Physical layer security (PLS) in wireless communication has gained recent attention due to the emergence of new technological breakthroughs in this space. Since the internode distances have been noted to play a key role in the desired security performance, we propose a novel quality-of-service-aware PLS model that incorporates the random spatial deployment of the legitimate users and a potential attacker. This proposed model considers practical constraints like maximum separation between legitimate users and eavesdropping capability of attacker. In this regard, a novel concept of eavesdropping zone is also introduced. Eventually, closed-form expressions are derived for secrecy outage probability using the probabilistic inter-node distance distributions between the legitimate users and attacker to shed key analytical insights like optimal parameter designing to achieve a desired secrecy performance. Lastly, specific simulation results, presented to validate the analytical claims and provide key secured system designing perspectives, corroborate the potential of the proposed framework for more accurately characterizing the desired PLS performance from both the legitimate users' and attackers point-of-view.
Physical layer security (PLS) in wireless communication has gained recent attention due to the emergence of new technological breakthroughs in this space. Since the internode distances have been noted to play a key role in the desired security performance, we propose a novel quality-of-service-aware PLS model that incorporates the random spatial deployment of the legitimate users and a potential attacker. This proposed model considers practical constraints like maximum separation between legitimate users and eavesdropping capability of attacker. In this regard, a novel concept of eavesdropping zone is also introduced. Eventually, closed-form expressions are derived for secrecy outage probability using the probabilistic inter-node distance distributions between the legitimate users and attacker to shed key analytical insights like optimal parameter designing to achieve a desired secrecy performance. Lastly, specific simulation results, presented to validate the analytical claims and provide key secured system designing perspectives, corroborate the potential of the proposed framework for more accurately characterizing the desired PLS performance from both the legitimate users' and attackers point-of-view.
Securing wireless communication, being inherently vulnerable to eavesdropping and jamming attacks, becomes more challenging in resource‐constrained networks such as internet‐of‐things. Towards this, physical layer security (PLS) has gained significant attention due to its low complexity. The authors address the issue of random inter‐node distances in secrecy analysis and develop a comprehensive quality‐of‐service (QoS) aware PLS framework for the analysis of both eavesdropping and jamming capabilities of the attacker. The proposed solution covers the spatially stochastic deployment of nodes. The secrecy performance is characterised against both attacks using inter‐node distance‐based probabilistic distribution functions. The model takes into account the practical limits arising out of underlying QoS requirements, which include the maximum distance between legitimate users driven by transmit power and receiver sensitivity. A novel concept of eavesdropping zone is introduced, and the relative impact of jamming power is investigated. Closed‐form expressions for asymptotic secrecy outage probability are derived offering insights into the design of optimal system parameters for desired security level against the attacker's capability of both attacks. The analytical framework, validated by numerical results, establishes that the proposed solution offers a potentially accurate characterisation of the PLS performance and key design perspective from point‐of‐view of both legitimate user and attacker.
In this paper, we investigate physical layer security in a random wireless network where both legitimate and eavesdropping nodes are randomly deployed.In the first scenario, we study the basic random network without a protected zone around the source node.The probability density functions (PDF) for the composite channel gain with both fading and path loss is derived and used to calculate the probability of secure connection and ergodic secrecy capacity.In the second scenario, we consider the use of secrecy protected zone around the source node to enhance the security in a noise limited network.Here we study the two cases (i) the eavesdroppers are aware of the secrecy protected zone; (ii) the eavesdroppers are unaware of the secrecy protected zone.Moreover, the distribution of the distances between the origin and random nodes outside the secrecy protected zone is derived.In the last scenario, the interferer protected zones around the legitimate receivers are used to improve the physical layer security by restructuring the interference.The derived analytical results are verified by the Monte Carlo simulations.It is shown that the application of secrecy and interferer protected zones lead to significant improvement in the security depending on different system parameters.
In this paper, we investigate physical-layer security in a random wireless network where both legitimate and eavesdropping nodes are randomly deployed. In the first scenario, we study the basic random network without a protected zone around the source node. The probability density functions (pdfs) for the composite channel gain with both fading and path loss is derived and used to calculate the probability of secure connection and ergodic secrecy capacity. In the second scenario, we consider the use of secrecy protected zone around the source node to enhance the security in a noise-limited network. Here, we study the following two cases: 1) The eavesdroppers are aware of the secrecy protected zone, and 2) the eavesdroppers are unaware of the secrecy protected zone. Moreover, the distribution of the distances between the origin and random nodes outside the secrecy protected zone is derived. In the final scenario, the interferer protected zones around the legitimate receivers are used to improve the physical-layer security by restructuring the interference. The derived analytical results are verified by the Monte Carlo simulations. It is shown that the application of secrecy and interferer protected zones lead to significant improvement in security, depending on different system parameters.
Traditional cryptographic encryption techniques at higher layers require a certain form of information sharing between the transmitter and the legitimate user to achieve security. Besides, it also assumes that the eavesdropper has an insufficient computational capability to decrypt the ciphertext without the shared information. However, traditional cryptographic encryption techniques may be insufficient or even not suit- able in wireless communication systems. Physical layer security (PLS) can enhance the security of wireless communications by leveraging the physical nature of wireless transmission. Thus, in this thesis, we study the PLS performance in emerging wireless transmission systems. The thesis consists of two main parts. We first consider the PLS design and analysis for ground-based networks em- ploying random unitary beamforming (RUB) scheme at the transmitter. With RUB technique, the transmitter serves multiple users with pre-designed beamforming vectors, selected using limited channel state information (CSI). We study multiple-input single-output single-eavesdropper (MISOSE) transmission system, multi-user multiple-input multiple-output single-eavesdropper (MU-MIMOSE) transmission system, and massive multiple-input multiple-output multiple-eavesdropper (massive MI- MOME) transmission system. The closed-form expressions of ergodic secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability (SOP) for these transmission scenarios are derived. Besides, the effect of artificial noise (AN) on secrecy performance of RUB-based transmission is also investigated. Numerical results are presented to illustrate the trade-off between performance and complexity of the resulting PLS design. We then investigate the PLS design and analysis for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-based networks. We first study the secrecy performance of UAV-assisted relaying transmission systems in the presence of a single ground eavesdropper. We derive the closed-form expressions of ergodic secrecy rate and intercept probability. When multiple aerial and ground eavesdroppers are located in the UAV-assisted relaying transmission system, directional beamforming technique is applied to enhance the secrecy performance. Assuming the most general κ-μ shadowed fading channel, the SOP performance is obtained in the closed-form expression. Exploiting the derived expressions, we investigate the impact of different parameters on secrecy performance. Besides, we utilize a deep learning approach in UAV-based network analysis. Numerical results show that our proposed deep learning approach can predict secrecy performance with high accuracy and short running time.
Due to the openness nature of wireless medium, security issues have increasingly become a bottleneck that restricts the development of ultra-reliable and low-latency communications (uRLLCs). Physical layer security (PLS) technique has been proposed to fulfill the security and confidentiality of information transmission by exploiting the characteristics of the wireless channel, which caters to the features of uRLLC. Furthermore, PLS also shows great practicality in artificial intelligence field, especially in wireless intelligent networks. However, the previous works on the study of PLS ignored the significance of mobility and limited packet length constraint required by uRLLC for satisfying low latency, in this paper, we investigate the impact of mobility on the secrecy performance of uRLLC by using the Random WayPoint (RWP) model and the Random Direction (RD) model. Specifically, with the tools of stochastic geometry, to observe the impact of key system parameters on the secrecy performance, we establish the closed-form expression of connection outage probability, secrecy outage probability, and decoding error probability-based secrecy transmission capacity (DEP-STC). Furthermore, we derive the condition that achieves a positive DEP-STC under two moving models, which can offer the network designer some greatly significant insights into achieving perfect secrecy. Simulations validate our derived theoretical results, and indicate that RWP moving receiver can obtain a higher security level than RD moving one, while RWP eavesdropper can lead to a lower security.
Passive eavesdropping compromises confidentiality in wireless networks, especially in resource-constrained environments where heavyweight cryptography is impractical. Physical layer security (PLS) exploits channel randomness and spatial selectivity to confine information to an intended receiver with modest overhead. However, typical PLS techniques, such as beamforming, artificial noise, and reconfigurable intelligent surfaces, often require additional active power or specialized deployment and rely on precise time synchronization and perfect CSI estimation, which limits their practicality. Meanwhile, the role of ambient backscatter devices (AmBDs) in potentially strengthening the legitimate channel while limiting eavesdroppers in generalized wireless network settings has not been fully investigated. To this end, we propose AmbShield, an AmBD-assisted PLS scheme that leverages naturally distributed AmBDs to simultaneously strengthen the legitimate channel and degrade eavesdroppers' reception without requiring extra transmit power and with minimal deployment overhead. In AmbShield, AmBDs are exploited as friendly jammers that randomly backscatter to create interference at eavesdroppers, and as passive relays that backscatter the desired signal to enhance the capacity of legitimate devices. We further develop a unified analytical framework that analyzes the exact probability density function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function (CDF) of legitimate and eavesdropper signal-to-interference-noise ratio (SINR), a closed-form secrecy outage probability (SOP), its high-SNR asymptote, and a secrecy diversity order (SDO). The analysis provides clear design guidelines on various practical system parameters to minimize SOP. Extensive experiments that include Monte Carlo simulations, theoretical derivations, and high-SNR asymptotic analysis demonstrate the security gains of AmbShield across diverse system parameters under imperfect synchronization and CSI estimation.