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Leakage-resilient authenticated key establishment protocols for secure channels

星漢 辛

Published Jan 1, 2005• 0 citations
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On the leakage resilience of secure channel establishment

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Secure communication channels are typically constructed from an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol, which authenticates the communicating parties and establishes shared secret keys, and a secure data transmission layer, which uses the secret keys to encrypt data. We address the partial leakage of communicating parties' long-term secret keys due to various side-channel attacks, and the partial leakage of plaintext due to data compression. Both issues can negatively affect the security of channel establishment and data transmission. In this work, we advance the modelling of security for AKE protocols by considering more granular partial leakage of parties' long-term secrets. We present generic and concrete constructions of two-pass leakage-resilient key exchange protocols that are secure in the proposed security models. We also examine two techniques--heuristic separation of secrets and fixed-dictionary compression--for enabling compression while protecting high-value secrets.

School of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science; Science & Engineering Faculty•Jan 1, 2015•2 citations
Secure communication channels are typically constructed from an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol, which authenticates the communicating parties and establishes shared secret keys, and a secure data transmission layer, which uses the secret keys to encrypt data. We address the partial leakage of communicating parties' long-term secret keys due to various side-channel attacks, and the partial leakage of plaintext due to data compression. Both issues can negatively affect the security of channel establishment and data transmission. In this work, we advance the modelling of security for AKE protocols by considering more granular partial leakage of parties' long-term secrets. We present generic and concrete constructions of two-pass leakage-resilient key exchange protocols that are secure in the proposed security models. We also examine two techniques--heuristic separation of secrets and fixed-dictionary compression--for enabling compression while protecting high-value secrets.