This article explores theoretical conditions necessary for “quantum immortality” (QI) as well as its possible practical implications. It is demonstrated that the QI is a particular case of “multiverse immortality” (MI) which is based on two main assumptions: the very large size of the Universe (not necessary because of quantum effects), and the copy-friendly theory of personal identity. It is shown that a popular objection about the lowering of the world-share (measure) of an observer in the case of QI doesn’t work, as the world-share decline could be compensated by the merging timelines for the simpler minds, and also some types of personal preferences are not dependent on such changes. Despite large uncertainty about MI’s validity, it still has appreciable practical consequences in some important outcomes like suicide and aging. The article demonstrates that MI could be used to significantly increase the expected subjective probability of success of risky life extension technologies, like cryonics, but makes euthanasia impractical, because of the risks of eternal suffering. Euthanasia should be replaced with cryothanasia, i.e. cryopreservation after voluntary death. Another possible application of MI is as a last chance to survive a global catastrophe. MI could be considered a plan D of reaching immortality, where plan A consists of the survival until the creation of the beneficial AI via fighting aging, plan B is cryonics, and plan C is digital immortality.
This article explores theoretical conditions necessary for “quantum immortality” (QI) as well as its possible practical implications. It is demonstrated that the QI is a particular case of “multiverse immortality” (MI) which is based on two main assumptions: the very large size of the Universe (not necessary because of quantum effects), and the copy-friendly theory of personal identity. It is shown that a popular objection about the lowering of the world-share (measure) of an observer in the case of QI doesn’t work, as the world-share decline could be compensated by the merging timelines for the simpler minds, and also some types of personal preferences are not dependent on such changes. Despite large uncertainty about MI’s validity, it still has appreciable practical consequences in some important outcomes like suicide and aging. The article demonstrates that MI could be used to significantly increase the expected subjective probability of success of risky life extension technologies, like cryonics, but makes euthanasia impractical, because of the risks of eternal suffering. Euthanasia should be replaced with cryothanasia, i.e. cryopreservation after voluntary death. Another possible application of MI is as a last chance to survive a global catastrophe. MI could be considered a plan D of reaching immortality, where plan A consists of the survival until the creation of the beneficial AI via fighting aging, plan B is cryonics, and plan C is digital immortality.
Abstract Quantum Immortality usually refers to, in a classical sense, a person who is “lucky” enough to survive in any incident in the world. Such a quantity of luckiness is even big enough to keep that person away from the aging of the human body. That is, in fact, when we say that one becomes “immortal”. Throughout the history of the world, there have been many times when people tried to find out the secret of anti-aging, but this ambitious dream, obviously, has failed every time. This paper will discuss quantum immortality in theoretical and mathematical aspects and evaluate its authority, or possibility, of its existence in real life. In order to accomplish this evaluation, the concepts of the main two interpretations of quantum physics: 1)Copenhagen Interpretation(or non-MWI interpretation), and 2)Many Worlds Interpretation(or MWI)will be necessarily involved. Throughout this paper, the MWI is proven to support the theoretical quantum immortal state, which, in this paper, means to achieve an expected theoretical outcome in the Everett box experiment. In order to show how MWI will give its credit to quantum immortality, the idea of the Infinite Monkey experiment is demonstrated in detail. After that, discussions of the computable probability of the outcome of the Infinite Monkey theorem and its pathological distribution are involved. Regardless of the situation in the Everett box, whether it is pathologically distributed or not, the mathematical outcomes show that MWI will be the only possibility of achieving the quantum immortal state during the Everett box experiment, or quantum gun experiment. Finally, the paper brings out the evaluation of quantum immortality in a real life stance.
Abstract The prospect, in terms of subjective expectations, of immortality under the no‐collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is certain, as pointed out by several authors, both physicists and, more recently, philosophers. The argument, known as quantum suicide, or quantum immortality, has received some critical discussion, but there hasn't been any questioning of David Lewis's point that there is a terrifying corollary to the argument, namely, that we should expect to live forever in a crippled, more and more damaged state, that barely sustains life. This is the prospect of eternal quantum torment. Based on some empirical facts, I argue for a conclusion that is much more reassuring than Lewis's terrible scenario. 1
Abstract David Lewis cautions that although a no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics entails immortality for trans-world selves, the nature of the branching leaves us crippled, lonely, deathly ill (although never dead), and mentally infirm, meaning that immortal life, on such terms, amounts to an existence in eternal torment. This paper argues that the problem Lewis points to is in fact one of individuation and that a synthesis of Lewis’ own notion of perdurance and Robert Nozick’s closest continuer theory, when cast in the mould of a deterministic multiverse (as conceived by the Oxford quantum physicist David Deutsch), individuates trans-world selves in such a way as to allow to prune the infinitesimal expectation of a miserable eternal existence from the histories of most trans-world agents. Thus, contrary to Lewis’ warning that if personal identity is a trans-world notion, then we should all shake in our shoes, this paper argues that even if we are trans-world selves, we almost certainly have nothing to worry about.
The Everett Box is a device in which an observer and a lethal quantum apparatus are isolated from the rest of the universe. On a regular basis, successive trials occur, in each of which an automatic measurement of a quantum superposition inside the apparatus either causes instant death or does nothing to the observer. From the observer's perspective, the chances of surviving m trials monotonically decreases with increasing m. As a result, if the observer is still alive for sufficiently large m she must reject any interpretation of quantum mechanics which is not the many-worlds interpretation (MWI), since surviving m trials becomes vanishingly unlikely in a single world, whereas a version of the observer will necessarily survive in the branching MWI universe. Here we ask whether this conclusion still holds if rather than a classical understanding of limits built on classical logic we instead require our physics to satisfy a computability requirement by investigating the Everett Box in a model of a computational universe running on a variety of constructive logic, Recursive Constructive Mathematics. We show that although the standard Everett argument rejecting non-MWI interpretations is no longer valid, we can show that Everett's conclusion still holds within a computable universe. Thus we argue that Everett's argument is strengthened and any counter-argument must be strengthened, since it holds not only in classical logic (with embedded notions of continuity and infinity) but also in a computable logic.
Observational evidence suggests that the universe is infinite, geometrically flat, homogeneous and isotropic on large scales. Hence, we should expect to find large numbers of identical copies of any object consistent with the laws of physics including conscious identities like people. Under suitable notions of continuity of identity, This would imply that immortality of these conscious identities is a consequence of functionalism. I argue that the same conclusion can be drawn using an Everett Deutsch interpretation of quantum mechanics. I also argue why this is the correct interpretation. Lewis’s “terrifying corollary” is reviewed and I discuss how Bostrom’s simulation argument, if correct, might mitigate our futures.