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Intrusion-Resilient Secure Channels.

Gene Itkis, Robert McNerney, Scott Russell

Published Jan 1, 2005• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

We propose a new secure communication primitive called an Intrusion-Resilient Channel (IRC) that limits the damage resulting from key exposures and facilitates recovery. We define security against passive but mobile and highly adaptive adversaries capable of exposing even expired past secrets. We describe an intuitive...

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This thesis is a study of erasures in cryptographic protocols. Erasing old data and keys is an important capability of honest parties in cryptographic protocols. It is useful in many settings, including proactive security in the presence of a mobile adversary, adaptive security in the presence of an adaptive adversary, forward security, and intrusion resilience. Some of these settings, such as achieving proactive security, is provably impossible without some form of erasures. Other settings, such as designing protocols that are secure against adaptive adversaries, are much simpler to achieve when erasures are allowed. Protocols for all these contexts typically assume the ability to perfectly erase information. Unfortunately, as amply demonstrated in the systems literature, perfect erasures are hard to implement in practice. We propose a model of imperfect or partial erasures where erasure instructions are only partially effective and leave almost all the data intact, thus giving the honest parties only a limited capability to dispose old data. Nonetheless, we show how to design protocols for all of the above settings (including proactive security, adaptive security, forward security, and intrusion resilience) for which this weak form of erasures suffices. We do not have to invent entirely new protocols, but rather show how to automatically modify protocols relying on perfect erasures into ones for which partial erasures suffices. Stated most generally, we provide a compiler that transforms any protocol relying on perfect erasures for security into one with the same functionality that remains secure even if the erasures are only partial. The key idea is a new redundant representation of secret data which can still be computed on, and yet is rendered useless when partially erased. We prove that any such compiler must incur a cost in additional storage, and that our compiler is near optimal in terms of its storage overhead. We also give computationally more efficient compilers for a number of special cases: (1) when all the computations on secrets can be done in constant parallel time (NC0); (2) for a class of proactive secret sharing protocols where we leave the protocol intact except for changing the representation of the shares of the secret and the instructions that modify the shares (to correspondingly modify the new representation instead). (Copies available exclusively from MIT Libraries, Rm. 14-0551, Cambridge, MA 02139-4307. Ph. 617-253-5668; Fax 617-253-1690.)
We introduce a new primitive called intrusion-resilient secret sharing (IRSS), whose security proof exploits the fact that there exist functions which can be efficiently computed interactively using low communication complexity in k, but not in k-1 rounds. IRSS is a means of sharing a secret message amongst a set of players which comes with a very strong security guarantee. The shares in an IRSS are made artificially large so that it is hard to retrieve them completely, and the reconstruction procedure is interactive requiring the players to exchange k short messages. The adversaries considered can attack the scheme in rounds, where in each round the adversary chooses some player to corrupt and some function, and retrieves the output of that function applied to the share of the corrupted player. This model captures for example computers connected to a network which can occasionally he infected by malicious software like viruses, which can compute any function on the infected machine, but cannot sent out a huge amount of data. Using methods from the bounded-retrieval model, we construct an IRSS scheme which is secure against any computationally unbounded adversary as long as the total amount of information retrieved by the adversary is somewhat less than the length of the shares, and the adversary makes at most k-1 corruption rounds (as described above, where k rounds are necessary for reconstruction). We extend our basic scheme in several ways in order to allow the shares sent by the dealer to be short (the players then blow them up locally) and to handle even stronger adversaries who can learn some of the shares completely. As mentioned, there is an obvious connection between IRSS schemes and the fact that there exist functions with an exponential gap in their communication complexity for k and k-1 rounds. Our scheme implies such a separation which is in several aspects stronger than the previously known ones.