the context. A more general, operational definition of contextuality introduced by Spekkens, which we will term 'probabilistic contextuality', drops the assumption of determinism and allows for operations other than measurements to be considered contextual. Even two-dimensional quantum mechanics can be shown to be contextual under this generalised notion. Probabilistic noncontextuality represents the postulate that elements of an operational theory that cannot be distinguished from each other based on the statistics of arbitrarily many repeated experiments (they give rise to the same operational probabilities) are ontologically identical. In this paper, we introduce a framework that enables us to distinguish between different noncontextuality assumptions in terms of the relationships between the ontological representations of objects in the theory given a certain relation between their operational representations. This framework can be used to motivate and define a 'possibilistic' analogue, encapsulating the idea that elements of an operational theory that cannot be unambiguously distinguished operationally can also not be unambiguously distinguished ontologically. We then prove that possibilistic noncontextuality is equivalent to an alternative notion of noncontextuality proposed by Hardy. Finally, we demonstrate that these weaker noncontextuality assumptions are sufficient to prove alternative versions of known 'no-go' theorems that constrain ψ -epistemic models for quantum mechanics.
In this work, we discuss a formal way of dealing with the properties of contextual systems. Our approach is to assume that properties describing the same physical quantity, but belonging to different measurement contexts, are indistinguishable in a strong sense. To construct the formal theoretical structure, we develop a description using quasi-set theory, which is a settheoretical framework built to describe collections of elements that violate Leibnitz’s principle of identity of indiscernibles. This framework allows us to consider a new ontology in order to study the properties of quantum systems. \nThis article is part of the theme issue ‘Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond’.
In this work, we discuss a formal way of dealing with the properties of contextual systems. Our approach is to assume that properties describing the same physical quantity, but belonging to different measurement contexts, are indistinguishable in a strong sense. To construct the formal theoretical structure, we develop a description using quasi-set theory, which is a set-theoretical framework built to describe collections of elements that violate Leibnitz's principle of identity of indiscernibles. This framework allows us to consider a new ontology in order to study the properties of quantum systems. This article is part of the theme issue 'Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond'.
Contextuality is a key distinguishing feature between classical and quantum physics. It expresses a fundamental obstruction to describing quantum theory using classical concepts. In turn, understood as a resource for quantum computation, it is expected to hold the key to quantum advantage. Yet, despite its long recognised importance in quantum foundations and, more recently, in quantum computation, the structural essence of contextuality has remained somewhat elusive - different frameworks address different aspects of the phenomenon, yet their precise relationship often remains unclear. This issue already looms large at the level of the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem: while traditional proofs proceed by showing the nonexistence of valuations, the notion of state-independent contextuality in the marginal approach allows to prove contextuality from seemingly weaker assumptions. In the light of this, and at the absence of a unified mathematical framework for Kochen-Specker contextuality, the original algebraic approach has been widely abandoned, in favour of the study of contextual correlations. Here, we reinstate the algebraic perspective on contextuality. Concretely, by building on the novel concept of context connections, we reformulate the algebraic relations between observables originally postulated by Kochen and Specker, and we explicitly demonstrate their consistency with the notion of state-independent contextuality. In the present paper, we focus on the new conceptual ideas and discuss them in the concrete setting of spin-1 observables, specifically those in the example of [S. Yu and C.H. Oh, Phys. Rev. Lett., 108, 030402 (2012)]; in a companion paper, we generalise these ideas, obtain a complete characterisation of Kochen-Specker contextuality and provide a detailed comparison with the related notions of contextuality in the marginal and graph-theoretic approach.
In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. We will argue that there exists a general confusion within the foundational literature arising from the improper of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. While the first one, introduced by Bohr, is related to an interpretation of which stresses the incompatibility (or complementarity) of certain measurement situations described in classical terms; the second meaning of is related to a purely formal understanding of as exposed by the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem which focuses instead on the constraints of the orthodox quantum formalism in order to interpret projection operators as preexistent or actual (definite valued) properties. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an omelette of contextuality which has been fully widespread through a popularized epistemic explanation of the KS theorem according to which: The measurement outcome of the observable A when measured together with B or together with C will necessarily differ in case [A, B] = [A, C] = 0, and [B, C] /= 0. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling and formal perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. Finally, we analyze the consequences of such widespread reading of KS theorem as related to statistical statements of measurement outcomes.