A Monist View of Quantum Theory and Neuroscience

Robert W. Baloh

Sisir Roy

Valia Allori

Is wave function monism, the view that the wave function completely \ndescribes physical objects, a sensible view? GRW, one candidate \nto solve the measurement problem, might be taken to be an \nexample of such view. I argue in this paper that it not so obviously \nso. I first show that a bare version of wave function monism is impossible, \nand even if one can construct monistic theories with additional \nrules (but no additional ontologies), they are not to be taken seriously. \nInstead, a preferable choice is that of a quantum theory in which physical \nobjects are represented by entities in three–dimensional space or \nin four-dimensional space-time.

Mauro Dorato

In this chapter Rovelli’s relational interpretation of quantum mechanics (RQM) is defended from some foreseeable objections, so as to clarify its distinctive philosophical implications. In particular, the chapter considers whether RQM presupposes a duality of evolutions and of ontology (the relationality of quantum world and the intrinsicality of the classical world). It then concentrates on the pluralistic, anti-monistic metaphysical consequences of the theory, due to the impossibility of assigning a quantum state to the entire universe. Finally interesting consequences of RQM with respect to the possibility of defining a local, quantum relativistic becoming are noted. Given the difficulties with the cosmic form of becoming required by priority monism, RQM seems to present an important advantage with respect to monistic views, at least as far as the possibility of explaining our experience of time is concerned.