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Routledge eBooks

Minimalist ontology and dynamical structure in classical and quantum mechanics

Michaël Esfeld, Dirk-André Deckert, Dustin Lazarovici, Andréa Oldofredi, Antonio Vassallo

Published Oct 25, 2017• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The Super-Humean strategy is a purely philosophical one: in a nutshell, on this strategy, there is a relationalist ontology, but a non-relationalist physical theory. When it comes to quantum mechanics, a discussion of ontology makes sense only if one spells out to which version of the quantum mechanics one is committed—that is, how one solves the measurement problem. The quantum theory going back to de Broglie and D. Bohm is the most prominent of them. It is based on a primitive ontology of permanent point particles as in the classical mechanics. The dynamical structure that a physical theory introduces is in any case defined for the universe as a whole. For instance, as soon as there are dynamical parameters whose value is conserved throughout the universe—such as the total energy—there are global correlations in the motions of the matter points.

DOI
10.4324/9781315142272-3

Related papers

Introduction

Michaël Esfeld, Dirk-André Deckert, Dustin Lazarovici +2 more

This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book explores the minimalist ontology of matter points and their dynamics in general philosophical as well as mathematical terms, independently of any particular physical theory. It shows how this ontology fits both classical mechanics of gravitation and quantum mechanics, as long as the latter includes a primitive ontology of matter distributed in ordinary space, as in Bohmian mechanics. The book points out the similarities between these two theories as well as their differences. It explains how in both cases one gets from an ontology and a dynamics defined for the universe as a whole to a description of subsystems of the universe and a dynamics for them. The book shows how an ontology of persisting particles that move according to a deterministic law can explain the characteristic phenomena of quantum field theory and ground its empirical predictions.

Routledge eBooks•Oct 25, 2017•0 citations

Quantum Humeanism,or: physicalism without properties

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In recent literature, it has become clear that quantum physics does not refute Humeanism. This point has so far been made with respect to Bohms quantum theory. Against this background, this paper seeks to achieve the following four results: to generalize the option of quantum Humeanism from Bohmian mechanics to primitive ontology theories in general, to show that this option applies also to classical mechanics, to establish that it requires a commitment to matter as primitive stuff, but no commitment to natural properties (physicalism without properties, to point out that by removing the commitment to properties, the stock metaphysical objections against Humeanism from quidditism and humility no longer apply. In that way, quantum physics strengthens Humeanism instead of refuting it.

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The paper points out that the modern formulation of Bohm's quantum theory known as Bohmian mechanics is committed only to particles' positions and a law of motion. We explain how this view can avoid the open questions that the traditional view faces according to which Bohm's theory is committed to a wave-function that is a physical entity over and above the particles, although it is defined on configuration space instead of three-dimensional space. We then enquire into the status of the law of motion, elaborating on how the main philosophical options to ground a law of motion, namely Humeanism and dispositionalism, can be applied to Bohmian mechanics. In conclusion, we sketch out how these options apply to primitive ontology approaches to quantum mechanics in general.

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As far as classical physics is concerned, it is possible to trace causal relations between physical objects (i.e. particles in this case) back to intrinsic properties of these objects (such as their mass and charge). On this view, causal relations turn out to be internal instead of external relations, supervening on intrinsic properties of the relata (as proposed by Heil and Lowe). However, one can raise doubts about this view already in Newtonian mechanics. The decisive blow to this view comes from quantum physics, with Bell’s theorem proving that no dynamics based on local, intrinsic properties of quantum objects can yield the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics. Nonetheless, quantum entanglement by no means implies that we have to abandon an ontology of objects (i.e. substances such as particles) in favour of an ontology of structures (as claimed by French and Ladyman). Any of the known proposals for a quantum ontology of matter in space-time is committed to objects. However, on any of these proposals, what determines the dynamics of these objects are not local, intrinsic properties, but a global or holistic property instantiated by all the objects together – that is, a structure that takes all the objects in the universe as its relata. The view set out in this paper thus amounts to combining ontic structural realism with an ontology of objects that can be conceived as substances. This suggestion is illustrated by drawing on the ontology of quantum physics worked out by Bohm and Bell. 1.

•Aug 29, 2013•25 citations

The Ontology of Bohmian Mechanics

Michaël Esfeld, Mario Hubert, Dustin Lazarovici +1 more

The article points out that the modern formulation of Bohm’s quantum theory, known as Bohmian mechanics, is committed only to particles’ positions and a law of motion. We explain how this view can avoid the open questions that the traditional view faces, according to which Bohm’s theory is committed to a wave-function that is a physical entity over and above the particles, although it is defined on configuration space instead of three-dimensional space. We then enquire into the status of the law of motion, elaborating on how the main philosophical options to ground a law of motion, namely Humeanism and dispositionalism, can be applied to Bohmian mechanics. In conclusion, we sketch out how these options apply to primitive ontology approaches to quantum mechanics in general. 1 Introduction2 What is the Ontological Status of the Wave-Function?3 Humeanism about Laws4 Laws Grounded in Dispositions5 Advantages of Dispositionalism6 Conclusion

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science•Sep 21, 2013•165 citations
The Super-Humean strategy is a purely philosophical one: in a nutshell, on this strategy, there is a relationalist ontology, but a non-relationalist physical theory. When it comes to quantum mechanics, a discussion of ontology makes sense only if one spells out to which version of the quantum mechanics one is committed—that is, how one solves the measurement problem. The quantum theory going back to de Broglie and D. Bohm is the most prominent of them. It is based on a primitive ontology of permanent point particles as in the classical mechanics. The dynamical structure that a physical theory introduces is in any case defined for the universe as a whole. For instance, as soon as there are dynamical parameters whose value is conserved throughout the universe—such as the total energy—there are global correlations in the motions of the matter points.
This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book explores the minimalist ontology of matter points and their dynamics in general philosophical as well as mathematical terms, independently of any particular physical theory. It shows how this ontology fits both classical mechanics of gravitation and quantum mechanics, as long as the latter includes a primitive ontology of matter distributed in ordinary space, as in Bohmian mechanics. The book points out the similarities between these two theories as well as their differences. It explains how in both cases one gets from an ontology and a dynamics defined for the universe as a whole to a description of subsystems of the universe and a dynamics for them. The book shows how an ontology of persisting particles that move according to a deterministic law can explain the characteristic phenomena of quantum field theory and ground its empirical predictions.
In recent literature, it has become clear that quantum physics does not refute Humeanism. This point has so far been made with respect to Bohms quantum theory. Against this background, this paper seeks to achieve the following four results: to generalize the option of quantum Humeanism from Bohmian mechanics to primitive ontology theories in general, to show that this option applies also to classical mechanics, to establish that it requires a commitment to matter as primitive stuff, but no commitment to natural properties (physicalism without properties, to point out that by removing the commitment to properties, the stock metaphysical objections against Humeanism from quidditism and humility no longer apply. In that way, quantum physics strengthens Humeanism instead of refuting it.
In the recent literature, it has become clear that quantum physics does not refute Humeanism: Lewis's thesis of Humean supervenience can be literally true even in the light of quantum entanglement. This point has so far been made with respect to Bohm's quantum theory. Against this background, this paper seeks to achieve the following four results: (1) to generalize the option of quantum Humeanism from Bohmian mechanics to primitive ontology theories in general; (2) to show that this option applies also to classical mechanics; (3) to establish that it requires a commitment to matter as primitive stuff, but no commitment to natural properties (physicalism without properties); (4) to point out that by removing the commitment to properties, the stock metaphysical objections against Humeanism from quidditism and humility no longer apply. In that way, quantum physics strengthens Humeanism instead of refuting it.
The paper points out that the modern formulation of Bohm's quantum theory known as Bohmian mechanics is committed only to particles' positions and a law of motion. We explain how this view can avoid the open questions that the traditional view faces according to which Bohm's theory is committed to a wave-function that is a physical entity over and above the particles, although it is defined on configuration space instead of three-dimensional space. We then enquire into the status of the law of motion, elaborating on how the main philosophical options to ground a law of motion, namely Humeanism and dispositionalism, can be applied to Bohmian mechanics. In conclusion, we sketch out how these options apply to primitive ontology approaches to quantum mechanics in general.
As far as classical physics is concerned, it is possible to trace causal relations between physical objects (i.e. particles in this case) back to intrinsic properties of these objects (such as their mass and charge). On this view, causal relations turn out to be internal instead of external relations, supervening on intrinsic properties of the relata (as proposed by Heil and Lowe). However, one can raise doubts about this view already in Newtonian mechanics. The decisive blow to this view comes from quantum physics, with Bell’s theorem proving that no dynamics based on local, intrinsic properties of quantum objects can yield the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics. Nonetheless, quantum entanglement by no means implies that we have to abandon an ontology of objects (i.e. substances such as particles) in favour of an ontology of structures (as claimed by French and Ladyman). Any of the known proposals for a quantum ontology of matter in space-time is committed to objects. However, on any of these proposals, what determines the dynamics of these objects are not local, intrinsic properties, but a global or holistic property instantiated by all the objects together – that is, a structure that takes all the objects in the universe as its relata. The view set out in this paper thus amounts to combining ontic structural realism with an ontology of objects that can be conceived as substances. This suggestion is illustrated by drawing on the ontology of quantum physics worked out by Bohm and Bell. 1.
The article points out that the modern formulation of Bohm’s quantum theory, known as Bohmian mechanics, is committed only to particles’ positions and a law of motion. We explain how this view can avoid the open questions that the traditional view faces, according to which Bohm’s theory is committed to a wave-function that is a physical entity over and above the particles, although it is defined on configuration space instead of three-dimensional space. We then enquire into the status of the law of motion, elaborating on how the main philosophical options to ground a law of motion, namely Humeanism and dispositionalism, can be applied to Bohmian mechanics. In conclusion, we sketch out how these options apply to primitive ontology approaches to quantum mechanics in general. 1 Introduction2 What is the Ontological Status of the Wave-Function?3 Humeanism about Laws4 Laws Grounded in Dispositions5 Advantages of Dispositionalism6 Conclusion