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International Conference on Space Optics (ICSO)

Quantum measurements of signals from the Alphasat TDP1 laser communication terminal

Kevin Günthner, Imran Khan, Birgit Stiller, Ömer Bayraktar, Daniel Tröndle, Herwig Zech, Gerd Leuchs, Dominique Elser, C. R. Müller, Karen Saucke, Frank F. Heine, S. Seel, Peter Greulich, Björn Gütlich, Ines Richter, S. Philipp-May, Christoph Marquardt

Published Sep 25, 2017• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum optics [1] can be harnessed to implement cryptographic protocols that are verifiably immune against any conceivable attack [2]. Even quantum computers, that will break most current public keys [3, 4], cannot harm quantum encryption. Based on these intriguing quantum features, metropolitan quantum networks have been implemented around the world [5-15]. However, the long-haul link between metropolitan networks is currently missing [16]. Existing fiber infrastructure is not suitable for this purpose since classical telecom repeaters cannot relay quantum states [2]. Therefore, optical satellite-to-ground communication [17-22] lends itself to bridge intercontinental distances for quantum communication [23-40].

DOI
10.1117/12.2296184

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Quantum optics [1] can be harnessed to implement cryptographic protocols that are verifiably immune against any conceivable attack [2]. Even quantum computers, that will break most current public keys [3, 4], cannot harm quantum encryption. Based on these intriguing quantum features, metropolitan quantum networks have been implemented around the world [5-15]. However, the long-haul link between metropolitan networks is currently missing [16]. Existing fiber infrastructure is not suitable for this purpose since classical telecom repeaters cannot relay quantum states [2]. Therefore, optical satellite-to-ground communication [17-22] lends itself to bridge intercontinental distances for quantum communication [23-40].
By harnessing quantum effects, we nowadays can use encryption that is in principle proven to withstand any conceivable attack. These fascinating quantum features have been implemented in metropolitan quantum networks around the world. In order to interconnect such networks over long distances, optical satellite communication is the method of choice. Standard telecommunication components allow one to efficiently implement quantum communication by measuring field quadratures (continuous variables). This opens the possibility to adapt our Laser Communication Terminals (LCTs) to quantum key distribution (QKD). First satellite measurement campaigns are currently validating our approach.
As quantum computing threatens to compromise classical cryptographic systems, the need for future-proof, information-theoretically secure methods of communication has become critical. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) leverages the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics to enable the secure generation and exchange of encryption keys, immune to computational attacks. This paper investigates the integration of QKD into telecom infrastructures to enable ultra-secure communication. We examine the performance of key QKD protocols, such as BB84 and E91, over fiber-optic and free-space channels, and simulate their deployment within realistic metropolitan network topologies. Results show that secure key rates of up to 10 kbps can be maintained over 50–80 km fiber links with Quantum Bit Error Rates (QBER) below 5%. The study also explores architecture models based on trusted relay nodes and WDM coexistence, highlighting practical deployment considerations. Our findings suggest that QKD is a viable enhancement for telecom security and a necessary foundation for long-term quantum-resilient communication systems.
Summary form only given. Quantum key distribution (QKD) has raised increased attention over the past years as one of the most attractive quantum technologies for practical implementation. QKD has already been implemented in intra-city networks all around the world. But up to now, bridging global distances with quantum communication remains an outstanding challenge. A promising candidate to provide this link is via optical satellite communication. As space-to-ground communication is already well developed for classical applications, one can make use of the already existing technology for QKD, i.e. modern Laser Communication Terminals (LCTs) may be adapted for quantum communication. An important first step to achieve this goal is a precise characterization of the system and the channel with regard to their quantum noise behaviour. We present quantum-limited measurements of signals from an LCT located on the satellite Alphasat in geostationary Earth orbit. The LCT generates binary phase shift keyed (BPSK) coherent states originally used for classical data communication. Our receiver is a Transportable Adaptive Optical Ground Station (T-AOGS) located at the Teide observatory on Tenerife. It corrects for phase front distortions in order to interfere the incoming signal with a local oscillator. This allows for heterodyne detection or, by phase-locking the local oscillator, for homodyne detection. The detector itself is quantum noise limited such that it can resolve the quantum uncertainty of the detected states (see Fig. 1). Evaluating the signal variance for homodyne detection, we are able to show that the detected states are quantum limited coherent states. Thus, we conclude that the coherence of the quantum states is preserved after propagation over a distance of 38600 km including the passage through turbulent atmosphere and we give an upper bound for any excess noise that the states might have acquired [1]. Moreover, we extent our analysis to heterodyne detection, characterizing arbitrary field quadratures. Our results indicate that satellite quantum communication is feasible in principle in such a scenario.
Quantum computers will change the cryptographic panorama. A technology once believed to lie far away in the future is increasingly closer to real-world applications. Quantum computers will break the algorithms used in our public key infrastructure and in our key exchange protocols, forcing a complete retooling of cryptography as we know it. Quantum key distribution is a physical layer technology immune to quantum or classical computational threats. However, it requires a physical substrate, and optical fiber has been the usual choice. Most of the time, it is used just as a point-to-point link for the exclusive transport of delicate quantum signals. Its integration in a realworld shared network has not been attempted so far. Here we show how the new programmable software network architectures, together with specially designed quantum systems, can be used to produce a network that integrates classical and quantum communications, including management, in a single, production-level infrastructure. The network can also incorporate new quantum- safe algorithms and use the existing security protocols, thus bridging the gap between today's network security and the quantum-safe network of the future. This can be done in an evolutionary way, without zero-day migrations and the corresponding upfront costs. We also present how the technologies have been deployed in practice using a production network.