Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Hardware Random Number Generator

Frederic P. Miller, Agnes F. Vandome, John McBrewster

Published Oct 27, 2009• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Hardware Random Number Generator. Computing, Cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator, Random number generator attack, Random number generation, Applications of randomness, Randomness extractor, Johnson? Nyquist noise, Photoelectric effect

Related papers

Random Number Generator Attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise Secure Key Exchange Protocol

Christiana Chamon, Shahriar Faysal Ferdous, László B. Kish

This paper introduces and demonstrates two new attacks against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme. The attacks are based on random number generators with compromised security. First we explore the situation in which Eve knows the seed of both Alice's and Bob's random number generators. We show that in this situation Eve can crack the secure key bit within a fraction of the bit exchange period even if her current and voltage measurements have only a single bit of resolution. In the second attack, we explore the situation in which Eve knows the seed of only Alice's random number generator. We show that in this situation Eve can still crack the secure key bit but she needs to use the whole bit exchange period for the attack. The security of the KLJN key exchange scheme, similarly to other protocols, necessitates that the random number generator outputs are truly random for Eve.

arXiv:2005.10429•May 21, 2020•2 citations

A comprehensive review of quantum random number generators: concepts, classification and the origin of randomness

Vaisakh Mannalath, Sandeep Mishra, Anirban Pathak

arXiv:2203.00261•Quantum Information Processing•Dec 13, 2023•110 citations

True Random Number Generators for Cryptography

Berk Sunar

Springer eBooks•Dec 10, 2008•61 citations

Statistical Random Number Generator Attack Against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange Protocol

Christiana Chamon, Shahriar Faysal Ferdous, László B. Kish

This paper introduces and demonstrates four new statistical attacks against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme. The attacks utilize compromised random number generators (RNGs) at Alice’s/Bob’s site(s). The case of partial correlations between Alice’s/Bob’s and Eve’s probing noises is explored, that is, Eve’s knowledge of Alice’s and Bob’s noises is limited but not zero. We explore the bilateral situation where Eve has partial knowledge of Alice’s and Bob’s RNGs. It is shown that in this situation Eve can crack the secure key bit by taking the highest cross-correlation between her probing noises and the measured voltage noise in the wire. She can also crack the secure key bit by taking the highest cross-correlation between her noise voltages and her evaluation of Alice’s/Bob’s noise voltages. We then explore the unilateral situation in which Eve has partial knowledge of only Alice’s RNG thus only those noises (of Alice and Eve) are correlated. In this situation, Eve can still crack the secure key bit, but for sufficiently low error probability, she needs to use the whole bit exchange period for the attack. The security of the KLJN key exchange scheme, similarly to other protocols, necessitates that the RNG outputs are truly random for Eve.

arXiv:2110.03088•Fluctuation and Noise Letters•Feb 25, 2022•8 citations

Quantum random number generators and their use in cryptography

Mario Stipčević

International Convention on Information and Communication Technology, Electronics and Microelectronics•Jan 1, 2011•0 citations

Investigating the Behavior of Classical Pseudorandom Number Generators on the qBraid Quantum Platform

Madhav Verma, Areeba Khan, Sumitra +2 more

This paper investigates the execution of classical pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) on quantum hardware, focusing on their behavior within the qBraid quantum computing platform. Although classical PRNGs such as the Mersenne Twister, LCG, and Blum-Blum-Shub are well-established in cryptographic and simulation applications, their operation in quantum environments has remained largely unexamined. This paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of their statistical and cryptographic performance under quantum-specific constraints, including qubit decoherence, gate noise, and circuit-level errors. The selected PRNGs are modeled and visualized using quantum circuit abstractions, then evaluated for output randomness using NIST SP 800-22 tests and distributional fidelity against uniform and gamma laws. The results reveal varying degrees of robustness among generators when subjected to quantum noise, offering insights into their suitability for hybrid quantum-classical systems. Additionally, their effectiveness is tested in an applied scenario of image encryption, demonstrating the real-world implications of quantum-induced randomness deviations. These findings lay the foundation for designing quantum-aware pseudorandom number generation strategies essential for secure and efficient quantum era applications.

IEEE International Conference on Green Industrial Electronics and Sustainable Technologies (GIEST)•Oct 11, 2025•0 citations
This paper introduces and demonstrates two new attacks against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme. The attacks are based on random number generators with compromised security. First we explore the situation in which Eve knows the seed of both Alice's and Bob's random number generators. We show that in this situation Eve can crack the secure key bit within a fraction of the bit exchange period even if her current and voltage measurements have only a single bit of resolution. In the second attack, we explore the situation in which Eve knows the seed of only Alice's random number generator. We show that in this situation Eve can still crack the secure key bit but she needs to use the whole bit exchange period for the attack. The security of the KLJN key exchange scheme, similarly to other protocols, necessitates that the random number generator outputs are truly random for Eve.
This paper introduces and demonstrates four new statistical attacks against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme. The attacks utilize compromised random number generators (RNGs) at Alice’s/Bob’s site(s). The case of partial correlations between Alice’s/Bob’s and Eve’s probing noises is explored, that is, Eve’s knowledge of Alice’s and Bob’s noises is limited but not zero. We explore the bilateral situation where Eve has partial knowledge of Alice’s and Bob’s RNGs. It is shown that in this situation Eve can crack the secure key bit by taking the highest cross-correlation between her probing noises and the measured voltage noise in the wire. She can also crack the secure key bit by taking the highest cross-correlation between her noise voltages and her evaluation of Alice’s/Bob’s noise voltages. We then explore the unilateral situation in which Eve has partial knowledge of only Alice’s RNG thus only those noises (of Alice and Eve) are correlated. In this situation, Eve can still crack the secure key bit, but for sufficiently low error probability, she needs to use the whole bit exchange period for the attack. The security of the KLJN key exchange scheme, similarly to other protocols, necessitates that the RNG outputs are truly random for Eve.
This paper investigates the execution of classical pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) on quantum hardware, focusing on their behavior within the qBraid quantum computing platform. Although classical PRNGs such as the Mersenne Twister, LCG, and Blum-Blum-Shub are well-established in cryptographic and simulation applications, their operation in quantum environments has remained largely unexamined. This paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of their statistical and cryptographic performance under quantum-specific constraints, including qubit decoherence, gate noise, and circuit-level errors. The selected PRNGs are modeled and visualized using quantum circuit abstractions, then evaluated for output randomness using NIST SP 800-22 tests and distributional fidelity against uniform and gamma laws. The results reveal varying degrees of robustness among generators when subjected to quantum noise, offering insights into their suitability for hybrid quantum-classical systems. Additionally, their effectiveness is tested in an applied scenario of image encryption, demonstrating the real-world implications of quantum-induced randomness deviations. These findings lay the foundation for designing quantum-aware pseudorandom number generation strategies essential for secure and efficient quantum era applications.