Observational evidence suggests that the universe is infinite, geometrically flat, homogeneous and isotropic on large scales. Hence, we should expect to find large numbers of identical copies of any object consistent with the laws of physics including conscious identities like people. Under suitable notions of continuity of identity, This would imply that immortality of these conscious identities is a consequence of functionalism. I argue that the same conclusion can be drawn using an Everett Deutsch interpretation of quantum mechanics. I also argue why this is the correct interpretation. Lewis’s “terrifying corollary” is reviewed and I discuss how Bostrom’s simulation argument, if correct, might mitigate our futures.
Observational evidence suggests that the universe is infinite, geometrically flat, homogeneous and isotropic on large scales. Hence, we should expect to find large numbers of identical copies of any object consistent with the laws of physics including conscious identities like people. Under suitable notions of continuity of identity, This would imply that immortality of these conscious identities is a consequence of functionalism. I argue that the same conclusion can be drawn using an Everett Deutsch interpretation of quantum mechanics. I also argue why this is the correct interpretation. Lewis’s “terrifying corollary” is reviewed and I discuss how Bostrom’s simulation argument, if correct, might mitigate our futures.
Abstract The prospect, in terms of subjective expectations, of immortality under the no‐collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is certain, as pointed out by several authors, both physicists and, more recently, philosophers. The argument, known as quantum suicide, or quantum immortality, has received some critical discussion, but there hasn't been any questioning of David Lewis's point that there is a terrifying corollary to the argument, namely, that we should expect to live forever in a crippled, more and more damaged state, that barely sustains life. This is the prospect of eternal quantum torment. Based on some empirical facts, I argue for a conclusion that is much more reassuring than Lewis's terrible scenario. 1
The Everett Box is a device in which an observer and a lethal quantum apparatus are isolated from the rest of the universe. On a regular basis, successive trials occur, in each of which an automatic measurement of a quantum superposition inside the apparatus either causes instant death or does nothing to the observer. From the observer's perspective, the chances of surviving m trials monotonically decreases with increasing m. As a result, if the observer is still alive for sufficiently large m she must reject any interpretation of quantum mechanics which is not the many-worlds interpretation (MWI), since surviving m trials becomes vanishingly unlikely in a single world, whereas a version of the observer will necessarily survive in the branching MWI universe. Here we ask whether this conclusion still holds if rather than a classical understanding of limits built on classical logic we instead require our physics to satisfy a computability requirement by investigating the Everett Box in a model of a computational universe running on a variety of constructive logic, Recursive Constructive Mathematics. We show that although the standard Everett argument rejecting non-MWI interpretations is no longer valid, we can show that Everett's conclusion still holds within a computable universe. Thus we argue that Everett's argument is strengthened and any counter-argument must be strengthened, since it holds not only in classical logic (with embedded notions of continuity and infinity) but also in a computable logic.
The Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics - arguably our most powerfully predictive scientific theory to date - describes a branching Universe composed of an infinite number of quasi-classical macroscopic physical worlds. Though elegant in its straightforward rendering of the mechanics, the Many Worlds Interpretation presents a challenge for understanding identity over time. If we wish to preserve the notion of strict numerical identity, we are faced with the choice between: denying the transitivity of identity; very short-lived lives with near constant death; or accepting that the world is filled with many more individuals than we previously dreamed. In adopting a perdurantist account of identity over time, I argue for this last option. But questions remain about the relationship that branching individuals have to those from whom they’ve split. In this dissertation, I develop a novel account that I call Many Worlds Counterparts. This theory takes its inspiration from Lewis’s Counterpart Theory in offering a modal analysis of de re possibility, but avoids the major challenges that Lewis’s theory faces.
This paper examines personal identity in the context of the Everett interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. According to Everett, the universe branches many – perhaps an infinite number of – times per second. This leads to a universe in which many versions of ‘you’ exist, many of whom are living different lives to yours. How are we to make sense of the continuation of the self in this context? This is of particular importance for Christian theism, which is committed to an enduring self that can be held responsible for past actions and can develop an ongoing relationship with God. The paper argues that the best way to understand identity in the Everettian world as fundamentally narrative in nature.
Abstract Quantum Immortality usually refers to, in a classical sense, a person who is “lucky” enough to survive in any incident in the world. Such a quantity of luckiness is even big enough to keep that person away from the aging of the human body. That is, in fact, when we say that one becomes “immortal”. Throughout the history of the world, there have been many times when people tried to find out the secret of anti-aging, but this ambitious dream, obviously, has failed every time. This paper will discuss quantum immortality in theoretical and mathematical aspects and evaluate its authority, or possibility, of its existence in real life. In order to accomplish this evaluation, the concepts of the main two interpretations of quantum physics: 1)Copenhagen Interpretation(or non-MWI interpretation), and 2)Many Worlds Interpretation(or MWI)will be necessarily involved. Throughout this paper, the MWI is proven to support the theoretical quantum immortal state, which, in this paper, means to achieve an expected theoretical outcome in the Everett box experiment. In order to show how MWI will give its credit to quantum immortality, the idea of the Infinite Monkey experiment is demonstrated in detail. After that, discussions of the computable probability of the outcome of the Infinite Monkey theorem and its pathological distribution are involved. Regardless of the situation in the Everett box, whether it is pathologically distributed or not, the mathematical outcomes show that MWI will be the only possibility of achieving the quantum immortal state during the Everett box experiment, or quantum gun experiment. Finally, the paper brings out the evaluation of quantum immortality in a real life stance.
The modern version of the wave-function collapse in quantum mechanics is based on decoherence and leads to the multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics. The decoherence causes the universe to develop an emergent branching structure. One can interpret the branching structure either as a tree structure or as parallel different histories. Time is not continuous since there are no measurable continuous in quantum physics. Notion of continuous range of possible values of time is just an idealization. The same goes with the direction of time that is a prior assumption based on the branching structure of the multiverse. The multiverse does not exist in external space nor time since there is nothing more beside it. The observer's mind should be not in a superposition with himself. Because of this, in the Many-minds interpretations it is argued that the distinction between worlds should be made at the level of the individual observer. The human bodies are in a superposition, but the minds have definite states that are never in superposition. All possible lives, personalities that do not violate the laws of physics are facts since they represent a valid history in the multiverse. We are one of this possible personalities. Our choices are defined by our personality explained to us by our mind, our consciousness is the unchangeable part of us. It is nonphysical and it senses the world. It does not interact with the brain in the other way beside it.