Securing wireless communication, being inherently vulnerable to eavesdropping and jamming attacks, becomes more challenging in resource‐constrained networks such as internet‐of‐things. Towards this, physical layer security (PLS) has gained significant attention due to its low complexity. The authors address the issue of random inter‐node distances in secrecy analysis and develop a comprehensive quality‐of‐service (QoS) aware PLS framework for the analysis of both eavesdropping and jamming capabilities of the attacker. The proposed solution covers the spatially stochastic deployment of nodes. The secrecy performance is characterised against both attacks using inter‐node distance‐based probabilistic distribution functions. The model takes into account the practical limits arising out of underlying QoS requirements, which include the maximum distance between legitimate users driven by transmit power and receiver sensitivity. A novel concept of eavesdropping zone is introduced, and the relative impact of jamming power is investigated. Closed‐form expressions for asymptotic secrecy outage probability are derived offering insights into the design of optimal system parameters for desired security level against the attacker's capability of both attacks. The analytical framework, validated by numerical results, establishes that the proposed solution offers a potentially accurate characterisation of the PLS performance and key design perspective from point‐of‐view of both legitimate user and attacker.
Securing wireless communication, being inherently vulnerable to eavesdropping and jamming attacks, becomes more challenging in resource‐constrained networks such as internet‐of‐things. Towards this, physical layer security (PLS) has gained significant attention due to its low complexity. The authors address the issue of random inter‐node distances in secrecy analysis and develop a comprehensive quality‐of‐service (QoS) aware PLS framework for the analysis of both eavesdropping and jamming capabilities of the attacker. The proposed solution covers the spatially stochastic deployment of nodes. The secrecy performance is characterised against both attacks using inter‐node distance‐based probabilistic distribution functions. The model takes into account the practical limits arising out of underlying QoS requirements, which include the maximum distance between legitimate users driven by transmit power and receiver sensitivity. A novel concept of eavesdropping zone is introduced, and the relative impact of jamming power is investigated. Closed‐form expressions for asymptotic secrecy outage probability are derived offering insights into the design of optimal system parameters for desired security level against the attacker's capability of both attacks. The analytical framework, validated by numerical results, establishes that the proposed solution offers a potentially accurate characterisation of the PLS performance and key design perspective from point‐of‐view of both legitimate user and attacker.
Physical layer security (PLS) in wireless communication has gained recent attention due to the emergence of new technological breakthroughs in this space. Since the internode distances have been noted to play a key role in the desired security performance, we propose a novel quality-of-service-aware PLS model that incorporates the random spatial deployment of the legitimate users and a potential attacker. This proposed model considers practical constraints like maximum separation between legitimate users and eavesdropping capability of attacker. In this regard, a novel concept of eavesdropping zone is also introduced. Eventually, closed-form expressions are derived for secrecy outage probability using the probabilistic inter-node distance distributions between the legitimate users and attacker to shed key analytical insights like optimal parameter designing to achieve a desired secrecy performance. Lastly, specific simulation results, presented to validate the analytical claims and provide key secured system designing perspectives, corroborate the potential of the proposed framework for more accurately characterizing the desired PLS performance from both the legitimate users' and attackers point-of-view.
Due to the openness nature of wireless medium, security issues have increasingly become a bottleneck that restricts the development of ultra-reliable and low-latency communications (uRLLCs). Physical layer security (PLS) technique has been proposed to fulfill the security and confidentiality of information transmission by exploiting the characteristics of the wireless channel, which caters to the features of uRLLC. Furthermore, PLS also shows great practicality in artificial intelligence field, especially in wireless intelligent networks. However, the previous works on the study of PLS ignored the significance of mobility and limited packet length constraint required by uRLLC for satisfying low latency, in this paper, we investigate the impact of mobility on the secrecy performance of uRLLC by using the Random WayPoint (RWP) model and the Random Direction (RD) model. Specifically, with the tools of stochastic geometry, to observe the impact of key system parameters on the secrecy performance, we establish the closed-form expression of connection outage probability, secrecy outage probability, and decoding error probability-based secrecy transmission capacity (DEP-STC). Furthermore, we derive the condition that achieves a positive DEP-STC under two moving models, which can offer the network designer some greatly significant insights into achieving perfect secrecy. Simulations validate our derived theoretical results, and indicate that RWP moving receiver can obtain a higher security level than RD moving one, while RWP eavesdropper can lead to a lower security.
In this paper, we investigate physical layer security in a random wireless network where both legitimate and eavesdropping nodes are randomly deployed.In the first scenario, we study the basic random network without a protected zone around the source node.The probability density functions (PDF) for the composite channel gain with both fading and path loss is derived and used to calculate the probability of secure connection and ergodic secrecy capacity.In the second scenario, we consider the use of secrecy protected zone around the source node to enhance the security in a noise limited network.Here we study the two cases (i) the eavesdroppers are aware of the secrecy protected zone; (ii) the eavesdroppers are unaware of the secrecy protected zone.Moreover, the distribution of the distances between the origin and random nodes outside the secrecy protected zone is derived.In the last scenario, the interferer protected zones around the legitimate receivers are used to improve the physical layer security by restructuring the interference.The derived analytical results are verified by the Monte Carlo simulations.It is shown that the application of secrecy and interferer protected zones lead to significant improvement in the security depending on different system parameters.
In this paper, we investigate physical-layer security in a random wireless network where both legitimate and eavesdropping nodes are randomly deployed. In the first scenario, we study the basic random network without a protected zone around the source node. The probability density functions (pdfs) for the composite channel gain with both fading and path loss is derived and used to calculate the probability of secure connection and ergodic secrecy capacity. In the second scenario, we consider the use of secrecy protected zone around the source node to enhance the security in a noise-limited network. Here, we study the following two cases: 1) The eavesdroppers are aware of the secrecy protected zone, and 2) the eavesdroppers are unaware of the secrecy protected zone. Moreover, the distribution of the distances between the origin and random nodes outside the secrecy protected zone is derived. In the final scenario, the interferer protected zones around the legitimate receivers are used to improve the physical-layer security by restructuring the interference. The derived analytical results are verified by the Monte Carlo simulations. It is shown that the application of secrecy and interferer protected zones lead to significant improvement in security, depending on different system parameters.
As the technology and computing power advance day by day, physical layer security in wireless communications gains more importance. It allows the security of wireless communications based on information theoretical guarantees without the need for cryptography. One important practical challenge for physical layer security arises from the fact that no information about the passive eavesdroppers is available to the legitimate nodes. Without such information, optimizing the transmission parameters has always been a difficult task. In this study we aim to address various challenging aspects about this issue and propose a new perspective into the analysis of secrecy with a focus on jamming. We start from the case of eavesdropper's channel state information (CSI) known to users in a three-node single-antenna multi-subcarrier network and present an improved optimization algorithm compared to previous methods. Then we expand our horizon to the case of multiple-antenna nodes with eavesdropper's CSI unknown to users. We investigate a secure wireless communication scheme which combines two of the most effective strategies to combat eavesdropping, namely mixing information with artificial noise at the transmitter and jamming from a full-duplex receiver. While such setup has been investigated in related works, new and important insights are revealed in this study. We investigate the design of optimal jamming parameters to achieve higher secrecy.We then derive a closed-form expression for asymptotic normalized instantaneous secrecy rate of our model. Based on the results of the asymptotic analysis, we propose an alternative less complex tractable optimization problem for the design of optimal transmission parameters to achieve higher secrecy. We show that even with the optimal parameters, secrecy is compromised if Eve is able to increase her number of antennas. To address this issue, we provide a comprehensive analysis of a new scheme called anti-eavesdropping channel estimation (ANECE) which prevents Eve from acquiring accurate channel estimations. We show that the usage of such scheme, makes it extremely hard for Eve to drive secrecy to zero. Numerical analyses and simulations are presented to support the arguments made in this study.We then derive a closed-form expression for asymptotic normalized instantaneous secrecy rate of our model. Based on the results of the asymptotic analysis, we propose an alternative less complex tractable optimization problem for the design of optimal transmission parameters to achieve higher secrecy. We show that even with the optimal parameters, secrecy is compromised if Eve is able to increase her number of antennas. To address this issue, we provide a comprehensive analysis of a new scheme called anti-eavesdropping channel estimation (ANECE) which prevents Eve from acquiring accurate channel estimations. We show that the usage of such scheme, makes it extremely hard for Eve to drive secrecy to zero. Numerical analyses and simulations are presented to support the arguments made in this study.We then derive a closed-form expression for asymptotic normalized instantaneous secrecy rate of our model. Based on the results of the asymptotic analysis, we propose an alternative less complex tractable optimization problem for the design of optimal transmission parameters to achieve higher secrecy. We show that even with the optimal parameters, secrecy is compromised if Eve is able to increase her number of antennas. To address this issue, we provide a comprehensive analysis of a new scheme called anti-eavesdropping channel estimation (ANECE) which prevents Eve from acquiring accurate channel estimations. We show that the usage of such scheme makes it extremely hard for Eve to drive secrecy to zero. Numerical analyses and simulations are presented to support the arguments made in this study.
Passive eavesdropping compromises confidentiality in wireless networks, especially in resource-constrained environments where heavyweight cryptography is impractical. Physical layer security (PLS) exploits channel randomness and spatial selectivity to confine information to an intended receiver with modest overhead. However, typical PLS techniques, such as using beamforming, artificial noise, and reconfigurable intelligent surfaces, often involve added active power or specialized deployment, and, in many designs, rely on precise time synchronization and perfect CSI estimation, which limits their practicality. To this end, we propose AmbShield, an AmBD-assisted PLS scheme that leverages naturally distributed AmBDs to simultaneously strengthen the legitimate channel and degrade eavesdroppers' without requiring extra transmit power and with minimal deployment overhead. In AmbShield, AmBDs are exploited as friendly jammers that randomly backscatter to create interference at eavesdroppers, and as passive relays that backscatter the desired signal to enhance the capacity of legitimate devices. We further develop a unified analytical framework that analyzes the exact probability density function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function (CDF) of legitimate and eavesdropper signal-to-interference-noise ratio (SINR), and a closed-form secrecy outage probability (SOP). The analysis provides clear design guidelines on various practical system parameters to minimize SOP. Extensive experiments that include Monte Carlo simulations, theoretical derivations, and high-SNR asymptotic analysis demonstrate the security gains of AmbShield across diverse system parameters under imperfect synchronization and CSI estimation.