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Journal of Information and Optimization Sciences

Cryptanalysis of olimid’s group key transfer protocol based on secret sharing

Priyanka Jaiswal, Sachin Tripathi

Published Apr 10, 2018• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In 2013, Olimid proposed an improved version of the group key transfer protocol based on secret sharing, and she claimed that her proposed protocol removes the security flaws of Sun et al.,’s group key transfer protocol. However, our analysis shows that the improved Olimid’s protocol is still have some other security flaws and vulnerable to outsider and insider attack.

DOI
10.1080/02522667.2017.1292655

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In 2013, Olimid proposed an improved version of the group key transfer protocol based on secret sharing, and she claimed that her proposed protocol removes the security flaws of Sun et al.,’s group key transfer protocol. However, our analysis shows that the improved Olimid’s protocol is still have some other security flaws and vulnerable to outsider and insider attack.
Group Key Transfer (GKT) protocols allow multiple parties to share a common secret key: a trusted Key Generation Center (KGC) selects a uniformly random value that has never been used before and securely distributes it to the legitimate principals. The paper restricts to GKT based on secret sharing; it briefly reviews the security goals and the existing formal security models. We motivate our work by the lack of GKT protocols based on secret sharing that are proved secure in a formal security model. Most of the recent proposals only provide informal and incomplete arguments to claim security, which makes them susceptible to known vulnerabilities. We support our affirmation by exemplifying with three different types of attacks (replay attack, insider attack and known key attack) mounted against protocols published within the last three years. We emphasize that none of these attacks would have been possible against a GKT protocol proved secure in a usual formal security model.
In 2008, Gang Yao et al. proposed an authenticated 3-round identity-based group key agreement protocol, which is based on Burmester and Desmedt’s protocol proposed at Eurocrypt 94. However, their protocol can only prevent passive attack. If the active attack is allowed, the protocol is vulnerable and an internal attacker can forge her neighbor’s keying material. It is obvious that the protocol do not achieve the aim of authentication. In this paper, we discuss the flaws to attack this protocol and propose an enhanced provably-secure protocol based on their protocol. At last, we make a detailed security analysis of our enhanced authenticated identity-based group key agreement protocol.